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Abstract 
 
The thesis evaluates the Christian worldviews of two theologians, Jürgen 
Moltmann and Sergei Bulgakov, with the purpose of constructing a relevant 
theology of hope for the 21st century.  The working definition of hope used in 
this thesis is that hope arises because there is some correspondence between 
the human will to live and the world that sustains and supports humanity.  It 
follows that if humans can find no correspondence between the world and 
themselves then hopelessness arises.  Increasing signs of alienation in society 
may stem from viewing the world as a meaningless place, or from viewing 
human life as meaningless, or both.  Within these parameters of meaning, a 
theology of hope needs to encompass a purpose for both human life and the 
world.  Jürgen Moltmann, a western Protestant theologian of the second half 
of the twentieth century, has based his life work on the theme of hope.  Hope 
is to be found in God’s promise to humanity of a future in which God will be 
all in all.  God, and only God, may be relied upon to save sinful humanity 
come what may.  In contrast, Sergei Bulgakov, an eastern Orthodox 
theologian of the first half of the twentieth century, rarely speaks of hope.  Yet 
Bulgakov offers a worldview in which humanity has an ontological place in 
the world, which he calls God’s divine Wisdom (Sophia).  God’s relationship 
to the world is based on providential interaction, not omnipotence, because 
God has created the world with its own being.  Humanity’s actions as co-
workers with God have significance in the world’s future.  Because of the 
foundation of goodness in the world, these cumulative actions may be relied 
upon to contribute to the positive future of the world when God will, indeed, 
be all in all.  I present Bulgakov’s sophiology as a more relevant theology of 
hope in the world today because there is an intimate correspondence between 
the human will to live, and therefore hope, and the world which is created to 
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Each person is an architect, building a framework of reference from the 
available materials of existence, both visible and invisible.  We are first given 
the building blocks of life by heredity, the circumstances of birth and the 
surrounding society and environment.  We continue to be framed by 
personal experiences and relationships, in short, by our whole inner and 
outer world.  As we grow into adulthood we construct an ever-changing 
worldview that enables us to understand our world and our place in it.  It is 
largely unseen and unconscious yet it strongly influences how we think and 
act.  As we mature we can become more conscious of our worldview and on 
how it affects our own lives, the lives of those we interact with and the 
world around us.   
Although each person has his or her own worldview, it is primarily shaped 
by a larger societal worldview.  The major paradigm that has shaped 
societies in advanced industrial nations is the scientific worldview.  Over the 
last few centuries the scientific revolution has changed the way many of the 
peoples of the world think about that world.  A key belief in a modern 
scientific worldview is that the universe, life and humanity exist by chance.1  
The perspective that there is no intrinsic meaning to human existence and 
that each person is just one small blip in an endless and expanding universe 
can be a frightening and depressing one.2  Another premise concerns the 
way human beings gain knowledge of the world.  In the scientific 
                                                 
1 Malcolm Hollick, The Science of Oneness: A Worldview for the Twenty-First Century 
(Winchester, New York: O Books, 2006), 162. 
2 Studies in psychology support the link between meaning, emotions and coping strategies.  
See, for example, Shelley E. Taylor et al., "Psychological Resources, Positive Illusions, and 
Health," American Psychologist 55, no. 1 (2000): 99-109.     2  
worldview, objective science is the means to true knowledge.3  The universe 
is comprised of matter or energy and we understand the world by studying 
its smallest components.4   This belief in the subject/object distinction has 
effectively separated humanity from the world around us.  The sense of 
alienation or otherness coupled with a failure to value whole systems could 
be the root cause of the many environmental problems in the world today.  
Feelings of separateness could even be the basis of many other inhuman acts 
which result in war, famine, poverty, and so on.  Of course, these are broad 
generalizations yet there is no denying that the world is in crisis.  Malcolm 
Hollick proposes that nothing less than radical change in our understanding 
of the universe and of the meaning and purpose of life will lead to a better 
future.5   
To this end I seek to contribute to a worldview that offers a different 
understanding of the universe, one that challenges notions of chance and 
meaninglessness.  The worldview that I wish to construct begins from the 
whole instead of the parts yet also gives an intrinsic meaning and purpose to 
life, both at an individual and personal level and a universal level.  This is a 
thesis about hope and meaning.  It considers that each person can be the 
conscious architect of his or her own worldview.  We are given the building 
blocks and we may also be constructive, taking what we need from the 
world to make sense of our lives.  My own framework is a Christian one 
therefore I seek a Christian worldview which offers a sense of meaning and 
purpose in my life.  I also seek an inclusive worldview which respects all 
people and all life on this earth that we share.  I look for hope and meaning 
because they appear to be rare and wonderful commodities at a time when 
                                                 
3 Hollick, Science of Oneness, 9. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 1.   3  
fear and mistrust are sown by those in power.6  My specific interest in this 
dissertation is in what kind of Christian worldview is needed to help one 
live an affirming, hopeful and constructive life in a changing, conflicted 
world.   
I will describe and assess two particular Christian worldviews, one eastern 
and one western, with an overarching question of hope: can a Christian-
based eschatological hope in the future be the basis of personal hope in life 
on earth now?  I examine the worldviews of two theologians, a western 
perspective from Jürgen Moltmann and an eastern perspective from Sergei 
Bulgakov.  One theologian is German Protestant, writing in the second half 
of the 20th century and into the 21st; the other, Russian Orthodox, writing in 
the first half of the 20th century.  Each theologian experienced times of great 
political and social turmoil in their countries of origin.  Their work can be 
seen as explorations into meaning in their own lives and the world around 
them.  Thus, the thesis examines and compares and contrasts the work of 
these two theologians from a perspective of hope and meaning.  The thesis 
also presents a broad convergence of ideas in these two theologians, where 
east meets west enriching and vitalizing each other.7  Taking aspects from 
both worldviews as well as adding personal reflections I construct my own 
worldview as an example of a personal position of hope.  My overall 
intention is to bring a sense of Christian hope into purposeful life in the here 
and now.  My thesis is that a worldview which gives humanity a meaningful 
place in the world is more likely to engender hope in the future.  Hope in the 
                                                 
6 For example, former Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, comments on the 
atmosphere of fear used by the U.S. government, particularly after the events of September 
11, 1999, to have neo-conservative policies passed which led to the “War on Terror.”   
Malcolm Fraser, "Torture Team: Human Rights, Lawyers, Interrogations and the 'War on 
Terror' - a Response to Philippe Sands," Melbourne Journal of International Law 9, no. 2 (2008). 
7 The terminology “east” and “west” will be used in a general sense in this thesis to 
distinguish between the Orthodox churches and their theologies and the Roman Catholic 
and Protestant churches and their theologies.   4  
future, in turn, motivates and activates one to work towards the change that 
is needful in the 21st century.   
Hope as a subject in its own right has been defined by many disciplines, 
including psychology, philosophy, sociology and theology.  I will not give 
an extensive treatment of hope in this dissertation but offer some framework 
here on how hope may be understood in its relationship to meaning.  Hope 
is a fundamental human affect.  It has been described as ‘the wager that 
there is some correspondence between this human will to live and the world 
which supports and sustains life.’8  This is a daring wager but it forms the 
basic presupposition for this thesis.  Even against all evidence to the contrary 
hope moves our human will presupposing that life is somehow worthwhile.  
Without hope the will is paralysed.  I suggest that despair and hopelessness 
arise when the world is seen as alien and one feels disconnected from it.  In 
that case making the connection between humanity and the world restores 
hope and the will to live and moves one to work positively in the world.  
Studies in behavioural psychology support these contentions.  People who 
are more hopeful have the ability to create successful pathways in their lives 
so that life is experienced in a qualitatively more positive way.9  Faith and 
hope have also been positively linked.  Religious thought lends itself to 
positive expectations, including expectations about greater concerns such as 
the future of humanity.10 Actively religious North American people are more 
likely to live longer, happier and healthier lives.11  Conversely, there is a 
                                                 
8 Michael J. Scanlon, "Hope," in The New Dictionary of Theology, ed. Joseph Komonchak, Mary 
Collins, and Dermot A. Lane (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan Ltd, 1989), 493. 
9 C. R. Snyder, "Hope and Optimism," in Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, ed. V. S. 
Ramachandran (San Diego: Academic Press, Inc., 1994), 536-8. 
10 Christopher Peterson, "The Future of Optimism," American Psychologist 55, no. 1 (2000): 49. 
11 David G. Myers, "The Funds, Friends, and Faith of Happy People," American Psychologist 
55, no. 1 (2000): 63.  See also H. G. Koenig, Is Religion Good for Your Health? The Effects of 
Religion on Physical and Mental Illness (Binghampton, N.Y.: Haworth Press, 1997), 97.   5  
well-documented relationship between hopelessness, depression and self-
harm.12 
Hope and meaning may have an intimate connection both at a personal level 
and an extended, universal level.  We can cultivate hope in our own lives 
and also have hope for the future of the world.  Many religious worldviews 
encompass both.  Already in the Christian tradition we find the importance 
of a hope that is both personal and encompasses the future of the world.  
Augustine was the first Christian writer to elaborate on the virtues of faith, 
hope and love, famously inscribed in 1 Cor. 13: 13: “And now faith, hope, 
and love abide, these three; and the greatest of all is love.”  Augustine and 
later Aquinas describe the theological virtues of faith, hope and love as 
operative faculties for the sanctification of the human soul.  Each person is a 
homo viator, journeying through life with one’s aim fixed on God.  In 
Augustine’s thought, the path has been sanctified by Christ through the 
Passion and resurrection: 
Through the compassion of love He is here, through the hope of love 
we are there. “For we are saved by hope” (Rom 8:24). Because our hope 
is certain. Although it refers to what is to come, we are described as 
though hope had already reached fruition.13 
Aquinas equates hope with the Holy Spirit as well as Christ.  On the one 
hand, Christ sets an example ‘so that they will understand that the path to 
redemption goes through suffering.’14  On the other hand, the Spirit helps  
first against the evil which disturbs peace, since peace is disturbed by 
adversities.  But with regard to adversities the Holy Spirit perfects 
                                                 
12 See, for example, R. R. Holden, "Hopelessness," in Encyclopedia of Psychology, ed. Raymond 
J. Corsini (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994), 156. 
13 Augustine, Homilies on the Psalms, Psalm 122, 1, in Augustine, Augustine of Hippo: Selected 
Writings, ed. John Farina, trans. Mary T. Clark, Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1984). 
14 Aquinas, Collationes Credo in Deum, sec. 6, in Eleonore Stump, "Aquinas on the Sufferings 
of Job," in Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. 
Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 353.    6  
[us] through patience, which enables [us] to bear adversities 
patiently… Secondly, against the evil which arrests joy, namely, the 
wait for what is loved.  To this evil, the Spirit opposes long-suffering, 
which is not broken by the waiting.15   
Difficulties are a part of life but the Spirit comforts and guides us.  Yet as 
Eleonore Stump suggests, Christianity does not call people to a life of self-
denying misery but to a life of joy even in the midst of pain and trouble.16  
Without joy, Aquinas says, ‘no progress is possible in the Christian life.’17  
The Holy Spirit ‘confirms our hope in eternal life,’ ‘counsels us in our 
perplexities about the will of God’ and ‘brings us to the will of God.’18  Here 
hope is also correlated with not knowing.  There are times when faith alone 
must be the source of hope.   
The connection between hope and meaning can be correlated to hope and 
faith.  It can be difficult to distinguish between the concepts of faith and 
hope.  If hope is hope for one’s salvation as Paul suggests (cf. Col. 1: 5) then 
it appears to be a matter of faith, a belief that one will be saved.  Both 
Aquinas and later Luther distinguish faith and hope on the basis of 
understanding and will.  In Aquinas’ thought, faith has a cognitional 
character.19  It is a recognition of God’s revelation in Christ.  Hope is 
volitional, part of the human will.20  L u t h e r  c o n c u r s :  ‘ f a i t h  c o n s i s t s  i n  a  
person’s understanding, hope in the will.’21  Faith for Luther is also 
                                                 
15 Aquinas, Super ad Galatos, chap. 5, lec. 6. 
16 Stump, "Aquinas on Job," 354. 
17 Aquinas, Super ad Philippenses, chap. 4, lec. 1. Cited in Ibid.   
18 Aquinas, Collationes Credo in Deum, sec 11. In  Ibid., 351. 
19 Aquinas, S.T. 2a2ae. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Volume 33: Hope (2a2æ. 17-22), 
trans. W. J. Hill, 60 vols., vol. 33, Summa Theologiae (London: Blackfriars, 1966). 
20 Aquinas, S.T. 2a2ae. 
21 Martin Luther, Table-Talk (Translator: William Hazlitt) [eBook] (Christian Classics Ethereal 
Library, 2008 [cited June 2008]); available from 
 http://0www.netlibrary.com.prospero.murdoch.edu.au/Reader/. CCXCVII.   7  
connected to absolute trust in God.22  I n  Table-Talk  Luther describes the 
elements of both faith and hope and thus distinguishes faith in 
understanding from hope in the will.  Faith precedes hope and is needed to 
teach right hope.  Faith ‘indites, distinguishes, and teaches, and is the 
knowledge and the acknowledgement; hope admonishes, awakens, hears, 
expects, and suffers.’23  Faith ‘fights against errors and heresies; it proves 
and judges spirits and doctrines.  But hope strives against troubles and 
vexations, and among the evil it expects good.’24  Faith is ‘a gift from God.’25  
Hope is ‘the courage and joyfulness in divinity [and] an elevation of the 
heart and mind...hope endures and overcomes misfortune.’26  The meaning 
that comes from faith is the inspiration for hope.  In both Aquinas and 
Luther hope is an important part of the relationship with God for the homo 
viator, a positive, enlivening feeling which opens the heart for love, the 
highest of all feelings.  Hope, based on faith, motivates the will to act in the 
world and both enlivens and encourages the heart and the mind.  Hope 
gives courage and joy.  Hope gives endurance and the power to strive to 
overcome difficulties.   
The theological understandings of faith and hope offered by Augustine, 
Aquinas and Luther support the correlation between hope and meaning that 
is the basis of this dissertation.  Meaning, or faith, supports and inspires 
hope.  The second supposition is that there is some correspondence between 
the hope that arises in the human will and the world which supports and 
sustains life.  I propose that such a correspondence is necessary for any 
                                                 
22 Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther,  t r a n s .  R o b e r t  C .  S c hultz (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1966), 44.  Cf. Martin Luther Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar, 1883), 
30, 133. 
23 Luther, Table-Talk ([cited). 
24 Ibid.([cited). 
25 Ibid.([cited). 
26 Ibid.([cited).   8  
worldview that encompasses hope.  A theology of hope then should 
demonstrate a positive connection between God, humanity and the world so 
that human hope is purposeful.  The meaning that is the basis of hope would 
then be that there is a purpose for both human life and the world.  These are 
the parameters of meaning I will be using when examining the worldviews 
of Jürgen Moltmann and Sergei Bulgakov. 
Hope is important yet not as important as faith and love in the writings of 
Augustine, Aquinas and Luther.  There will be no extensive theology of 
hope until Jürgen Moltmann’s work in the 20th century.  Moltmann began his 
extensive body of work with Theology of Hope in the 1960’s.  He united hope 
and eschatology, basing hope in God’s promise to us for the future.  Since 
then he has explored various areas of Christian theology and his worldview 
will be examined to understand how Moltmann comprehends God, the 
cosmos and humanity’s place within it.  In contrast Sergei Bulgakov in his 
own wide-ranging body of work rarely mentions the concept of hope.   
Bulgakov developed a system which gives God’s Wisdom (Gk. Sophia) an 
intrinsic place within God, the cosmos and humanity.  Because of 
humanity’s integral place within the cosmos I propose that Bulgakov’s 
sophiology is an implicit theology of hope.  Bulgakov is an architect of hope 
because he has constructed a worldview of wholeness and meaning.   
Moltmann and Bulgakov share some similarities as well as differences in 
their worldviews.  For both the triune God is intimately connected with the 
created world.  Hope is based in a certain future with God in the eschaton.  
On the path of the homo viator Christ is the exemplar and the Spirit is, as also 
noted in Aquinas, the source of joy amidst suffering.  The crucial difference 
in the theologies of Moltmann and Bulgakov concerns how God interacts 
with creation.  In Moltmann’s theology God is the active subject of the world 
and is the power of salvation.  Through Christ God takes the world of sin   9  
into the godself’s being.27  The power of the resurrection is a sign of God’s 
promise that God will also act in the future to overcome the sin in all of 
creation.  In Bulgakov’s thought God’s relationship to the world is based on 
providential interaction, not omnipotence, because God has created the 
world with its own being.  Humanity’s actions as co-workers with God have 
significance in the world’s future.  Because of the foundation of goodness in 
the world these cumulative actions may be relied upon to contribute to the 
positive future of the world when God will, indeed, be all in all.   
I will argue in this thesis that hope in the 21st century must reside in more 
than God alone. It is time to renew our hope in humanity, knowing the faith 
God has in us and knowing that humanity is created for the highest possible 
spiritual destiny.   Bulgakov’s theology returns humanity to its place as an 
agency of change and transformation in the cosmos revealing the inherent 
wisdom of creation.  Hope in humanity is also about developing trust in our 
fellow human beings.  Relationships are the fertile ground where hope and 
trust develop in mutual enrichment.  Relationships include those with other 
living beings, both spiritual and earthly.  Moltmann’s theology reminds us 
that there is a time for challenging the injustices of the world and that there 
is a time for stillness, for being “at one” with all of creation.  Taken together 
the two theologies create a worldview where meaning is ultimately about 
human responsibility for its own world.  
I will now introduce each theologian more fully together with the influences 
which have helped them shape their respective worldviews.  Each chapter of 
the thesis will also be summarized and situated within the thesis as a whole.  
Some parameters of the dissertation will be given in where it follows on 
                                                 
27 A note on inclusive language.  I use the term “godself” as a non-gender specific pronoun 
for God in this thesis.  I will also alter quotes wherever possible to use inclusive language.    10  
from my contemporaries and in where it offers a unique juxtaposition of two 
theologians from very different backgrounds. 
     11  
Jürgen Moltmann 
Jürgen Moltmann (born 1926, Hamburg, Germany) has been described as 
‘the most important German-speaking Protestant theologian since the 
Second World War.’28  He has been a prolific writer and his books have sold 
in large numbers and been translated into many European and Asian 
languages.  It is worth mentioning some of the key life experiences that have 
shaped his theology since these all contribute to his worldview.  Moltmann 
had a secular upbringing.  His early interest in mathematics and physics 
changed to theology as a result of his war experiences.  As a prisoner of war 
in Scotland he learnt of German atrocities in the prison camps of Bergen-
Belsen and Auschwitz and experienced the horror and shame of being a 
German soldier.  A life-changing event occurred when, having been given a 
Bible by an army chaplain, he discovered the psalms of lament as well as the 
cry of Jesus from the cross: “My God, why have you forsaken me?” In The 
Source of Life he writes, ‘I knew with certainty: this is someone who 
understands you…the divine brother in distress, who takes the prisoners 
with him on his way to resurrection.  I began to summon up the courage to 
live again, seized by a great hope…this early fellowship with Jesus, the 
brother in suffering and the redeemer from guilt, has never left me since.’29  
We will especially encounter this motif of finding God in godforsakenness in 
Moltmann’s christology, the subject of Chapter 2. 
A second important experience in the prisoner of war camp was Moltmann’s 
encounter with the ecumenical movement towards reconciliation.  A group 
of Christian Dutch students spoke of Christ as the bridge through which 
they could bring themselves to speak to the prisoners.  Moltmann recalls that 
                                                 
28 Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 
trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 12.  Moltmann 
29 Jürgen Moltmann, The Source of Life: The Holy Spirit and the Theology of Life, trans. Margaret 
Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 5.   12  
they spoke of their own wartime experiences, including the loss of Jewish 
friends, encounters with the Gestapo and the destruction of their homes.   
Moltmann realized that ‘we too could step on to this bridge which Christ 
had built from them to us, and could confess the guilt of our people and ask 
for reconciliation.’30  He experienced the power of confession and 
forgiveness and this example of Christian reconciliation in practice became 
an important motif in Moltmann’s own ecumenical drive.  However, 
although this initial feeling of reconciliation was through a human vehicle 
Moltmann’s theology of hope is firmly centred on God’s and not humanity’s 
capacity for reconciliation.   
The last experience relevant to his worldview that I will mention is the guilt 
of the survivor.  Moltmann survived a firebombing in Hamburg in 1943 
while his friend standing next to him was killed.  In his first turn towards 
God, he cried out “My God, where are you?” and later he says, ‘the question 
“Why am I not dead too?” has haunted me ever since.’31  G o d  c a m e  t o  
Moltmann out of the horror, misery and darkness of war and he felt that 
survival was not just a gift but a responsibility.  As a pastor and theologian 
Moltmann has lived his life in God’s service and in thanksgiving.  From 1966 
he held a chair of Reformed theology at Tübingen University for 25 years.  
His dialectical theology, however, has its roots in his early life-changing 
experiences of the extremes of despair and hope, of shame and forgiveness, 
and the witnessing of death and life.  The metaphor of Christ as the bridge 
mentioned above has remained elusive in Moltmann’s theology.  It is only in 
his later theology that some sense of reconciliation between the dark and the 
light or the human and the divine takes place.  
                                                 
30 Ibid., 6. Cited in Müller-Fahrenholz, Kingdom and Power, 18. 
31 Moltmann in Müller-Fahrenholz, Kingdom and Power.  Original quote in Moltmann, Source 
of Life, 2.   13  
Moltmann’s personal experiences of the world around him have continued 
to influence his theology.  Moltmann wrote about hope in the 60’s, the 
politics of suffering in the 70’s, ecology in the 80’s, and the turn to the Spirit 
in the 90’s.  Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz points out that it is Moltmann’s 
intention ‘to be recognized as a committed man of his day’32 and to dialogue 
with the issues of the times.  Chapters 1-3 assess Moltmann’s theology 
historically, that is, appraise the unfolding of his thought over four decades. 
The concerns of each decade are broadly summarized by four themes, each 
with significant publications.  They are hope and eschatology, (Theology of 
Hope, 196433), christology, (The Crucified God, 197434), creation, (God in 
Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, 198535) and pneumatology, 
(The Spirit of Life, 199236).  Two later works that reflect some changes to his 
earlier eschatology and christology are also included as major texts: The Way 
of Jesus Christ, 199037 and The Coming of God, 1996.38 
I will mostly be working with the English translations of Moltmann’s work 
and supplementing this with the original German when certain concepts 
need clarification or closer interpretation.  The themes represented by these 
works form Moltmann’s worldview. We have hope in this future because it 
is God’s promise to us.  The guarantee of this promise is Jesus Christ who is 
present to us through the cross and the resurrection.  The Spirit is God’s 
presence on earth, sharing both the joy and the suffering of existence.  One 
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34 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (London: SCM 
Press Ltd, 1974). 
35 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, trans. Margaret Kohl, 
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(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). 
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sees an elucidation of the basis of hope in all areas of Christian theology 
viewed through an eschatological lens.  In other words, Moltmann has 
“filled out” his original theological impulses with his work over the decades 
since Theology of Hope.  My intention in the three chapters on Moltmann is to 
offer a broad overview of his theology and to give an outline of his 
theological worldview.39  My focus is on those elements of his worldview 
which establish the relationship between God and the world and my aim is 
to determine any correspondence between God, the world and human hope.  
  
Chapter 1 of this dissertation, entitled “A theology of hope: the importance 
of hope,” begins with a synopsis of Moltmann’s earliest meditations on hope 
in Theology of Hope.  Moltmann presents eschatology as the central focus of 
his doctrine of Christian hope.  God’s promise of salvation is the source of 
hope.  The resurrection of Christ, which prefigures the new creation, changes 
the category of human history into one of God’s history.  The future is 
dialectically opposed to the present and the past so that reality will only be 
achieved in the future.  Hope informs Christian praxis by motivating both 
the church and the individual to challenge and revolutionize the present.   
Moltmann’s intent in Theology of Hope is to challenge the eschatological 
thinking in the theology of the preceding decades.  His first concern is to 
return eschatology to a central and contextual place within Christian 
theology.  Moltmann contends that the renewed interest in eschatology in 
Protestant thinking of the previous sixty years (that is, from the end of the 
nineteenth century) was been based in problematic forms of Greek thinking.  
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This has obscured the “real language” of eschatology.40  The transcendental 
eternity of Karl Barth, Bultmann’s existentialism and Kierkegaard’s eternal 
present all suffer, in Moltmann’s thinking, from a Greek notion of the logos 
as the epiphany of the eternal present.41  M o l t m a n n  c a l l s  t h i s  k i n d  o f  
thinking ‘transcendental eschatology.’42  He objects to its ahistoricity and to 
its definition of the transcendental self whereby human self-revelation lives 
in this realm of eternal revelation.   The future kingdom of God has little or 
no relationship to history or the world.  However, Moltmann’s resituating of 
eschatology in terms of God’s revelation falls into similar difficulties.   
Human history becomes subsumed into God’s history.  The world must be 
resisted in its godforsakenness until God resurrects all in the eschaton. 
Chapter 1 includes Moltmann’s later writings on hope.  Theology of Hope 
found an enthusiastic audience in the 60’s in an atmosphere of what 
Moltmann later described as an “outburst of hope.”43  But the world of the 
21st century is a different place.  Therefore chapter 1 also assesses whether 
Moltmann’s theology of hope was a product of the times or whether it still 
has relevance today.  In Moltmann’s later theology he attempts some 
reconciliation between God’s actions and the world.  Instead of the 
resurrection seen as an alien event and a contradiction it is seen as the path 
of the human spirit.  Spiritual growth is possible through the trials of the 
world.  There is some sense of a progressive revelation of the Spirit and 
some correspondence between this world and the future.  In terms of the 
dissertation this is important for a sense of hope in the world of today 
because it gives some reason for life on earth.  
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42 Moltmann, Hope, 45. 
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Chapter 2 of the dissertation is entitled “The Crucified God: suffering in the 
world.”  This chapter examines Moltmann’s christology and includes a 
synopsis of The Crucified God. Its purpose in terms of the overall dissertation 
is to establish where Moltmann situates hope in the face of suffering.  And 
this is Moltmann’s own purpose in this book: it is a response to the 
fundamental issue of theodicy— why is there suffering in the world?  His 
aim is to understand the crucified Christ in the context of the resurrection so 
that the crucifixion is central to humanity’s picture of freedom and hope.  He 
acknowledges that a theology of the cross is not obvious in his previous 
work, Theology of Hope, but asserts that it was the guiding light all along.44  
As Richard Bauckham points out, in this return to the centrality of the cross 
Moltmann is indebted to Luther and to his own Reformed tradition.45  He 
adopts Luther’s dialectical mode of theological thinking as well as Luther’s 
central thesis: Crux probat omnia (‘The cross is the criterion of all things’).46 
Moltmann cites his own influences as beginning with lectures by Hans 
Joachim Iwand, Ernst Wolf and Otto Weber in 1948/49 in Göttingen.  From a 
background of Reformation theology, these lectures centred theology 
around the crucifixion, ‘in the sight of the one who was abandoned and 
crucified.’47   Later influences in the 1960’s included the Second Vatican 
Council and the World Council of Church’s Uppsala Conference in 1968.  
These two events gave Moltmann hope that from the post-war criticism of 
church and theology new horizons could open up for society and the church.   
For Moltmann, ‘Whether or not Christianity, in an alienated, divided and 
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oppressive society, itself becomes alienated, divided and an accomplice of 
oppression, is ultimately decided only by whether the crucified Christ is a 
stranger to it or the Lord who determines the form of its existence.’48  
Theology becomes political in terms of resistance to alienation, division and 
oppression in the world.  In Moltmann’s desire to give a more profound 
dimension to his theology of hope he is aware that he is ‘following the same 
course as Johann Baptist Metz, who for several years has been associating his 
politically critical eschatology more and more closely with the “dangerous 
remembrance” of the suffering and death of Christ.’49  Moltmann sees a crisis 
of identity for the church and Christians which can only be alleviated by 
living into the world, that is, by moving into a ‘social and psychotherapeutic 
commitment.’50 
From these various influences, Moltmann frames his own christology.   
Chapter 2 gives a summary of this christology.  It examines Moltmann’s 
interpretation of the historical Jesus and his humanity and how Jesus in 
history becomes the resurrected Christ.  Moltmann is at pains to situate the 
cross of Jesus within the whole Trinity.  He is influenced by the Jewish 
theology of Abraham Heschel, in which ‘God is affected by events and 
human actions and suffering in history.’51 The cross is not just the suffering 
of God but also a protest against suffering.  The resurrection therefore 
represents an eschatological victory over suffering.  He proposes a kenotic 
model where humanity follows Christ ‘along the way of self-emptying into 
non-identity.’52  The way of praxis is determined by dialectic thought: he 
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50 Ibid., 13. 
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who was godforsaken is raised, therefore we also can identify with the 
godless and forsaken.   
Chapter 2 closes with a critique of Moltmann’s christology and discusses 
how successful Moltmann’s answer to theodicy is.  The problems of the 
divine/human divide remain in Moltmann’s christology and theodicy.   
Moltmann rejects the early doctrine of the two natures in Christ53 and 
reframes the crucifixion as an “event” between Father, Son and Spirit.  There 
is only one nature for Moltmann so that the human suffering of Jesus is 
shared by the Father and the Spirit.  God joins with the world and its history 
in this event but this does not mean that any reconciliation within the 
human world occurs.  Reconciliation is only possible as a divine feat of the 
eschaton. There is no correspondence to be found between the world itself 
and humanity except in its shared godforsakenness.  Yet God’s love has been 
revealed to humanity in the shared suffering of the cross and human praxis 
now means acting in solidarity with those who suffer.  Moltmann, however, 
has no answer for the presence of suffering or evil in the world.  
The final chapter on Moltmann’s theology is entitled “God in creation:   
humanity and ecology.” Chapter 3 examines Moltmann’s theology of 
creation in God’s relationship to the world and humanity’s relationship to 
the world.  Its purpose is to complete the picture of Moltmann’s systematic 
enterprise and revisit his theology of hope.  This chapter specifically focuses 
on two books: God in Creation and The Spirit of Life, but references several 
other works that give Moltmann’s later thoughts on eschatology and hope.  
Although this later theology appears to be almost a complete reversal of the 
theology discussed in the previous two chapters there are fundamental 
aspects that do not change.  God has joined with creation yet creation has no 
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purpose in its own right.  Humanity is not an agent of transformation 
towards the promised eschaton when God redeems all things.  Humanity, 
however, is given the relational model of the Trinity as its guide to overcome 
its natural perversity and continues to have a certain hope in the future. 
Moltmann’s aim in God in Creation is to forward a new theology of creation 
that addresses the modern ecological crisis.  His method is twofold.  He 
critically examines the historical unfolding of theological doctrines of 
creation in order to find the reasons for the current human understanding of 
the world.  Then, to form his own theology of creation, he takes positive 
aspects of these theologies of creation and combines them with an 
engagement with new, post critical scientific methods and ways of thinking.   
God in Creation represents a marked shift in Moltmann’s thinking.   
Humanity’s alienation from the world, previously seen as necessary in The 
Crucified God, is now seen in a negative light.  The world has changed from 
something that is condemned to pass away to one that needs saving.  The 
goal changes to peace with nature.  Moltmann now gives a comprehensive 
survey of theological doctrines of creation in terms of their propensity to 
alienate and isolate humanity from the world.  These polarizing doctrines, 
where nature is opposed to God, body to spirit, and so on, are shown to 
cause the unhealthy state of the world today.  He offers an ecological 
theology of nature, with the central metaphors of openness and closedness.  
Self-transformation is achieved through developing an openness to nature. 
God in Creation is a response to the ecological crisis that was becoming more 
and more evident since the 1980’s.  In German Protestant theology 
Moltmann finds a problematic alternative posed: ‘either “natural theology,” 
which thought that God’s order could be discovered in the natural 
conditions of nation and race…or “revealed theology,” which hears and   20  
holds fast to Jesus Christ as “the one Word of God.”’54  Moltmann 
endeavours to bring these two alternatives together so that salvation history 
is revealed in the world.  He gives a comprehensive history of modern 
theology’s tendency to dismiss natural theology as peripheral to revealed 
theology.  Friedrich Schleiermacher, Friedrich Gogarten, Rudolf Bultmann 
and Emil Brunner are named as examples o f  t h e  d i v i s i v e  s p l i t  m a d e  i n  
philosophy and theology between humanity and nature.55  He prefers to 
adopt an earlier natural theology which sees a reflection of God in nature 
and that ‘all divine activity is pneumatic in its efficacy.’56  God in Creation, 
therefore, is largely Moltmann’s pneumatology.  Through emphasizing the 
working of the Holy Spirit Moltmann emphasizes relationality and 
mutuality as the way forward for an ecological theology.  He wants to move 
away from an anthropocentric world view to a theocentric cosmic 
viewpoint. 
In  Spirit of Life Moltmann develops cosmic hope, that is, hope for all of 
creation.  Central to this hope is the Spirit’s role in creation and in the 
eschaton.  Moltmann looks to a trinitarian model of God to understand the 
essence of mutuality and relationship.  He maintains a dialectical view of the 
world but proposes that oppositions need to be viewed as complementary, 
as aspects of a common process.  This makes it possible ‘to discern and 
define more precisely the possible reconciliation between freedom and 
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necessity, grace and nature, covenant and creation, being a Christian and 
being a human being.’57  Reconciliation becomes the new catchcry.   
A major influence for Moltmann in developing an ecological theology is the 
kabbalistic tradition of Judaism, specifically the ideas about the divine 
zimsum (God’s self-limitation) and the divine Shekinah.  Zimsum, meaning 
concentration and contraction, is used to signify God’s relationship to 
creation.  Instead of the Augustinian idea of creation as an act of God 
outwards, Moltmann uses this understanding of the kabbalistic doctrine of 
the self-limitation of God.  For Moltmann, this means that ‘God makes room 
for his creation by withdrawing his presence.’58  It is the Holy Spirit who 
resides in the world.  Moltmann takes understandings of the shared 
suffering of Shekinah with the people of Israel to create a metaphor of the 
Spirit as a motherly presence who resides with us in the world.  From Franz 
Rosenweig he takes up the importance of the sabbath for God both in 
creation and in the world to come.59   The sabbath becomes the pinnacle of 
creation for Moltmann, a day for being rather than becoming.   
Moltmann’s theocentrism is evident in the relatively small amount of 
writing he devotes to anthropology.   It is surprising that Moltmann does not 
address anthropology in Crucified God.  He does examine humanity in 
chapters 8 and 9 in God in Creation.  He considers evolutionary humanity and 
the human being as God’s image in creation.  With his new emphasis on the 
created world he largely resituates the human person by emphasizing its 
close relation to the rest of nature.60  O n e  p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  i s  t h a t  
Moltmann, in his move towards wholeness and nature, reclaims bodiliness 
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in his use of Gestalt theory.61   The theological model for the human being is 
Jesus Christ.  Moltmann disagrees with Karl Barth’s idea of Jesus Christ as 
the model of ‘ordered oneness and wholeness.’62  Moltmann’s Jesus is a 
human being who struggles at Gethsemane and dies believing himself 
forsaken by his Father.63  Moltmann prefers a social analogy of the human 
being in God’s image where the ideal of human relationship is modelled on 
the social Trinity. 
In the conclusion of Chapter 3 I summarize Moltmann’s theological 
worldview.  I suggest that his theocentric emphasis can often make human 
endeavour look superfluous.  It is God who atones, raises up and glorifies 
creation.  God carries the human history of suffering and injustice.   
Although Moltmann supports the notion of reconciliation in human society 
this reconciliation does not affect the eschatological redemption of creation.  
Despite this lack of efficacy Moltmann supports resistance to forms of 
oppression, environmental awareness and societal change.  There are signs 
of promise in life on this earth and this gives us hope for the future when 
God will glorify the world.  The discussion of Moltmann’s theology will 
continue in chapter 7, which will compare the theologies of Jürgen 
Moltmann and Sergei Bulgakov in the light of their respective worldviews 
and my own thesis on hope arising from a relationship between the human 
will to live and the world which sustains and supports life.   
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Sergei Bulgakov 
Chapters 4-6 of the dissertation examine the work of Sergei Bulgakov (1871-
1944), a Russian Orthodox priest and scholar.64  My intention in examining 
this particular eastern perspective is to introduce the theory of sophiology.  
Bulgakov’s understanding of Sophia, the Wisdom of God, is one which 
offers a different understanding of the role and purpose of humanity in 
creation to the one encountered in Moltmann’s theology.  Chapter 4 of the 
thesis will focus on God’s relationship to creation and humanity through 
Sophia.  Chapter 5 examines Bulgakov’s interpretation of Christ, particularly 
his understanding of the crucifixion and evil and their effect on Sophia and 
humanity.  Chapter 6 will interpret sophiology as a theology of hope, 
addressing Sophia’s history, past, present and future, with particular 
reference to the work of the Spirit. 
For someone who has been called ‘one of the leading theologians and 
thinkers of our era’65 Bulgakov is largely unknown in the west.  English 
scholarly engagement has been hampered not only by a dearth of translated 
texts, a situation in the process of being deservingly rectified by translator 
Boris Jakim, but interest has no doubt also been hampered by the radical and 
complex nature of the work itself.66  The study of Sophia, too, is also largely 
unknown in western theology, found only in some feminist and 
ecotheological writings.  Yet I propose that both Bulgakov and Sophia have 
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much to offer in the search for human meaning, purpose and hope.  Here is a 
brief introduction to both Bulgakov—his life and influences—and Sophia. 
Sergei Bulgakov was born in central Russia in 1871, the son of an Orthodox 
priest.  In the revolutionary climate of Russia in the late nineteenth century, 
Bulgakov rejected his faith and adopted Marxism, later becoming a lecturer 
in political economy at Kiev.  A study of German idealism led him to 
renewed interest in both religion and philosophy and to study the 
sophiology of Vladimir Soloviev.  A thorough biography which traces 
Bulgakov’s spiritual evolution at this time is The Cross and the Sickle: Sergei 
Bulgakov and the Fate of Russian Religious Philosophy, 1890-1920 by Catherine 
Evtuhov.67   
Bulgakov returned to his faith and was ordained in 1918, but was soon 
forced to live in exile for the remainder of his life.  He and his wife and 
children moved to Prague and then Paris, where Bulgakov became dean and 
professor of dogmatics in the newly formed Russian Orthodox Theological 
Academy.  Bulgakov was a man of immense learning, embracing the 
Scriptures, patristics, philosophy, psychology, Russian and Western 
literature, economic and social theory as well as engaging with theologians 
from many countries and denominations.68   He was one of the founders of 
the ecumenical Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius in 1927.  This 
organization, which continues today, provided a forum for contact and 
friendship between Orthodox and Anglicans.69   
                                                 
67 Catherine Evtuhov, The Cross and the Sickle: Sergei Bulgakov and the Fate of Russian Religious 
Philosophy, 1890-1920 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
68 Michael Plekon, "Russian Theology and Theologians Revisited," St Vladimir's Theological 
Quarterly 44 (2000): 412. 
69 For a history of the Fellowship see A Historical Memoir by Nicolas and Militza Zernov (1979) 
http://www.sobornost.org/fellowship_history.html.    25  
Like Moltmann, key personal experiences helped to shape Bulgakov’s 
theological enterprise.  Bulgakov experienced a being that he recognized as 
Sophia. He encountered Sophia both on the steppes of southern Russia and 
in the Hagia Sophia, Constantinople.  In the Hagia Sophia, ‘St Sophia was 
revealed to my mind as something absolute, self-evident, and irrefutable.’70  
Perhaps openness to these visions occurred because Sophia has a place in 
Russian Orthodox liturgy.71  Bulgakov experienced both the highs and lows 
of existence.  After the death of his three year old son he wrote, ‘“In the light 
of a new, hitherto completely unknown experience heavenly joy together 
with the pain of the crucifixion descended into my heart, and in the darkness 
of God-forsakenness, God reigned in my soul.”’72  Both Moltmann and 
Bulgakov experienced God even in the darkness of suffering. 
His exile from Russia was also formative.  He became a part of what is called 
the Russian School.  The theology of the Russian School developed 
differently from Orthodoxy in Russia as the exiles grappled with the 
challenges of a displaced faith community.73  These included, as Valliere 
proposes, ‘the tension between tradition and freedom, the challenge of 
modern humanism, the mission of church to modern society, the status of 
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dogma in modern intellectuality and the significance of religious 
pluralism.’74  Valliere describes the Russian School as the first Orthodox 
people to struggle with these modern issues.  Western Christendom had had 
centuries of religious change in the Renaissance, Reformation and 
Enlightenment.  Patristic Orthodoxy on the other hand had maintained the 
centrality and importance of Orthodoxy without any such engagement.  The 
Russian School in its diaspora ‘sought to reconstruct the theological 
tradition, to move beyond patristic Orthodoxy to a philosophic Orthodoxy 
for new times.’75  Engagement with modern philosophy was a defining 
characteristic of the Russian School, philosophy being regarded in its basic 
sense as the search for sophia (wisdom), for insight into the meaning of life.  
In one of Bulgakov’s first major works, Philosophy of Economy (1911)76  he 
transforms his beginnings in Marxism and political economy with this 
philosophical engagement, particularly of German Idealism combined with 
his Russian inheritance of Sophia. Bulgakov rejects the economic materialism 
of Marxism and the positivistic turn to science and introduces a 
metaphysical “sophic” economy where the object of human labour is to 
transform fallen nature.  For the concept of world unity he turns to Friedrich 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie with its ‘identity of subject and object and the 
understanding of nature as a living, growing organism.’77   F o l l o w i n g  
Vladimir Soloviev, Bulgakov identifies this organism as Sophia, God’s 
Wisdom. 78   
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Soloviev is the founder of the sophiological stream in modern Russian 
philosophy. He begins with the problematic dualism in Christian 
consciousness between God and the world.  This dualism has been 
developed in two different ways.  In the west the human principle of reason 
and personality has been developed at the expense of connectedness with 
God.  In the east a passive and other-worldly ascetic and conservative spirit 
has been developed.  The two principles can and should help one another 
towards humanity’s goal, a free union with God, which Soloviev calls Divine 
humanity.79  In Lectures on Divine Humanity, Soloviev begins to develop the 
two key concepts of divine humanity and the doctrine of Sophia.  Divine 
humanity is the union of the Logos  with Sophia, the world soul.  In The 
Justification of the Good80 Soloviev elaborates on the threefold expression of 
love that enables this union in time.  If the human being is the middle place 
of transformation there is an ascending love whose object is God, an 
equalising love between human beings, and a descending love that acts 
upon material nature, bringing all within the fullness of the absolute 
good.Many of Bulgakov’s ideas of Sophia are developed from Soloviev’s 
work:  the idea of Sophia as the creative love of God become the ideal 
substance of creation, Sophia as the body and soul of humanity, Sophia as 
the meaning and truth of creation, Sophia as the spirit of creation, as its ideal 
and its beauty, and Sophia as the Body of Christ and the Church.81  
Bulgakov’s contribution to these diverse factors in sophiology is an 
endeavour to systematize them into a trinitarian theology.   
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In this endeavour Bulgakov ventured into new territory, naming God’s 
nature Sophia.  His theology was controversial and was condemned in 
certain parts of the Russian church.82  Although Bulgakov was not under 
any of the hierarchs that accused him he chose to defend his theology and 
was exonerated of all charges.83  However, after Bulgakov’s death few 
theologians continued his work in both east and west.84  Valliere suggests 
that this was partly due to the neo-Patristic Orthodoxy which dominated 
Orthodox theology after Bulgakov’s death and which rejected much of the 
Russian School’s theology.85  More recently there has been renewed interest 
in his work in both east and west but there remains great scope for 
engagement with Bulgakov’s theology.86 
Bulgakov’s theology has suffered fifty years of neglect but Sophia herself has 
had 1500 years of neglect.  Sophia’s history is complex but because Sophia is 
integral to Bulgakov’s worldview and because Sophia is largely unknown in 
western theology I will give some broad sweeps of her story.  Bulgakov 
gives some background to the biblical basis for his sophiology in Sophia: The 
Wisdom of God.87   For a comprehensive history of Sophia through the 
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centuries, see Thomas Schipflinger, Sophia-Maria: A Holistic Vision of 
Creation.88  Another extensive work which demonstrates the many 
incarnations of Sophia in different cultures and times is Sophia, Goddess of 
Wisdom: The Divine Feminine from Black Goddess to World Soul by Caitlin 
Matthews.89  I will give a précis of Sophia’s history from a biblical 
orientation, which begins with the Hebrew Bible, continues with contention 
during the early patristic debates, and then although largely disappearing, 
diverges into distinct western and eastern streams.   
Sophia as personified Wisdom is an important figure in the Hebrew Bible.  
Indeed, only four other figures have more words devoted to them: God, Job, 
Moses and David.90  Her first appearance occurs in Proverbs where she calls 
from the street for all to embrace her wisdom because ‘she is a tree of life to 
those who lay hold of her’ (3: 18a).91  She is an integral part of the created 
world: 
The Lord created me at the beginning of his work, 
The first of his acts of long ago. 
Ages ago I was set up, at the first, 
Before the beginning of the earth… 
When he marked out the foundations of the earth, 
Then I was beside him, like a master worker, 
And I was daily his delight, 
Rejoicing before him always, 
Rejoicing in his inhabited world 
And delighting in the human race. 
Prov. 8: 22-24; 29-31. 
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In the Wisdom of Solomon her divine, cosmic character is more fully 
delineated as well as her connection to humanity and the created world. 
There is in her a spirit that is intelligent, holy, 
Unique, manifold, subtle, mobile, clear, unpolluted, 
Distinct, invulnerable, loving the good, keen, 
Irresistible, beneficent, humane, steadfast, sure, 
Free from anxiety, all-powerful, overseeing all, 
And penetrating through all spirits 
That are intelligent, pure, and altogether subtle. 
For wisdom is more mobile than any motion; 
Because of her pureness she pervades and penetrates all things. 
For she is a breath of the power of God, 
And a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty… 
For she is a reflection of eternal light, 
A spotless mirror of the working of God, 
And an image of goodness. 
Although she is but one, she can do all things, 
And while remaining in herself, she renews all things… 
She reaches mightily from one end of the earth to the other, 
And she orders all things well. 
Wis 7: 23-27a; 8: 1 
Other key texts are found all through the Wisdom literature and texts that 
refer to her cosmic origins include Sirach 1: 1-20, Sirach 24: 3-22 and Wisdom 
of Solomon 10: 1-21.  Sophia fell from her high status in the Hebrew Bible to 
post-patristic obscurity in the fifth century CE.   The turning point came in 
the christological battles of early Christianity.  The language of the Prologue 
of John’s gospel was seen to reflect the wisdom literature of the Hebrew 
Bible and there was no doubt in the minds of these early theologians that 
Jesus as the Logos was Sophia incarnate.92  The dispute between Athanasius 
and Arianism in the fourth century CE was over how the Wisdom/Logos 
collocation might affect the divinity of the second person of the Trinity.   
Because in Proverbs 8: 22 God “created” (e/)ktise/n,  ektisen) Sophia or 
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Wisdom at the beginning of creation, Arius and his followers argued that the 
Son as Wisdom incarnate was a creature who had a beginning in time.93  
Athanasius eventually won the support of the early church with his 
interpretation of ektisen as “begotten,” meaning that the Son ‘is the offspring 
from the Father’s substance…he is Wisdom (Sophia) and Word (Logos) of 
the Father, in whom and through whom he creates and makes all things.’94  
This meant, in effect, that Sophia was accepted as fully divine, 
consubstantial with the Father. 
In a patriarchal religion influenced by Hellenistic philosophy an additional 
problem was Sophia’s gender.  Philo of Alexandria, for example, writes that 
‘progress is indeed nothing else than the giving up of the female gender by 
changing into the male, since the female gender is material, passive, 
corporeal and sense-perceptible, while the male is active, rational, 
incorporeal and more akin to mind and thought.’95  In his pursuit of progress 
Philo replaces the feminine Sophia terminology with the masculine Logos 
terminology.  By the fifth century CE the Logos/Son had become the 
authoritative terms used for the second person of the Trinity.  Bulgakov will 
later challenge the complete identification of Sophia with the Logos but at 
this point in history Sophia is effectively replaced and displaced.   
In western Christianity Sophia would live on only in pseudonymic guises, 
such as Lady Philosophy, the goddess Natura and the Virgin Mary until the 
twentieth century.96  In the east, renewed interest in the biblical Sophia arose 
again in the late nineteenth century in Russian.  However, Vladimir 
Soloviev’s retrieval of Sophia in nineteenth century Russia was not from 
                                                 
93 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 227-28.  
94 Athanasius, Orations against the Arians 1.16. 
95 In Engelsman, "Feminine Dimension", 112.  Original quote, Philo of Alexandria, QE I, 8 in 
Loeb Classical Library edition (12 vols), Harvard University Press, 1929-62. 
96 See Matthews, Sophia, 191-99, 231-34.   32  
total obscurity.  Sophia had survived in the east in Orthodox liturgy and 
iconography.97  Soloviev also experienced visions of Sophia who he 
associated with the personified Wisdom of the Bible.98   Renewed interest in 
Sophia in the west appeared with the advent of feminist theology and 
ecotheology in the latter part of the twentieth century.99  The focus here, 
however, has been on separate traditions of Sophia rather than eastern 
liturgical traditions.  Feminist theology has returned to early christological 
debates to find feminine aspects of the divine as noted below. 
It is perhaps surprising that Russian sophiology and the western feminist 
retrieval of Sophia have rarely coincided.  Two exceptions have been in the 
work of Brenda Meehan and Celia Deane-Drummond.  Meehan compares 
the two groups and believes that ‘both groups have constructed Sophia in a 
way that serves their own social, political, and religious purposes.’100  
Feminist theology has sought a feminine image of the divine to counteract 
2000 years of patriarchal dominance while Soloviev sought a model of 
wholeness to counter the positivism, materialism and atheism of the 
nineteenth century.  Nevertheless, she suggests several retrievals that offer 
positive and emancipatory aspects of sophiology.  These include the values 
of ‘relational mutuality, inclusivity, nondomination, and an overturning of 
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oppositional dualisms.’101  Deane-Drummond, too, illustrates the differing 
approaches to Sophia between feminist theology and the Russian 
sophiologists.  The feminist approach has taken as its starting point ‘the 
experience of wisdom in the world, rather than wisdom as a theological term 
which links creaturely wisdom.’102  Deane-Drummond draws together the 
insights from both groups, creating a holistic theology of creation.  Using 
Bulgakov’s work, Sophia is in all three persons of the Trinity which ‘works 
together in a unity of communion and love’103 while Sophia as the feminine 
face of God ‘highlights the feminine divine in the creative process.’104 
In the past twenty years there has been a growing interest from both east 
and west in Russian sophiology in its own right.  Because sophiology covers 
all aspects of theology, books, theses and articles have covered such diverse 
subjects as eschatology, Mariology, pneumatology, ecclesiology, 
iconography, ecotheology, christology, the Church, the angels and 
cosmology.  Even so the field is still comparatively small.  Michael Meerson 
is a present-day Orthodox theologian reviving the project of the Russian 
school.105  Among the English resources, Paul Valliere has offered a 
comprehensive study of both Soloviev and Bulgakov.106  Wisdom from Above: 
A Primer in the Theology of Father Sergei Bulgakov, by Aidan Nichols offers an 
introduction to Sergei Bulgakov and a systematic presentation of his 
dogmatic theology.  Another good introduction is an edited anthology with 
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notes by Rowan Williams: Sergii Bulgakov: Towards a Political Theology.107  In 
Living Icons: Persons of Faith in the Eastern Church Michael Plekon ranks 
Bulgakov with Tillich, Barth and Rahner as one of the great 20th century 
theologians.108  Plekon gives an interesting biographical and theological 
overview, noting Bulgakov’s zeal for unity of the Church arising from his 
eschatological experience and perspective.109  
My intent in this dissertation is to present my own broad overview of 
Bulgakov’s trinitarian theology, with reference mainly to his “great trilogy,” 
The Lamb of God, The Bride of the Lamb, and The Comforter.110  The chapters on 
Bulgakov’s work are not a chronological survey.  To affect a comparison 
with Moltmann’s work they are organized to reflect the themes in the 
chapters on Moltmann’s theology: hope and eschatology, christology, and 
creation and pneumatology.  Therefore, Chapter 5 addresses Bulgakov’s 
understanding of God in creation, including his anthropology, chapter 6 
looks at christology and theodicy, and chapter 7 examines pneumatology, 
eschatology and hope.  As with Moltmann’s work I will mostly be working 
with the English translations of Bulgakov’s work.  However, I will reference 
some Russian texts which have not been translated into English.  I will also 
refer to the Russian when concepts need clarification or closer interpretation 
or when English equivalents do not give justice to the original words or 
concepts.  
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Chapter 4 is entitled “God in creation: Sophia and humanity.”  This chapter 
examines Bulgakov’s theology of creation, including God’s relationship to 
humanity and humanity’s relationship to the world.  Its purpose in terms of 
the overall thesis is to present Bulgakov’s cosmology as a complete system 
with humanity integral to and effective within it.  The picture presented is 
one of the idealism of creation, both in its inception and in its future.  This is 
the basis of hope: humanity is created with its perfect world and place in 
which to move towards the fullness and clear “sophianicity” of existence.   
In Bulgakov’s theology of creation as outlined in Bride of the Lamb he 
discourses with Plato, Aristotle, patristics and Thomas Aquinas. He suggests 
that between the extremes of cosmism, with the world as uncreated and self-
evident, and dualism, with its separation of God from the world, there is a 
middle way.   Bulgakov’s middle way is a theology of Sophia.  The Russian 
School’s quest for sophia became for Bulgakov a quest to understand Sophia.  
It was a search for wholeness that led to a theological understanding of the 
relationships between apparent opposites or apparent difference.   
Boundaries are movable, such as in apophatic/kataphatic theology – what 
can and cannot be said about God.  Or boundaries are shown to have created 
false dichotomies, as in philosophy and theology. Mystery and revelation 
belong together.  Human and divine natures belong together. Furthermore, 
our boundaries are not God’s boundaries: God is an Absolute/Immanent 
being, not just one or the other.  Bulgakov offers a new Chalcedon, a 
systematic exploration of the ousia of God leading to a new hypothesis of 
how the human and divine natures unite in one hypostasis.  This union is of 
fundamental significance for God’s relationship to creation because creation 
is formed from God’s divine nature, the divine Sophia. 
Creation is a trinitarian act.  The Father is the substance of the world, the Son 
is the manifestation or structure of the Father’s substance and the Spirit   36  
gives reality to this substance, “birthing” the world.  Creation is a part of 
God kenotically formed from God’s nature, Sophia.  The basis of creation is 
God’s love and humanity is created to freely experience God’s love.   
Humanity is a microcosm and mirrors God’s relationship to the godself’s 
divine nature, Sophia.  Humanity is created to be the hypostatic centre of the 
creaturely manifestation of Sophia, the “I” of its nature.  In its ideal state 
humanity’s task is to reveal the sophianicity of the world. 
The radical aspect of Bulgakov’s theology of creation is that creation is 
formed from God’s own substance.  The criticisms included in this chapter 
are Bulgakov’s kataphatic exploration of the Chalcedonian dogma and 
creation theology.  The difference between Creator and created is said to be 
lost because God begets from the godself’s own substance as distinct to 
creation from “outside” of God.  However, his sophianic system supports 
my own thesis of hope because there is an intimate relationship between 
God, humanity and the world.  Humanity also has a meaning and purpose 
within the world.   
Chapter 5, entitled “Christ, Sophia and Evil,” explores Bulgakov’s 
christology.  This chapter examines the role of Christ in the incarnation, 
death and resurrection and the balance of good and evil in the world.   
Whereas Chapter 4 presents the ideal of creation in the divine Sophia this 
chapter examines fallen Sophia/humanity.  The misunderstanding of the 
first humanity (the unified “Adam”) about the process of self-determination 
results in the “Fall,” a terrible imbalance between humanity and its nature.   
Because of the compatibility between the divine and the human, Christ, as 
the second Adam, is able to redeem the prototype of humanity.  The lifting 
of the weight of sin allows humanity to continue its process in time.   
The subject of evil and its power in creation is an important issue of theodicy 
and also of human agency.  Why evil exists is one aspect; how much power   37  
it has is another.  Bulgakov’s understanding of the doctrine of original sin is 
different from the western one influenced by Augustine.  He sees western 
understandings as ‘an exaggerated and extreme expression’111 of the 
doctrine of original sin.  According to Bulgakov, in Luther’s doctrine of the 
servum arbitrium humanity loses the image of God and is powerless to do the 
good.112  Orthodox and Catholic doctrine, however, sees a weakening and not 
a total loss of human freedom.  Humanity has some agency and some power 
to overcome personal sin.  Bulgakov supports the Orthodox doctrine of 
theosis, the divinization of humanity and the world.  Humanity works 
within the world creatively revealing its sophianicity, its basis in God’s 
wisdom.  The resurrection brings Christ’s real presence into the world.   
Together with the world’s basis of goodness this means that the good is 
stronger than the forces of chaos and evil in the world, giving humanity 
hope that love and beauty will prevail. 
The last chapter on Bulgakov’s theology is Chapter 6, entitled “A theology of 
hope? Sophia and the future.”  It examines Bulgakov’s eschatology and 
pneumatology to complete a picture of his worldview.  In The Comforter, the 
second book of the great trilogy, Bulgakov forwards a unique concept of the 
dyadic relationship between Christ and the Holy Spirit based on biblical 
interpretation but overturning 1500 years of church dogmatics.  Once again 
Bulgakov thoroughly examines the history of interpretation, this time on the 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit.  Bulgakov’s aim is to honour a trinitarian 
theology where each Person of the Trinity is ‘equally eternal, equally divine, 
and equally important.’113  Bulgakov sees a fundamental weakness in 
Cappadocian theology which, in its articulation of three hypostases united in 
one essence, tends towards impersonalism in God.  Because the three 
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persons are united by nature alone God is ‘only the divine It, not the 
trihypostatic  I, the divine triunity.’114  However, this tendency can be 
countered by balancing ‘a unity in nature, [with] a unity of Personhood, a 
trihypostatic One.’115  There is a unity of personhood in God as well as a 
unity of nature, a three-centred union.   
Bulgakov proposes that the idea of three centres in one has the power to 
overcome the problematic filioque clause, which has been part of the 
division between east and west for a thousand years.  He believes that there 
are problems on both sides and both have their basis in understanding the 
personhood of the Son and the Spirit in terms of origin, producing a 
theology which tends towards subordination not equi-divinity.  For 
Bulgakov the sending of the Spirit is an economic role within the Trinity, not 
a statement of the Spirit’s origin from the Father.  All three persons of the 
Trinity are eternal and can have no beginning. Bulgakov, in his positive 
pneumatology, restores the Spirit as person to equi-divinity and personhood 
in the triune God.  The importance of this move is that the Spirit has an 
equally efficacious role in the economy of salvation. 
In its economic manifestation the Spirit is the sophianic basis of creation.  
Since the Pentecost, the Spirit, together with Christ, works personally 
(hypostatically) within the world until the end times.  Continuing the 
principle of trinitarian kenosis, Bulgakov posits that the Spirit’s form of 
kenosis constitutes a kind of holding back from creation.  The Spirit gives life 
and form to creation in the beginning but allows for a creative process 
within creation that continues until the Spirit’s complete union with creation 
in the final transfiguration.  The human spirit illustrates humanity’s capacity 
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to be influenced by the Spirit through the Spirit’s tools of sanctification and 
inspiration.  The human being is also an ensouled and corporeal being, part 
of Sophia.  It is humanity’s task to participate in the sanctification of the 
world, until the world is ‘brought to a state where it can receive the coming 
of the God-Man in glory and where God will be all in all.’116  This is part of a 
mysterious process of divine-human cooperation. 
The Holy Spirit is the agency through which the final transfiguration of the 
world is achieved.  Like Moltmann, Bulgakov is certain of this final glory.  
But, unlike Moltmann, Bulgakov emphasizes that this transfiguration is not 
an external act of God, imposed upon the world and alien to it.  The Spirit 
has descended into the world to actualize the salvation of the world.  The 
world is a very part of God.  The mystery is that God must ‘suffer the world 
with its imperfection, without destroying its proper self-determination.’117  
Free will exists and human agency exists and humanity has a part to play in 
its own self-determination.  Therefore, there is a positive and a negative 
aspect to the world’s history.  On the one side, human sin affects the world 
in its very being, ontologically, and cannot be simply forgiven or erased 
from the world slate: ‘Once committed, a sin must be lived through to the 
end.’118  Although salvation is assured there will be a time of judgment when 
any sin not overcome will be experienced in Christ’s presence and measured 
against the image of Christ.  The purpose of this time of judgment is for 
purification in readiness for the final glorification.  In this life, however, a 
human person can work creatively and transformatively with the substances 
of the world and participate in the process of theosis as consciously as 
possible.  The balance for Bulgakov always remains with the good because 
the good is the basis of creation. 
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Comparison and Conclusion 
Chapter 7 is entitled “Moltmann and Bulgakov: convergence and 
divergence.”  This dissertation is unique in its comparison of the theologies 
of Moltmann and Bulgakov and it is also unique in assessing Bulgakov’s 
theology as a theology of hope.  Although from very different backgrounds, 
my first premise in constructing a worldview which is relevant to the 21st 
century is that any wisdom from any age or time may be used if it meets the 
criteria of hope, meaning and purpose suggested in this dissertation.  Thus, 
my first criterion in selecting these theologians was that I felt they both had 
something to say about hope, Bulgakov implicitly, and Moltmann explicitly 
in his first major publication, Theology of Hope.  My second criterion was that 
both men had a comprehensive body of work from which a specific 
(Christian) worldview could be constructed.  There is no direct engagement 
between Bulgakov and Moltmann because Bulgakov died before 
Moltmann’s academic career began and Moltmann has not referred to 
Bulgakov’s work.119   
There are many similarities as well as significant differences in the 
theologies of an exiled Russian Orthodox priest writing in the first half of the 
20th century and a post war German Protestant theologian writing in the 
second half of the 20th century.  Although Bulgakov is writing from an 
earlier period in history and necessarily influenced by the philosophy and 
theology of that period there is much about his writing that is relevant 
today. Bulgakov’s christological and trinitarian writing on doctrine ventures 
into areas considered radical even today but no less important because of 
that. In his cosmological unity of Sophia he prefigures ecological concerns 
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and scientific theories of wholeness.  His eschatology also ventures into new 
territory, proclaiming universal salvation at a time when judgment 
eschatology was the norm.   
It is particularly in Moltmann’s later work that we discover closer resonance 
with Bulgakov’s theology of the cosmos and humanity.  They both draw on 
the idea of kenosis for God’s relationship to the world and of the 
interpersonal relationships within God as the ideal model for human 
relationship.  The basic difference, however, in reference to my own thesis of 
hope, is a major one.  Moltmann’s principle of relationship between God and 
humanity is a social one.  The world is place, although humanity is expected 
to respect that world as God’s creation.  For Bulgakov, the ontological 
principle dominates over the social or moral principle.  The world is not just 
place, it is our  place, humanity’s very nature and an intrinsic part of 
ourselves.  Each individuality contributes to the whole.   
The difference in viewpoint may be a matter of religious background.  A 
gross simplification would be to say that Moltmann, despite his efforts, 
cannot overcome an Augustinian (western) tendency to view humanity as 
critically flawed.  Bulgakov, despite all evidence to the contrary in the 
difficulties of his own life and life in war-torn Europe, cannot shake the 
belief that God’s creation, and all in it, is good.  These fundamental starting 
points influence the theology of these two men both subtly and overtly.   
In the final chapter, the Conclusion, the dissertation returns to the 
importance of hopeful living for its effects on the world now.  One basis for 
such hope is based in wisdom or understanding.  The focus shifts from a 
cosmic worldview to the personal.  Each person can construct his or her own 
framework of hope and meaning with the tools available in his or her own 
life.  We can use Bulgakov’s sophiology to give a larger Christian worldview 
of meaning.  The human being is made in the image of Christ out of God’s   42  
love.  Humanity is given self-determination within its own world.  The 
importance of human agency demonstrates our human responsibility within 
the world.   Knowledge or understanding of these principles may give hope 
that each one of us can make a positive and effective contribution to the 
world.  In terms of this thesis Moltmann’s worldview is flawed as a theology 
of hope but nevertheless aspects of his Christian praxis can add to the 
worldview framed by sophiology.  Moltmann reminds us that there is a time 
for challenging the injustices in the world and there is a time for stillness, 
peace and joy in God’s creation.      43  
Part 1: Jürgen Moltmann and Hope 
Chapter 1: A Theology of Hope: the importance of hope 
Introduction 
 
The first three chapters of this dissertation examine the worldview of Jürgen 
Moltmann.  Broadly speaking, the subject of this chapter is hope and 
eschatology; of chapter 2, suffering and evil; and of chapter 3, humanity and 
the world.  The purpose of examining Moltmann’s larger worldview is to 
discover any correspondence between the human will to live and the world 
that supports and sustains us, which is the underlying thesis of hope in this 
dissertation.   
Moltmann has been credited with returning the theme of hope to theological 
reflection in the twentieth century.1  Moltmann places hope in the God of the 
Bible who promises eternal life to sinful humanity.  This is the theme of 
Theology of Hope, Moltmann’s first significant publication in his academic life, 
and this remains an important theme throughout his long (continuing) 
career.  The emphasis in this chapter is on a critical examination of Theology 
of Hope because it gives Moltmann’s most systematic presentation on hope.  I 
will examine Theology of Hope in two areas: one, eschatology as the doctrine 
of Christian hope, embracing both the object of hope and the hope inspired 
by it, and, two, how hope works in praxis, revolutionizing and transforming 
the present.  My examination will also include later work (and contemporary 
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criticism) which augment the fundamentals of hope as both God-centred 
and eschatological that we find in Theology of Hope.  
  
We will see that Moltmann’s engagement with the modern world is 
formative in shaping his theology of hope.  Post war questions of theodicy 
are raised which Moltmann answers dialectically.  The cross represents the 
godlessness and forsakenness of the world while the resurrection symbolizes 
hope for the new world of the future.  The covenantal promise of God to 
humanity is apocalyptically fulfilled in Christ.  God reveals the godself’s 
power and potentiality in the resurrection and humanity responds with 
obedience, entering the new covenant of Christ’s history.  Hope comes from 
the future when God’s promise is completed in the new world of the 
eschaton.  The dialectic nature of this world is problematic in Moltmann’s 
early theology, bearing little relationship to the eschaton.  Active opposition 
and resistance are needed to the evil in the world.  The sharp distinction 
between worlds is ameliorated in later theology by proposing a progressive 
revelation of the Spirit.  Spiritual growth is possible through trials in the 
world.  Human history is a witness to God’s covenant and revelation 
through Christ and the Spirit.  Faith and hope reside in the God of the 
promise. 
 ‘Theology of Hope’  
Moltmann’s intent in Theology of Hope is to reintroduce eschatological 
thinking as a central Christian doctrine.  He engages with non-Christian 
expressions of hope as well as recent eschatological scholarship.  Instead of 
eschatology as some ‘loosely attached appendix’2 tacked at the end of 
Christian dogmatics, Moltmann aims to underscore its importance as the 
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basis of Christian hope. One of the non-Christian catalysts for Moltmann’s 
challenge is Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope.3  Bloch extensively examines 
hope from a Marxist perspective, seeing hope as the driving force propelling 
humanity to a utopian humanist future.  Moltmann formulates Theology of 
Hope in part as a Christian response to the question of hope.  He challenges 
the “provisionality” of Bloch’s open world process because of its lack of 
finality.4  The endless possibilities of Bloch’s utopia arise from the world 
itself.  Moltmann opposes this thinking by safeguarding the transcendence 
of God: God’s future does not result from the trends of world history; God is 
creator ex nihilo both in creation and in the eschaton.5  However, Moltmann’s 
courtship with Bloch’s work also attracted criticism.  Karl Barth called 
Theology of Hope Bloch’s principle of hope “baptized.’’6  Moltmann refutes 
this, saying ‘I did not seek to be Bloch’s “heir”…I wanted to undertake a 
parallel action in Christianity on the basis of its own presuppositions.’7  It is 
just this parallel thinking that is problematic according to Gerhard Sauter, 
who finds Moltmann’s use of Blochian language indiscriminate.8  Richard 
Bauckham suggests that because of this slippage, Moltmann fails to clarify 
the relation between the immanent and transcendent possibilities in the 
world.9  Moltmann insistence on hope in a God who transcends all that is 
wrong with the world diminishes any immanent possibilities for God in the 
world. 
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Moltmann also takes up the theology of Johannes Weiss and Albert 
Schweitzer, who, at the end of the nineteenth century both highlighted the 
importance of eschatology for Jesus and early Christianity.  Both drew 
attention to the radical nature of Jesus’ message, notably the contrast 
between the kingdom of God to come and the world.  For Weiss, this makes 
Jesus ‘“supra-worldly,”’10 with nothing in common with the world.  For 
Schweitzer, Jesus’ attempt to bring in the kingdom of God is crushed by 
‘”the wheel of the world.”’11  On the one hand, according to Moltmann, 
eschatology is ‘suppressed by idealism’ and on the other it is ‘condemned to 
ineffectiveness.’12  For Moltmann, Weiss’ idealism ignores Jesus’ historical 
message and the import of Jesus’ message lies only in future apocalyptic 
times.  Moltmann appreciates Schweitzer’s portrayal of the foreignness of 
Jesus but takes exception to his view that the Son of Man is part of a cyclical 
and eternal struggle.  
Karl Barth and, later, Rudolf Bultmann, also endeavour to underscore the 
eschatological nature of Christianity: ‘“If Christianity be not altogether and 
unreservedly eschatology, there remains in it no relationship whatever to 
Christ.”’13  Moltmann supports this new turn to Christian eschatology but 
finds Barth’s understanding of the eschaton problematic because the 
eschaton is ‘a transcendental eternity, the transcendental meaning of all ages, 
equally near to all the ages of history and equally far from all of them.’14  For 
Barth, ‘“every moment in time bears within it the unborn secret of 
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revelation, and every moment can thus be qualified.”15  Bultmann’s 
existentialism also talks of the ‘eschatological moment.’16  The problem for 
Moltmann with transcendental notions of eschatology is that they arise from 
the Greek understanding of the logos, namely, the epiphany of the eternal 
present.  From Homer and Parmenides to Goethe, Hegel and Nietzsche, the 
eternal present is believed to be accessible to humanity and God can be 
sought and experienced in the kairos, the now of time.  This leads to 
Kierkegaard “where the eternal is concerned there is only one time: the 
present.”17  What matters in this thinking is ‘to perceive in the outward form 
of temporality and transience the substance that is immanent and the eternal 
that is present.’18  For Moltmann, however, this means that the eternal 
present has no relationship to the world or to history.  Indeed, it makes any 
sense of history obsolete because the eternal can be found in any moment. 
Moltmann’s purpose then, in Theology of Hope, is to challenge the idea of 
“transcendental eschatology.”19  Not only is this problematic for its 
relationship to history and the world, it is problematic for understanding the 
revelation of God.  In classical Kantian thinking, the goal of revelation is 
identical with its origin.20  The notion of eschatology, because it resides in 
the future, cannot be understood now.  God’s revelation to humanity is only 
to be understood in the experience of human selfhood, of one’s self-
revelation.  It is addressed in the sphere of moral reason, of the practical 
ability to be a self.  Through this one attains to ‘the non-objective, non-
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objectifiable realm of freedom and of ability to be a self.’21  The eschaton is 
the realm of the transcendental self.  Moltmann also opposes this 
understanding of the “inward apocalypse.”22   Moltmann’s theology divides 
humanity and the eschaton, because, at least in Theology of Hope, there he 
struggles to find any connection between God and the human world.  
For Moltmann, the real language of eschatology is not based in Greek 
notions of transcendence or the eternal but in biblical thinking.  By this he 
means the language of promise to Israel which becomes a new language of 
promise to Christianity.  The eschatological message was (and continues to 
be) confused ‘especially where Christianity encountered the Greek mind.’23  
The challenge of theology is to unveil the original message of promise in 
order to understand our relationship to the world and to history.   
Furthermore, God’s promise of the glory of the end times should not only be 
an uplifting hope and joy that helps one face the difficulties of the here and 
now, it should also be understood contextually, as intrinsically related to the 
doctrines of the cross and the resurrection.  Towards this end, Theology of 
Hope  addresses biblical revelation and covenantal history.  This biblical 
orientation shows God acting in the world in Israel’s history culminating in 
the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  God demonstrates the 
godforsaken nature of humanity.  Faith and hope reside in God’s ability to 
overcome the contradictions of earthly existence.   
In Moltmann’s thought, eschatological theology must be situated in the 
historical faith of Christianity.  He returns to the original biblical message of 
God’s promise in order to understand humanity’s relationship to God, to the 
world, and to history.  In the Hebrew Bible, the biblical promise arises with 
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God’s covenant with humanity.  In the first instance this is Yahweh’s 
promise of the land to Israel.  However, the promise is part of a covenant in 
which Israel promises to uphold the law.  Yahweh is faithful and the people 
have a choice to obey or disobey.  Since the historical promise is not fulfilled, 
it becomes open to ‘a constantly new and wider interpretation.’24  Gerhard 
von Rad suggests that the prophetic teaching becomes eschatological and the 
basis of salvation is shifted away from the disobedience of the people and on 
to a future action of God.25  The teaching also becomes universal, seen in 
Amos where ‘God judges all wrong, including that among the peoples who 
do not know his law.’26   The covenant holds but it has become a universal 
eschatological promise. 
The message of promise takes centre stage in Moltmann’s own eschatology. 
The New Testament is the witness to a new interpretation of the message 
given to Israel.  Moltmann describes Paul’s quarrel as being not with the law 
but with the promise.  The promise is not the promise of possessing the land 
but the promise of life, the quickening of the dead (Rom. 4:15, 17). The 
promise for eternal life begins with the resurrection of Jesus.  Christ is the 
end of the law (Rom. 10:4) but not the end of the promise.  On the contrary, 
the promise has ‘its rebirth, its liberation and validation.’27  This promise is 
still based in biblical thinking because God is expected to ‘act uniquely and 
comprehensively upon the world.’28  The promise has now become an 
eschatological certainty in Christ.  Indeed, ‘Christianity stands or falls with 
the reality of the raising of Jesus from the dead by God.’29  This is the real 
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language of eschatology.  The resurrection of Jesus stands ‘directly within 
the special horizon of prophetic and apocalyptic expectation, hopes and 
questions about that which according to the promises of this God is to 
come.’30  H o p e  i s  b a s e d  o n  G o d ’ s  f u t u r e faithfulness to bring about the 
fullness of what has been promised.31   
The promise is now part of God’s history and becomes transcendent.  The 
promise ‘keeps the hoping mind in a “not yet” which transcends all 
experience and history…’32  Jewish notions of apocalyptic thinking are 
rejected by Moltmann and described as an ‘obstinate exclusiveness,’33 
holding to a sense of ‘the historic and this-worldly fulfilment of the 
promises.’34  It is interesting to note that, according to Jacob Neusner, later 
rabbinic Judaism overturned the historical model and formed a paradigm of 
the transcendent, that is, of the eternal truth of the Temple.35  What is 
temporal or specific was then explained in terms of what is eternal and 
transcendent.  Neusner observes that this way of understanding history has 
been practised within Christianity as well as Judaism so that both use, not 
human measurements of time, but ‘God’s way of telling time.’36  This is also 
Moltmann’s principle, where the resurrection has moved human notions of 
time into an eschatological paradigm.   
The resurrection is central to God’s promise of the glory of the end times.  
This promise is not only an uplifting hope and joy that helps one face the 
difficulties of the here and now, it should also be understood contextually, as 
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intrinsically related to the doctrines of the cross and the resurrection.   
Moltmann proposes that eschatology is 
the doctrine of Christian hope, which embraces both the object hoped 
for and also the hope inspired by it.  From first to last, and not merely 
in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward looking 
and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and 
transforming the present.37 
Moltmann will develop a theology of the resurrection more particularly in 
The Crucified God but his underlying ideas are already apparent in Theology of 
Hope.  In Theology of Hope he does not explain the resurrection but sets it 
within an eschatological framework.  This is because the resurrection is 
inexplicable in terms of worldly or historical or human experience.   
Moltmann speaks apophatically in terms of what the resurrection is not. The 
resurrection does ‘not stand within a cosmological horizon of questions as to 
the origin, meaning and nature of the world… [nor] within an existential 
horizon of questions as to the origin, meaning and nature of human 
existence.’38  Influenced by Wolfhart Pannenberg, the category of the 
resurrection is the future.39  The resurrection is not dependent on the past 
but is something new in the world and points to a transcendent future.  For 
Pannenberg, it is the future which determines the now, not the past, and the 
task of the human being is to remain open to this ‘power of the future.’40  
Moltmann agrees that, since the resurrection, there is a change in 
relationship to historical time.    However, he goes a step further.  In this 
early theology, the resurrection is an alien event in the world.  The world 
and the resurrection stand in such a contradiction that ‘this world “cannot 
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bear” the resurrection and the new world created by resurrection.’41   That 
Jesus Christ is crucified shows ‘the godless reality of sin and death’ in the 
world.42  This world of death cannot be progressively transformed into the 
new world of the eschaton.   Although this position is ameliorated in later 
theology, it is worth noting Moltmann’s initial stand because it is a basic 
position that he attempts yet struggles to modify, as we shall see in Chapter 
3 of this dissertation. 
In  Theology of Hope the resurrection serves as a symbol of the 
godforsakenness of the world.  Randall Otto suggests that Moltmann’s use 
of the term “resurrection” diverges significantly from its usual usage.  An 
understanding of ‘the social character of Moltmann’s use of this symbol is 
vital to a proper apprehension of his work.’43  In fact, the resurrection 
appears to be only symbolic, with no obvious transformative or physical 
function in the world. As symbol, the life of Jesus provides the model for the 
social life:  
The historical person of Jesus thus provides the model of the life of 
liberating suffering that each man is called to emulate in history until, 
at last, new being is achieved and the provisional eschatological titles 
of Jesus (“Christ,” “Lord,” and so forth) become ontological realities 
that all people share in the community of the kingdom.’44   
Ontological reality is only possible in this future.  Otto points out that 
Moltmann has a basic nonontological stance for the world featuring ‘the 
processive character of reality, the ontology of the not-yet, and the lack of a 
finalized, objective fact in any sense of the word.’45  This is not the real world 
and the resurrection can only work in the world at a social and symbolic 
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level until the end times.   Until then, we assent ‘to the tendency towards 
resurrection of the dead.’46   
The use of the word “tendency” describes Moltmann’s tentative approach to 
understanding any sense of a process in history or worldly existence in 
Theology of Hope. Indeed, we cannot understand human life nor can we 
understand God.  God acts in the world in unfathomable ways.  The 
resurrection and the eschatological future are both alien events in which God 
acts for the sake of humanity.  This understanding becomes problematic 
when hope for the future is bound up with understanding the nature of 
God’s promise to us.  For Moltmann, ‘the word is a word of 
promise…yet…it stands in contradiction to the reality open to experience 
now and heretofore.’47  Norman Young succinctly states the dilemma in 
Moltmann’s theology of hope: ‘Hope calls us to action but does not tell us 
what kind of action.  We are to act anticipating the fulfilment of God’s 
promises but cannot be sure what is promised.’48  Indeed, God’s future 
actions cannot be anticipated.  God’s actions, the creation, the resurrection, 
and the eschaton are mysteries.  Thus, the resurrection is ‘without analogy, 
without correlation—it cannot be understood.’49  Moltmann states that it 
does not speak ‘the language of facts.’50   
Although there are problems with this one-sided shaping of the present 
from the future what Moltmann has to say about the power of hope and the 
future is important.  Moltmann maintains against criticisms from Karl Barth 
and others that the main question must be: is the future an extrapolation of 
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the present or does the future determine the present in anticipation?51  
Moltmann naturally supports the latter, unfortunately at the expense of the 
former.  However, like Teilhard de Chardin’s cosmic Christ, the God of the 
future does pull humanity forward to the promised future and this concept 
must not be lost to the other extreme found in some scientific worldviews: 
that the future is solely a result of the past and present.52  In later work 
Moltmann too embraces the cosmic Christ as the moving power in evolution 
and as the redeemer of all creation.53  Anticipation is closely associated with 
both hope and planning.  Some sense of the future is necessary for hope to 
be realistic and planning to be fruitful.54  Moltmann’s theology would be 
more balanced if he accepted Barth’s notion that God is God of all modes of 
time, giving equal importance to past, present and future.55 
However, the eschatological future remains in contradiction to present 
reality.  The word of promise ‘cuts into events and divides reality into one 
reality which is passing and can be left behind, and another which must be 
expected and sought.’56  There is a clear divide between this world and the 
next.  Eschatological thinking is ‘the condition that makes possible the 
adaptation of Christianity to its environment and, as a result of this, the self-
surrender of faith.’57  The “adaptation” to the environment, in Theology of 
Hope, is to see the world as a passing reality, as alien even.  The world is not 
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as it should be but we must have hope and faith that God will be faithful to 
us.  The one who hopes ‘will never be able to reconcile himself with the laws 
and constraints of this earth, neither with the inevitability of death nor with 
the evil that constantly bears further evil.’58  Hope and planning are in a 
dialectic relationship to the world and its history so that anticipation of the 
coming kingdom results in a refusal to conform to ‘the coercive powers of 
this world.’59  Y e t  f a i t h  a n d  h o p e  i n  t h e  e s c h a t o n  i s  t h e  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  
contradictions, trials and godlessness seen in this world, the faith and hope 
that God will be faithful and overcome these contradictions.  
History is also understood in these terms.  History is a part of the reality 
which will pass away.  It has nothing to do with ‘evolution, progress and 
advance.’60  Moltmann’s reasoning here is: ‘If the word is a word of promise, 
then that means that this word has not yet found a reality congruous with it, 
but that on the contrary it stands in contradiction to the reality open to 
experience now and heretofore.’61  This word will only be found in the 
eschatological future and this is the only sense in which history exists, as the 
“not-yet” of the future.  World history and even ‘the historic character of 
human existence’62 are meaningless.  The future ‘does not have to develop 
within the framework of the possibilities inherent in the present, but arises 
from that which is possible to the God of the promise.’63  According to Otto, 
despite some misconceptions by other scholars, Moltmann does not support 
the Barthian stand for ‘the space-time factuality of the resurrection.’64  It is a 
‘word event’ alone, for the purposes of hope, for imagining of the future.65  
The crucifixion is an historical event (historisch) but the resurrection is 
historic (geschichtlich) and eschatological.  In Hope and Planning, Moltmann 
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speaks of the resurrection as historical ‘in as far as it creates history by 
opening up a new future.’66   
Otto suggests that Moltmann imposes a revisionist Marxist view of history 
upon the Hebrew Bible resulting in a view of God that is alien to it ‘and that 
is instead the processive becoming of humanity.'67   In Marxism the end of 
human labour pre-exists in human consciousness and constitutes the law 
that guides a person’s action.68  Moltmann substitutes this end with God’s 
promise of the future.  Hope is ‘not something which one man has and the 
other does not have, but is a primal mode of existing…’69  What is 
problematic for Otto in this view is that the human person, in fact, ‘has no 
n e e d  f o r  a n y  G o d  t o  m a k e  p r o m i s e s  s o  a s  t o  o p e n  h i s t o r y  f o r  h i m . ’ 70  
Humanity moves forward because it has to, pulled forward by the mode of 
being in the “not-yet.”   
However, the resurrection of Jesus Christ does occur in the world, in history.  
In Moltmann’s thought, the historic raising of Jesus Christ stands as the 
beginning of a new history discontinuous with the past.  This is ‘the 
mysteriously continuing history after Easter.’71  That the world and time 
continue at all is a mystery in the light of the resurrection.  There is a time 
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lapse between the raising of Christ and the raising of humanity and creation.  
This time lapse is not history in the sense of events following on from events.  
There has been a historical past before the resurrection which has been, as 
we have noted, a witness to the promise. The new history is a witness to the 
transformed promise.  The new history is not historical but a waiting for the 
future. There is no process or progress but a now and a then.  The 
resurrected Christ will be experienced in the future.  Jesus Christ is ‘the 
hidden Lord and hidden Saviour,’ and we must wait for the ‘future 
unveiling.’72  The parousia is seen as something coming towards us from the 
future.  It is not waiting for the return of Christ but it is ‘a presence which 
must be awaited today and tomorrow.’73  It is ‘a different thing from a reality 
that is experienced now and given now.’74  It points towards a different 
reality, not just a revelation of the ‘hidden ways’75 but of a reality that 
contains newness, something ‘which has so far not yet happened through 
Christ.’76 
It is the demonstration of God’s power of resurrection in the raising of Jesus 
which gives us the hope we need to live in the present world of sin and 
death. The purpose of the resurrection is seen to be a ‘revelation of the 
potentiality and power of God.’77  God raises Jesus Christ to demonstrate his 
faithfulness and his promise.78  This idea will be fully developed in The 
Crucified God and described in the following chapter.  The purpose of the 
new history is to be witness to God’s faithfulness shown in the resurrection: 
‘the continuity of the risen Christ with the earthly, crucified Jesus 
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necessitates the acceptance of the historic witness about him and about what 
happened to him.’79  God’s faithfulness, shown in the resurrection of Jesus, is 
the sole basis of our hope.  Indeed, God is the effective (and only?) force of 
transformation.  History is the necessary process between now and then.  It 
is a process which must happen, determined, it appears, by God alone.   The 
resurrection shows that Christ has already assumed lordship over the world 
in readiness for the time when humanity is set free from the world.  The 
reason for the time lapse between this resurrection and the future 
resurrection of creation is not fathomable for human beings.  The 
resurrection is a part of “God history” where God acts upon the world and 
sets in motion  
an eschatologically determined process of history, whose goal is the 
annihilation of death in the victory of the life of the resurrection, and 
which ends in that righteousness in which God receives in all things 
his due and the creature thereby finds its salvation.80    
As in 1 Cor. 15: 25, Christ ‘must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his 
feet.’81  There is some necessity that time elapses before this reign is complete 
though there is no fathoming why this must be or how long this may be. 
The resurrection is a new action by God.  Although the words “anastasis” 
and “resurrection” imply some form of repetition there is there is no “again” 
about resurrection. In Moltmann’s opinion, ‘Resurrectio is no restoration, but 
rather a promissio. It has no anamnesis, but rather anticipation.’82  He proposes 
that Paul and the disciples utilized the prevalent apocalyptic symbol of the 
resurrection to explain what was otherwise inexplicable.83  Following the 
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principle of newness, Moltmann suggests that Jesus as Christ was ‘created 
out of nothing,’84  The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo becomes one of a God who 
creates out of nothing not just in the beginning but also in the resurrection 
and in the eschaton.  It is God’s loving free will that underlies God’s actions.  
The world is not divine in itself and the resurrection is necessary to 
contradict ‘the nothingness of transitoriness.’85   
The importance of Christianity as a religion of history suffers under 
Moltmann’s theology.  L. Gilkey has said, ‘Until Moltmann and Pannenberg, 
no one conceived that historical inquiry could again be a ground for a 
Christology based on the Resurrection.’86  Paul Ricoeur 'applauds 
Moltmann's resituation of the Resurrection as hope for the future within the 
framework of the Jewish theology of the promise, removing it from the 
Hellenistic schemas of 'epiphanies of eternity.'87  These are examples of the 
widespread misconception that Moltmann’s theology has a historical basis. 
It is easy to see how such a misconception could arise given the weight of 
argument Moltmann gives to history in Theology of Hope and given his 
opposition to any kind of Greek notion of the eternal present.  However, 
Moltmann rejects all previous understandings of both non-historical and 
historical thinking, offering a new framework of God’s history.   
In his interpretation of Greek thinking, the eternal present is said to rob us of 
hope, time and history.  Yet Moltmann can call for the ‘turning in to the 
nearness of God’ while simultaneously dismissing a ‘mysticism of being, 
with its emphasis on the living of the present moment.’88   In later work 
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these positions are not placed in such opposition.  In The Coming of God, 
Moltmann speaks of the simultaneity of the eschaton to all times.89  Here 
Moltmann is influenced by Rudolf Bultmann’s principle that meaning in 
history lies in the present, in the ever-present possibility of the eschatological 
moment.90  Bultmann calls Christian existence a paradox because it is both 
‘an eschatological unworldly being and an historical being.’91  T o  b e  
historical is to live from the future, the sphere of indefinite possibilities.   
However, this also raises an anomaly, as pointed out by Richard Bauckham:  
Moltmann does not seem to have faced the problem of how the 
simultaneity of the eschaton to all time can be understood from the 
perspective of a moment within historical time, which would 
somehow have to be understood as both a moment within the flow of 
time and as in immediate relationship with the transcendent future in 
which it will be transformed into eternity.92   
To Moltmann’s mind, time remains transitory and cannot belong to or have 
a relationship to God’s eternity.  However, the imaginative power of hope 
can cling to the future time because of a “similarity” between the present 
moment and the eschatological moment.93 
For Moltmann, history (Geschichte) is grounded in the subjective historic 
moment, not in objective, factual history (Historie).94  Human history is 
subjective history.  The history of the Hebrew Bible is simply a ‘word 
history,’95 a witness to the promise.  This promise is validated in the event of 
Christ and ‘starts the traditional promise to Abraham off on a new history.’96  
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Yet this history, too, is a word history, a witness to God’s action in the 
resurrection of Christ and the promise of an eschatological future.  For 
Aaron Park, this ‘flatly contradicts the historical understanding which the 
writers of the New Testament had as they recorded the eschatological 
message for the Christian church.’97 In his comparison of the theologies of 
Moltmann, Bultmann and Pannenberg, he states,  
Such terms as “history” and “future” when used by the theologians of 
hope, do not necessarily convey a historical meaning in the sense that 
an ordinary historian understands.  They are really meant to 
designate categories or forms of thought by means of which one can 
conceive reality meaningfully.98  
The category is dialectical philosophy.  Both history and the future can only 
be understood in dialectical terms because of the ‘discontinuity between 
Jesus’ message of the kingdom and the church’s Christological message of 
the kingdom.’99  In Park’s estimation Moltmann writes ‘as if the future of 
Jesus Christ did not depend on human activities at all and as if it could be 
assured of its own fulfilment, because of the inner necessity of the Christ-
event itself.‘100  Once again, human freedom is circumscribed.  Park 
concludes that ‘the interpretation of Christian hope as offered by both 
Pannenberg and Moltmann is definitely not in accord with the eschatological 
message of the New Testament.’101  
In summary, Moltmann’s theology of hope in Theology of Hope is a 
contextualized eschatology.  Our basis of hope lies in God’s action in the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ, which prefigures the future resurrection of all of 
creation.  The new creation is ‘expected and hoped for solely in a totality of 
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new being.’102  Therefore, history and the world are part of a current reality 
which must be resisted.  We hope for the future fulfilment of God’s promises 
and while we wait in hope we actively challenge worldly conceptions of 
reality.   This leads us to the second area under discussion in examining 
Moltmann’s doctrine of hope and its relationship to the present.  We have 
summarized the theoretical basis of eschatology as the doctrine of Christian 
hope, embracing both the object of hope, that is, the resurrected Jesus Christ, 
and the hope inspired by the resurrection.  The second concern of Theology of 
Hope is Christian praxis.  How does hope work in praxis, in revolutionizing 
and transforming the present? 
The Praxis of Hope 
If God is the effective force of transformation, what is the role of humanity in 
the waiting period before the eschaton?  How do we achieve the ‘earthly, 
historic correspondence with the hoped-for and promised kingdom of God 
and of freedom’?103  These are important questions if we are seeking a 
worldview that gives humanity a meaningful place in the world.   
Moltmann’s use of the word “correspondence” here is misleading, however, 
because none can be found.  Indeed, correspondence really should read 
“alienation.”  Somewhat surprisingly, this need for alienation with reality is 
also seen as a call for action: the ‘life of everyday accordingly becomes the 
sphere of the true service of God (Rom. 12:1ff).’104  Christian praxis takes 
place in the dialectic between the cross and the resurrection.  The cross is the 
symbol of the godlessness and forsakenness of the world while the 
resurrection is the symbol of hope for a new world.  Hope reconciles us to 
the not-yet and makes us ready to bear the cross of the present.  Moreover, 
hope encourages us to challenge present reality knowing that this reality is 
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not the eschatological future for which we wait.  We become followers of 
Christ in obedience, faith and hope.   
What does this active discipleship entail?  Obedience means entering into 
the new covenant, the new history which has begun with the cross and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.  This covenant is one of faith in God’s 
faithfulness and hope in the eschatological future. To have neither faith nor 
hope is a sin.   God ‘has exalted man and given him the prospect of a life that 
is wide and free’105 yet humanity does not respond in like faith.  The sins of 
faithlessness and hopelessness are seen in passivity: ‘it is not the evil he 
does, but the good he does not do, not his misdeeds but his omissions, that 
accuse him.’106  Unwillingness to act is a sin against hope and against God.  
Conversely, obedience means a willingness to enter into covenant with God, 
which is also a call for action.  What action is called for?  We must take up 
the cross of existence in both the ‘trials of the body and the opposition of the 
world.’107 This action calls up two seemingly opposed attitudes.  The “trials 
of the body” call for an attitude of acceptance while “the opposition of the 
world” calls for the contrary attitude of non-acceptance and active challenge.  
Both attitudes lead to action, even the attitude of acceptance.   We will 
examine each of these aspects. 
The acceptance of the trials of the body does not arise from or lead to 
passivity.  Followers of Christ ‘obediently take upon them the sufferings of 
discipleship and in these very sufferings await the future glory.’108  T h i s  
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acceptance is ‘the self-giving non-resisting way of the cross.’109  B o t h  t h e  
trials of the body and the opposition of the world must be accepted ‘in terms 
of seeking after, and calling for, the coming freedom in the kingdom of 
Christ.’110  Suffering is spiritually transformative: to suffer is ‘to be changed 
and transformed.’111  God alone can transform the world but for humanity 
there remains the possibility of spiritual growth.  Indeed, God ‘stands 
opposed to (entgegen-steht) the human spirit’112 so that we may have the 
freedom to choose obedience and in this obedience there is then the 
possibility of transformation at a spiritual level.   
The world, also, is an oppositional force.  The acceptance of the trials of the 
body, which leads to spiritual transformation, does not mean acceptance of 
the world as it is.  The second aspect of Christian discipleship is, therefore, 
active opposition and resistance to the world.  Because ’faith cannot suffer 
the world to become a picture of God, nor a picture of man,’113 we must 
oppose and resist the godless and forsaken world.  Meaningful action is 
‘possible only within a horizon of expectation otherwise all decisions and 
actions would be desperate thrusts into a void and would hang 
unintelligibly and meaninglessly in the air.’114   The gospel message of hope 
informs our relationship to the world.  We oppose all that is not part of this 
eschatological horizon, all that is at odds with righteousness and peace.   
Moltmann adopts the notion of “progressive revelation,” meaning that the 
revelation of the kingdom of God ‘becomes progressive in the human spirit, 
or that the progress of the human spirit can be interpreted as the self-
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movement of absolute Spirit.’115  In the divide between this reality and the 
future reality of the kingdom of God, it is not clear what “progressive” 
means here.  The movement of the human spirit is ‘onwards—not 
upwards.’116  We can not transform present reality but we keep moving 
forward towards the new reality promised to us.  Indeed, it is eschatology 
that ‘keeps history moving by its criticism and hope.’117 The person of hope 
‘leaves behind the corrupt reality and launches out on to the sea of divine 
possibilities.’118  The scope for transformation is at a spiritual level and made 
possible by future projection to, by faith and hope in, the kingdom of God.  
God calls from the future kingdom and humanity responds with faith and 
hope.  There is an obvious divide between current and future reality but the 
mysterious “sea of divine possibilities” is set between the two as part of 
God’s progressive revelation.  We try to live into this future. Thus, any 
spiritual transformation moves us forward but does not appear to have any 
transformative effect on the kingdom of God itself. 
Moltmann’s conviction is that the future alone can bring hope.  The present 
and the past is not a source of hope.  He considers that ‘it is not our 
experiences which make faith and hope, but it is faith and hope that make 
experiences and bring the human spirit to an ever new and restless 
transcending of itself.’119  Faith and hope in the future lead us to challenge 
the world and ourselves.  Our challenge to the world is that which creates 
our experiences.  The positive side to this is that imagining the future of 
God’s kingdom should affect life now.  God’s promise is our source of joy.  
Developing this theme in The Coming of God, Moltmann speaks of God 
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drawing all created beings into the mutual relationships of the trinitarian 
God, ‘into the wide open space of the God who is sociality.’120  The fullness 
of God gives Moltmann ‘the liberty to leave moral and ontological concepts 
behind’ for this eschatological future.121  The negative side to this thinking is 
that Moltmann avoids the question of human (and, in a sense, God’s) 
morality in existence now. Hugh Pyper finds this a ‘crucial gap’ in The 
Coming of God because it denies that death in and of the world may be part of 
God’s purposes.122  What does it mean, he asks, to die with Christ? 
Moltmann’s praxis of the individual becomes a part of the collective praxis 
of the church.  Bauckham calls mission the second main theme of Theology of 
Hope, after the theme of promise.123  The praxis of the church begins with the 
missionary proclamation of the gospel, ‘that no corner of this world should 
remain without God’s promise of new creation through the power of the 
resurrection.’124  The new history since the resurrection must continue to be 
proclaimed.   The church is also enjoined to act responsibly, both in the 
human and natural world.  The church acts ‘in the interests of a humanizing 
of conditions and in the interests of the realization of justice.’125  T h e  
Christian church works towards community in respecting the humanity of 
each person.  It also sees itself ‘in a profound bodily solidarity with the 
‘earnest expectation of the creature’ (Rom. 8: 19ff.), both in its subjection to 
vanity and in the universal hope.’126  This is the beginning of a theology of 
creation which will lead to the environmental awareness of God in Creation. 
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Conclusion 
In summary, the praxis that is outlined in Theology of Hope begins with hope 
in the future kingdom of God.  This hope informs our relationship to the 
world, which we challenge and resist because of its contradiction to the 
coming kingdom.  There is also the beginning of an attempt to outline some 
sense of correspondence between the divine and earthly kingdoms, if only in 
the possibility of individual spiritual transformation.  This, together with the 
preferential option for the poor, will be developed further in Crucified God 
and in later works.  However, even ‘the best of all the possible worlds open 
to us is still a human world and won’t become a divine one, for what is 
divine is not an enhancement of what is human.’127  The divide between the 
human and spiritual worlds remains. 
The strength of Moltmann’s systematic beginnings of Theology of Hope is the 
return to theological debate of two important themes: eschatology and hope.  
Moltmann challenged what he saw as the continuing failure of theology to 
engage with eschatology as well as the contemporary world.  Hope looks to 
the future and is a vital attribute to humanity.  Without hope, there is 
despair, apathy and an inability to act.  Moltmann places hope in a Christian 
context of Christ’s deed for the future of the world.  Because of this deed of 
Golgotha we can look forward to a redeemed future.  God is, indeed, our 
hope.  The publication of Theology of Hope was greeted with great enthusiasm 
in the 1960’s even beyond the theological world.  There was a climate of 
optimism, the “outburst of hope,” which, as Bauckham suggests, made it 
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seem as though this ‘hopeful turning to the future was the characteristic of 
modern humanity.’128   
Although this book continues to have influence there are aspects that have 
been seen as dated and relevant only to its historical context.  For example, S. 
Smith has wondered about the sense of separation between Moltmann’s God 
and the world.  We will only be truly united with God in the future 
eschaton.  Is this sense of separation a sign of the times?  Smith has 
speculated, ‘[b]ecause our materialism and narcissism have blinded us to 
God as a living presence, have we now conjured a theology to somehow 
account for this by putting him into the future?  Has virtue (hope) become 
the child of tragic necessity?’129  Is hope our only hope?  Yet Moltmann is 
assured of God’s promise for eschatological union. This surety has also been 
critiqued as if the end is so certain that there is ‘no real discussion to be 
made.’130  Moltmann ignores the prospect of future judgment as 
condemnation.  This one-sidedness challenges the nature of human freedom.  
If God redeems all of creation no matter what, then this is a determinism 
that disregards human freedom (and responsibility!)  Humanity (despite 
Moltmann’s call for Christian praxis) needs only to wait.  Indeed, Smith has 
questioned whether the church for Moltmann is ‘in its witness and mission 
anything more than the harbinger of the truth of all men.’131  
It is interesting to note that the task of theology for Moltmann is similar to 
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  h o p e  i n  t h i s  d i s s e rtation, that is, that there is a 
correspondence between the human will and the world which sustains and 
supports it.  Moltmann writes that it is the task of theology ‘to expound the 
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knowledge of God in a correlation between understanding of the world and 
self-understanding.’132 And yet there is little correlation to be found in this 
earlier theology.  The knowledge of God is given to us in revelation, in the 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  This is the beginning of a new 
history which leads to a new future.  Moltmann returns eschatology to its 
central position in Christianity.  The future glory of God beckons to us and 
we look towards it in hope.  The difficulty in this eschatology is not only to 
be found in the relationship between God and the world but particularly in 
humanity and its relationship to the world.  The risen Christ’s lordship over 
the world is to set humanity free from this world ‘for the coming salvation in 
faith and hope.’133  At the same time he can say, '[i]s any self-understanding 
of man conceivable at all which is not determined by his relation to the 
world, to history, to science?’134  Yet this correlation between this world and 
knowledge of God remains tenuous.  We are promised a glorious future but 
the way is not clear.  Our “self-understanding” is that we are “subject to 
vanity” (Rom. 8: 19) along with all of creation.  We are ‘wayfarers.’135  The 
world is no longer to be regarded from the standpoint of the law.  Indeed, 
human beings and the world are materially untransformable.  This world 
does not appear to correlate with the new world at all.  We have the 
historical parable of the coming kingdom (as in Barth) but Moltmann 
continues to presuppose ‘an enduring qualitative difference between earth 
and heaven.’136 
Moltmann interprets Paul’s proclamation of “the end of the law” as an end 
to all that has gone before.  There is no room for transformation or a gradual 
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development of any earthly entity or process.  The world is so unredeemable 
that we need a new creation, out of nothing.  Moltmann’s answer to 
Auschwitz is that it is unanswerable.  He does not attempt a theodicy of this 
world, an answer to the sheer weight of pain and suffering experienced in 
the world.  Christ has taken the weight of evil upon himself in his ‘lordship 
over the world’137 yet evil appears to be growing exponentially.  The fact of 
this continuing world existence is unanswerable if not embarrassing in terms 
of a Christian theodicy.  And yet any systematic exploration of the creaturely 
relationship to God must examine the problem of evil.  Moltmann will 
develop his anthropology further in both The Crucified God and  God in 
Creation yet, as we will see in the following sections, he does not formulate a 
response to why evil exists or the dilemma inherent in bodily existence.   
Moltmann will emphasize moral and political evil rather than natural evil. 
  
The social symbolism of the resurrection mentioned above also translates 
into Moltmann’s anthropology.  Because the world and humanity are 
untransformable, bodily resurrection is understood symbolically:  ‘[n]ot the 
corpse that we can dissect objectively, but the body with which we identify 
in love, stands in the horizon of the resurrection hope.  There is no 
meaningful hope for the body we have, but only for the body we are.’138  New 
being is only achieved in the future kingdom.  The body is a social unit 
where a person can find identity in this life by going out of one’s self ‘and 
becoming personally, socially, and politically incarnate.’139  Moltmann 
himself had a personal, resurrection experience.  He describes how, while a 
prisoner of war during World War II, he experienced resurrection: ‘faith 
                                                 
137 Moltmann, Hope, 299. 
138 Jürgen Moltmann, Religion, Revolution, and the Future (New York: Scribner's, 1969), 58. 
Cited in Otto, "Resurrection," 89.  Original emphasis. 
139 Moltmann, Religion, Revolution, 57.  Cited in Otto, "Resurrection," 90.   71  
inside the “house of the dead.”140  This came about through an acceptance of 
suffering and can be seen as the personal impetus behind a theology of both 
hope and the resurrection.  The resurrection is experienced even within this 
world and is a symbolic representation of the resurrection of the eschaton. 
There is no denying Moltmann’s enthusiasm for the power of God.  God will 
act in the end times to bring about ‘new, eternal life’ for all.141  F o r  
Moltmann, hope comes from this eschatological future.  Our hope is assured 
because it is God’s promise to us.  The biblical promise encapsulated in the 
covenant with Israel is revealed in a new light since the Christ event.  The 
promise becomes universal.  Our guarantee for the future is in the person of 
Jesus Christ, now present through the cross and the resurrection.  The cross 
symbolizes the godlessness and forsakenness of the world.  The resurrection 
reveals the power and potentiality of God, symbolizing hope for the new 
world.  Because God has raised Jesus Christ we can have faith and hope that 
God will act again in the eschaton to bring in the new world.  All the 
contradictions inherent in the world as it is now will be overcome.  History 
since the resurrection is witness to a progressive revelation of the Spirit 
which will culminate in the eschaton.  It is not necessarily apparent to the 
human world what this revelation consists of, however, human spiritual 
growth is possible through engagement with the trials of the world.  Thus, 
Christian praxis operates between the cross and the resurrection.  We live in 
time and materiality for now but the reality of the world in its forsakenness 
and godlessness must be challenged and resisted.  The work of the church is 
to proclaim the new covenant and the Christian response begins with 
obedience.  Obedience, faithfulness and hope then give the strength needed 
to work towards a true humanity and justice.   
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Moltmann expertly highlights all the contradictions of the world, the 
dichotomies of existence.  We live in a dialectical world, with only the 
promise of a different future. Theology of Hope represents the early 
Moltmann.  It can be seen as arising from his own life, his own points of 
reference, as Jaeger has noted.142  Moltmann himself stated his challenge of 
the 50’s and 60’s was to formulate an answer to Auschwitz.143  He was also 
responding to the theology of his times, which was ‘busy creating a theology 
without God, or, at least, without considering him.’144  Theology was 
suffering from a “death of God” mentality. Moltmann could not find an 
answer to Auschwitz, or, indeed, human and worldly existence and history.  
He chose to look to a God in the future and a redeemed future for the world.  
Hope could only be found in God, not in the world and certainly not in 
humanity.  In the next chapter, we will see this dialectical approach in 
Moltmann’s theology of the cross. 
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Chapter 2  The Crucified God: suffering in the world 
Introduction 
This chapter adds a significant facet to Moltmann’s worldview: the 
significance of the crucifixion of Christ for both God and humanity.   
Moltmann wrote The Crucified God partly as a response to the political 
climate of the late 1960’s and early 70’s.1  The movements of hope in the 60’s 
had met stronger resistance and opposition than they could deal with and it 
was now important to address issues of theodicy and evil.   As Moltmann 
has pointed out, a theology of the cross is inherently important but not 
obvious in his early theology of hope.2  Thus, the starting point in Crucified 
God becomes, not the resurrection and the future, but an integrated theology 
of the cross—the resurrection of the crucified Christ.  In the history of 
Christian theology Moltmann finds an emphasis on theologies of the 
resurrection which he wants to redress with a new emphasis on the 
crucifixion.  Moltmann also speaks of the crisis of relevance and identity in 
Christian life, and a theology of the crucified Christ is needed to answer this 
twofold crisis.  Although the cross does not figure greatly in Theology of Hope, 
many of its other themes are further developed in Crucified God.  The 
dialectical principle of knowledge is still the basis for revelation.  The 
crucified Christ becomes the example par excellence of the unredeemable 
nature of the world and humanity highlighted in Theology of Hope.  Whereas 
in Theology of Hope this leads humanity to challenge the world, in Crucified 
God this challenge is shown to have already been faced and overcome by 
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Jesus.  We follow the path of Jesus because he has become the eschatological 
Christ of hope.  Moltmann develops his trinitarian theology, focussing here 
on the first two persons of the Trinity.   
Moltmann’s aim in Crucified God is threefold: firstly, to interpret the crucified 
Christ in the light and context of his resurrection, so that the crucifixion is 
central to the picture of freedom and hope; secondly, to challenge and 
revolutionize our concept of God by asking, “who is God in the cross of the 
Christ who is abandoned by God?” and, lastly, to examine humanity by 
going beyond ideas of personal salvation and examining the “demonic” 
crisis in society.  Moltmann’s approach is to proffer dialectical thought as the 
primary means of knowledge.  Revelation occurs in contradiction.  He then 
highlights the scandalous and contradictory nature of the cross and outlines 
why the cross needs to be the basis for Christian theology.  He proposes a 
trinitarian God who experiences suffering and encompasses the negative so 
that humanity need not suffer alone.   
I will begin with a précis of the main points of Crucified God under three 
headings, followed by a conclusion.  The three areas reflect Moltmann’s 
threefold intent.  They examine the historical Jesus and his cross, God and 
the cross and humanity and praxis in the light—or shadow—of the cross.  
My aim in examining Crucified God is to establish whether Moltmann’s 
theology of hope is enhanced or changed by his christology.  Are the 
theological difficulties of his theology of hope—determinism, absence of 
judgment, ontology of future, lack of reconciliation—addressed or answered 
in Crucified God?  Does humanity continue to stand separate, somewhat 
bewildered and unreconciled in earthly existence while looking for a distant 
hope?  In many respects the answer to this question is yes.  The world 
remains godforsaken and humanity’s hope lies in the God of the future.  We 
can absolutely trust that God will save humanity in the eschaton.  What has   75  
changed is that the God of the future is also present with humanity in its 
godforsakenness.  The Father, Son and Spirit all share in the suffering of 
humanity through the events of the cross.  Moltmann adds a healthy 
corrective to an emphasis on the resurrection with his examination of the life 
and death of Jesus. 
The Historical Jesus and his Cross 
Moltmann describes the centrality of the cross in defining Christianity, yet to 
speak of death on the cross was, for both the Israelites and the Romans, 
degrading and an embarrassment.  Paul’s theology of the cross highlights 
the “foolishness” of proclaiming the crucified Christ (1 Cor. 23).  For 
Moltmann, this foolishness has been disregarded, or at least, ameliorated in 
the history of theology.  Instead, he proposes that the death on the cross 
must be regarded in its radical, confrontational, alien and contradictory 
nature.  There are starting points for a traditional doctrine of the Trinity that 
are based on the incarnation but, according to Moltmann, it is only in the 
modern era, since Hegel, that a doctrine of the Trinity emerges that starts 
with the contradiction of the cross.3  Moltmann approaches his theology of 
the cross from two directions.  The first one begins with Jesus’ historical life 
leading to the cross, and the second one begins with the resurrection and 
looks back at the cross.  According to Moltmann, early Christian theology 
emphasized the resurrected Christ and the consequences of the resurrection 
for humanity and the world.4  A n d ,  i n d e e d ,  Theology of Hope also 
emphasized the resurrection.  Moltmann now sees a need to give equal 
weight to a theology of the cross that incorporates the life and death of Jesus.  
As noted in the Introduction, in this return to the centrality of the cross 
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Moltmann is indebted to Luther and to his own Reformed tradition.5  
Moltmann adds a new element by assessing the participation of all three 
persons of the Trinity.  Because God is revealed in the suffering of the cross, 
the crucifixion challenges the way we know God.  
Moltmann looks at the particularity of Jesus’ life and the implications that his 
death has for a theology of God.  The crucifixion must be viewed from both 
directions and not just be historically assessed in light of the resurrection.  
For Moltmann, it is because of Jesus’ life in its political and social challenge 
that he is crucified.  Jesus was handed over to the authorities because his 
message was considered blasphemous—he named himself God.  However, 
the sentence of crucifixion was only given to those who posed a threat to the 
political or social order of Rome.  Jesus was seen as an instigator of foment 
because of his challenge to Rome’s authority.  So although the Pharisees and 
Zealots see Jesus as a traitor to the sacred cause of Israel, he is tried as a 
fomenter of social unrest by the Romans.6  In the larger picture, Jesus is, 
indeed, both of these things in his public testimony of the law of grace being 
above the laws of nations, empires, races and classes.7   
There is an intentionality about Jesus’ actions that leads him to the 
crucifixion.  Jesus sets out for Jerusalem and takes the expected suffering 
upon himself.  Moltmann, however, does not see this as ‘an example of 
patience and submission to fate.’8  Indeed, the cry of abandonment and the 
agony of his death point to the opposite viewpoint.  The mystery of Jesus’ 
death, however, is in its manner, which is so unlike comparable narratives of 
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the death of great witnesses of faith.9  Jesus believes himself forsaken by his 
God and he suffers greatly.  For Moltmann, ‘every Christian theology is 
consciously or unconsciously answering the question, “Why hast thou 
forsaken me?”’10  Although Jesus through his political machinations actively 
seeks death, he dies forsaken and abandoned by God.  Jesus cries, “My God, 
my God, why have you forsaken me?” (Mt. 27: 46; Mk. 15: 34).  Moltmann 
believes that the words from the cross are theologically motivated 
additions.11  Later tradition ‘took doctrinal offence and reformulated the cry 
of Jesus and made it more pious.’12   
In his own exegesis of the (authentic) words of forsakenness, Moltmann 
observes a change in meaning from their original sense in Psalm 22:1.  Psalm 
22 is the plea of a righteous person for God to defend the Godhead’s own 
righteousness and faithfulness.  Jesus, however, calls to God to defend the 
Son’s theological existence.  The cry means ‘not only “My God, why hast thou 
forsaken  me?  But at the same time, “My God, why hast thou forsaken 
thyself?”’13  It is not just the relationship of God to humanity, as in Psalm 22, 
but God to God, God to his Son.  Radically, Moltmann suggests that Jesus 
‘died as one rejected by his God and his Father.’14  The rejection is seen to be 
a rejection of all that is of the world, all that is (in)human.  The death on the 
cross is God’s indictment not only on human society but on the whole 
world.  Moltmann does not change this view over time.  In one of his latest 
books,  In the End- the Beginning, Moltmann speaks of a God who must 
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endure the creation of human beings and the inherent inhumanity in the 
world.15  
How does the earthly Jesus become the eschatological Christ?  Here 
Moltmann takes into account the second viewpoint of the cross—the cross in 
the light of the resurrection.  The perennial problems of Christianity and the 
world reside in the tension between the two aspects of ‘the earthly and the 
eternal, the particular and the universal, the temporal and the 
eschatological.’16  Moltmann poses four questions to distinguish Jesus from 
his divine titles, such as “Christ,” “Son of Man” and “Son of God.”  The 
questions are: “Is Jesus true God?” “Is Jesus true Man?” “Are you he who is 
to come?” and “Who do you say that I am?”  
The first question, “Is Jesus true God?” examines how the eternal, 
unchangeable God could live in temporal, transitory existence.  He rejects 
Fichte’s and Hegel’s notions of the self-revelation of God, of God as subject, 
and of the ‘sublimation of history in the spirit’17 because they do not take 
into account the historical person of Jesus.  Any attempt to sublimate 
anything of the world into the divine world is an attempt to understand 
history as a necessity.  For Moltmann, ‘only a new creation which is based on 
the crucified Christ can sublimate the scandal of his cross into a pure hymn 
of praise.’18  This line of thinking is a continuation from Theology of Hope in 
the radical discontinuity between the time before and after Christ.  The life 
and death of Jesus illustrate the unredeemable nature of history. 
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In Moltmann’s answer to the second question, “Is Jesus true Man?” he 
attacks the Christian anthropology which has defined humanity in 
relationship to Jesus as a human person.  He rejects most of the early 
theology which names the resurrected Jesus in terms of formulas of 
adoption, enthronement or representation because they emphasize the 
resurrected Christ over the crucified Jesus.19  These titles (Christ, Son of God, 
Kyrios) subordinate the human experiences of Jesus to the divine, 
eschatological Christ. He agrees, however, with the sense of his expiatory 
role: humanity could not achieve its own righteousness and needed Christ as 
liberator from its sin and to enable communion with God.  In the death of 
Jesus, God acts in favour of humanity.  Humanity can gain a share in the 
resurrection (Phil. 3: 10-12) by ‘sharing in the fellowship of Christ’s 
suffering.’20  The cross is ‘the form of the coming, redeeming kingdom.’21  
The resurrection becomes the basis for this new kingdom, which we share in 
its provisional form until the end times.   
Moltmann rejects Kant’s basis of reason and Schleiermacher’s basis of feeling 
as a ground for a “Jesuology” hermeneutic.  The dispute centres on how the 
human being apprehends God.  According to Moltmann, for Kant we can 
only understand through our faculty of reason, and anything beyond reason 
is of no practical use.22  However, this assessment may be unbalanced. 
Although Kant privileges reason over faith, he speaks of a practical and 
soteriological faith in the Son of God.  Kant’s basis of this faith arises from a 
kinder picture of humanity.  He supposes that humanity must have some 
God-given capacity to emulate the Son of God and this is to be found in the 
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human being’s faculty of reason.23  Moltmann contrasts this christology of 
moral example with Schleiermacher’s supposition that God can be 
experienced directly through the feeling life.  According to Schleiermacher, 
humanity can experience consciousness of God because Jesus perfected 
human God-consciousness.24  Moltmann’s criticism with both schemas is 
that the transcendent perfection of Christ is the mode of knowledge and this 
denies both the suffering of Jesus and his rejection by God.  Moltmann’s own 
basis is ‘the transcendence of concrete rejection.’25  Christ is ‘outside history, 
outside society and outside the question of the humanity of living men.’26   
Moltmann develops this thinking further in the next two questions.  The 
third question is “Are you he who is to come?”  Moltmann answers yes, but 
if Jesus is the Christ then an eschatological re-evaluation of Judaic messianic 
expectation must be undertaken.  We have noted in the previous chapter 
that the promise given to the Israel becomes a universal promise of salvation 
(above, 49).  If the Messiah has now come, what does this mean for 
atonement?  Moltmann rejects the Christian concept of the instigation of a 
process of redemption with the resurrection.  He sees the new messianic 
expectation as a hope in the future kingdom, with the resurrection as a sign 
of God’s promise. The human person is brought ‘to repentance through his 
own suffering in the cross of Jesus.’27   
The last question, “Who do you say that I am?” is similarly answered.   
Because the future kingdom is discontinuous with the present world, the 
person of Jesus Christ is seen to be a novelty.  The ‘centre of his existence is 
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outside of himself’28 until the eschaton, when the novelty will no longer be a 
novelty and Christ will be the basis of a new creation.  The idea of a new 
creation marks a change from early Jewish apocalyptic thought.  Instead of 
the Jewish apocalyptic understanding of the resurrection of the dead, 
Christian proclamation announces that one person has already been raised 
from the dead.  The transcendent God becomes immanent in Jesus and the 
immanent Jesus is transcendent in God.29  The great mystery of dichotomies 
arises: true life in the midst of false life; reconciliation in the midst of strife; 
the law of grace in the midst of judgment, and creative love in the midst of 
legalism.  The resurrection is proleptic, anticipating an expected future event 
as though it was already an accomplished fact.   It does not speak the human 
‘”language of facts,” but only the language of faith and hope, that is, the 
“language of promise.”’30  The old world of suffering and strife cannot 
demonstrate the new creation. The resurrection arises from a new element 
that God introduces into the world, which will become universal in the 
eschaton: ‘[c]reation, new creation and resurrection are external works of 
God against chaos, nothingness and death.’31 
According to Moltmann, in early Christian tradition there was little dispute 
over the resurrection of Jesus.32  The disputes were over the interpretation of 
the death of the cross in the light of resurrection.  Moltmann agrees that all 
of Jesus’ life must be explained in light of resurrection: ‘his future 
determines and explains his origin and his end his beginning.’33  Yet the 
resurrection is a mystery: ‘God is disclosing something which is concealed 
from the knowledge of the present age of the world.  He is revealing 
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something which cannot be known by the mode of knowledge of the present 
time.’34  The resurrection heralds a ‘new eschatological understanding of 
time.’35  The ‘future of the new world of life has already gained power over 
this unredeemed world of death and has condemned it to become a world 
that passes away.’36  In the eschaton, this mystery of life over death will be 
revealed to humankind.  
Moltmann’s project is to “resurrect” the resurrection in light of the cross.  He 
does this by assessing the crucifixion in terms of the life of the historical 
Jesus.  He wants to reclaim the horror of Jesus’ death on the cross and with 
it, its radical, alien and confrontational nature.  Jesus is forsaken by his 
Father, and human society and the earthly world are indicted.  Yet, despite 
this, God raises Jesus from the dead, instituting (or perhaps escalating) the 
tension between the earthly and the eternal, and the temporal and 
eschatological.  The eschatological presence of Christ stands in tension with 
the godforsaken world.  How does Jesus’ forsakenness accord to God’s 
righteousness?  To answer this question, Moltmann adds a trinitarian 
element to his interpretation of the crucifixion.  Moltmann examines both the 
Trinity as persons and the Trinity as the one God to examine first the 
righteousness of God, the Father, and second, what the crucifixion expresses 
about God as one.  Moltmann interprets the death of Jesus not as a divine-
human event but as a trinitarian event between the Son and the Father, from 
which the Spirit arises.   This new framework challenges earlier 
interpretation which seeks to understand the crucifixion through the 
relationship between the human and divine natures. 
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God and the cross 
Moltmann has already stated that God the Father abandoned the Son on the 
cross.  How then does the crucifixion correspond to the righteousness of 
God?  According to Richard Bauckham this question is central: ‘the heart of 
the argument of The Crucified God is an interpretation of the cross of Jesus as 
the abandonment of the Son of God by his Father, set within the horizon of 
the question of theodicy.’37  The importance of the crucifixion lies in its effect 
on God.  Moltmann asks, what does Christ’s suffering on the cross mean for 
the triune God?  He believes a problematic distinction between the divine 
and human natures in trinitarian doctrine within western theology has led to 
an incorrect understanding of God’s relationship to the crucifixion.   
The Chalcedonian Creed states that Christ is both fully human and fully 
divine ‘inconfusedly, inalterably, undividedly and inseparably.’38  
Moltmann’s first challenge is to the nature of divinity.  According to 
Moltmann, early Christianity inherited the Platonic notion of apatheia: God in 
the Godhead’s divine nature cannot suffer.39  Because God could not suffer, 
the suffering of Christ was seen to be suffering in Christ’s person  in his 
human nature and not in the Godhead’s trinitarian nature.  Later, with the 
help of the scholastic notion of communicatio idiomatum, one could ‘attribute 
the human characteristics of suffering and death to the whole person of 
Christ.’40  Now the divine nature could suffer and die but only within the 
person of Christ, not within the whole Trinity.  The distinction arose 
between the immanent Trinity and the Trinity in the economy of salvation.  
To support his idea of the suffering of God, Moltmann challenges the history 
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of interpretation of the two natures of Christ.  He believes that trinitarian 
doctrine has been weak in western theology with a problematic distinction 
between divine and human natures.  Adopting Platonic notions of the 
transcendent God, early theology believed that God in the Godhead’s divine 
nature, cannot suffer.41  The suffering of Christ was seen to be suffering in 
Christ’s person as the second person of the Trinity and not in the Godhead’s 
trinitarian nature.  With the help of the scholastic notion of communicatio 
idiomatum, one could ‘attribute the human characteristics of suffering and 
death to the whole person of Christ.’42  The divine nature could suffer and 
die but only within the person of Christ, not within the whole Trinity.  The 
distinction then arose between the immanent Trinity and the Trinity in the 
economy of salvation.  Reformation theology also debated this.  Moltmann 
rejects Zwingli’s view that ‘God remains untouched in his sovereignty by 
taking the human nature of Christ.  Christ suffers and dies according to his 
manhood, his veil of flesh, on our behalf.’43  He prefers Luther’s notion that 
the person of Christ is determined by the divine person.  Therefore, ‘the 
divine person also suffers and dies in the suffering and death of Christ.’44  
John Jaeger too detects a Hegelian influence of ‘negative and painful 
elements in human history being included in God’s history.’45   Moltmann’s 
God suffers with humanity.  In supposing the suffering of God, Moltmann 
rejects the Christian tradition of the transcendent God: ‘Were God incapable 
of suffering in any respect…then He would also be incapable of love.’46  
Christ’s suffering is shared by God and taken up into God.   
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In more recent theology Moltmann demonstrates a blurring of the 
distinction between the transcendent and the immanent God. 47  For Rahner, 
the Trinity is the nature of God and the nature of God is Trinity.   
Furthermore, ‘the Trinity of the economy of salvation is  the immanent 
Trinity.’48  Moltmann agrees: ‘we must abandon the doctrine of the two 
natures and with it any concept of God-metaphysical, moral, or political—
that is assumed to have general validity.’49  M o l t m a n n  p r o p o s e s  t h a t  w e  
must give up the distinction between God in godself and God for us, so that 
‘the nature of God would have to be the human history of Christ and not a 
divine “nature” separate from man.’50   This nature is, following Rahner, the 
Trinity.51   
The nature of the Trinity is not an ontological category but a social one.  It is 
exemplified in the event of the cross, in the relationship between the Father, 
the Son and the Spirit.  Following his logic that the Father abandons his Son 
on the cross, Moltmann speculates that not only does the Son suffer in 
believing himself forsaken in his Father’s love, the Father also ‘suffers in his 
love the grief of the death of the Son.’52  In Moltmann’s opinion, the problem 
of the doctrine of the two natures for is that it ‘must understand the event of 
the cross statically as a reciprocal relationship between two qualitatively 
different natures, the divine nature which is incapable of suffering and the 
human nature which is capable of suffering.’53  Moltmann prefers to 
understand the crucifixion and resurrection as a trinitarian event.  The death 
on the cross ‘is not the event of co-humanity, but the event of Golgotha, the 
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event of the love of the Son and the grief of the Father from which the Spirit 
who opens up the future and creates life in fact derives.’54  The Spirit is that 
which weaves between the Father and the Son in their love and their grief. 
God is the “event” between the Father, Son and Spirit.  Moltmann’s 
pneumatology is not developed in any detail until his later work in God in 
Creation.  Because of this, Carl Braaten believes that Moltmann’s desire to 
offer a trinitarian concept of God here fails.   The relations between the 
Father and Son are spelled out but ‘the Spirit goes along for a free ride.   
Would not a bitarian concept of God work as well?’55  With his emphasis on 
the crucifixion as a trinitarian event Moltmann also leaves the human nature 
of Jesus behind. 
In Theology of Hope Moltmann defines God by the raising of the crucified 
Jesus from the dead. In Crucified God, Bauckham proposes that God is 
defined by God’s own self-abandonment on the cross.56  Moltmann writes, 
‘in the forsakenness of the Son the Father also forsakes himself.’57  T h e  
Father suffers the grief of love.  Moltmann tries to avoid patripassianism by 
introducing the term “patricompassianism” (Patricompassianismus) in The 
Future of Creation.58  Both the Father and the Son suffer and act in surrender: 
the Father surrenders the Son and the Son surrenders to the will of the 
Father.  However, the Father does not suffer and die like the Son.  The Father 
suffers ‘Sonlessness’ when he forsakes his Son just as the Son feels forsaken 
by the Father.59   Unfortunately, Moltmann himself devotes only a few 
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sentences to the difference in suffering of the Father and the Son.  Braaten 
suggests that, because Moltmann wants to use language about the suffering 
of God, ‘this should have merited an explicit treatment rather than a mere 
assertion that the Father’s suffering is of a different kind than the Son’s.’60  
Because Moltmann defines God by the crucifixion, he has also been criticized 
for effectively identifying God with the historical process begun in the 
crucifixion.  Walter Kasper asks, ‘How does [Moltmann] escape the (no 
doubt unwanted) consequence that God needs history to “come to 
himself”?’61  Moltmann replies that his dialectical thinking is not to be 
understood as a collapse of oppositions into identity.  Rather, God freely 
empties godself into what is alien in order to bring the world into the future 
glory of God.  It is a picture of hope because it demonstrates God’s openness 
to involve the Godhead in salvation history.62 
The title The Crucified God is challenging.  The suggestion that God 
experiences death is a radical one.  The early theology of the church 
considered that it was the human nature of Jesus which died, not the divine 
nature of Christ and this understanding has prevailed.  The Christ as the 
Logos and as part of the Trinity cannot die.  Indeed, it is through the Logos 
that the created world exists.  D. Attfield sees the monolithic nature of 
Moltmann’s theology problematic because it supposes that the second 
person of the Trinity can die.  He proposes a distinction in Christ’s roles to 
overcome this dilemma.  In his role in the incarnation Christ becomes the 
logical subject of the human being Jesus.  In this role Christ does not use his 
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omnipotence or omniscience to overrule the actions of Jesus.  (We will see 
that Sergei Bulgakov has this same understanding of the relationship 
between the divine and human natures of Christ (chapter 5, 195).)  In 
Attfield’s thought, it is the human Jesus who suffers, believes himself 
abandoned on the cross, and dies.  However, Christ also has a discarnate 
role as an integral part of the triune God.  In his divine nature ‘[t]he Word, 
with his Father and the Spirit in the Trinity and in his cosmic sphere, feels 
himself as the man enduring the gallows tree.’63  In this way, the two natures 
do not have to be a divisive element in God.  Hypostatic union between the 
two natures ensures that the trinitarian God is connected to Jesus Christ.   
Despite the theological difficulties, what is important for Moltmann is that 
God becomes God “for us” in this mutual suffering.  Through this suffering, 
God brings righteousness into an unrighteous world.  God’s righteousness 
of grace is described by Bauckham as ‘unconditional love which at the cost 
of divine suffering accepts the unrighteous and identifies with the 
forsaken.’64  One person is raised so that he can communicate God’s creative 
love and new righteousness which ‘breaks through the vicious cycles of hate 
and vengeance and which…creates a new [hu]mankind with a new 
humanity.’65  For Moltmann, Christ ‘introduces the coming reign of God into 
the godless present by means of representative suffering.’66  T h r o u g h  
Christ’s suffering and death, ‘the risen Christ brings righteousness and life to 
the unrighteous and the dying.’67  The new righteousness is based on grace, 
not the law.  The representative suffering of Christ is not to be associated 
with a sacrificial expiation of sins.  Expiation is interpreted within the 
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framework of the law and is retrospective: ‘By sin man falls short of the 
righteousness of the law and comes under the accusation of the law; by 
expiation he is restored to the righteousness of the law.’68  Righteousness is 
moved out of a human framework of law and into a new framework of 
God’s righteousness demonstrated in a new creation.   
As noted in the beginning of this section, Bauckham believes that the heart 
of Crucified God is a question of theodicy based on an interpretation of the 
abandonment of the Son of God by his Father.  Yet the above model of 
righteousness is as far as Moltmann goes in offering any systematic 
treatment of evil or of theodicy either in Crucified God or in later works.  Evil 
has come into the world through humanity but Moltmann does not excuse it, 
nor explain why there is so much pain and evil needing transformation.  Nor 
does Moltmann say that evil is necessary for the sake of good.  In The Future 
of Creation (1977), he writes, ‘we cannot go beyond the fact of evil, for which 
no reason can be given…’69  The cross is the centre of all theology because, 
through the cross, God joins with creation and takes upon himself all the evil 
and suffering in the world, transforming it into his own history.  Evil is 
overcome and ‘integrated in the being of God.’70  God acts in solidarity with 
the suffering world.  However, as Celia Deane-Drummond notes, a theology 
of shared suffering does not necessarily diminish God’s responsibility for 
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that suffering.71  Nor is she convinced by Moltmann’s idea of substitutionary 
atonement because of the implications it has for a God of love, especially in 
the context of the suffering in the natural world.72   
An important consideration in traditional theories of atonement is how the 
benefits of Christ’s death and resurrection are transferred to all humanity.  
Braaten believes that ‘a fundamental treatment of the concept of substitution 
would seem to be absolutely essential if the Father’s participation in the 
suffering and death of the Son would carry ultimate salvific meaning for 
those who suffer alone and die forgotten deaths today.’73  Indeed, because 
Moltmann offers no critical analysis of the classical theologians, Braaten 
finds Moltmann’s methodology problematic in the whole of Crucified God: 
  
In a book that proposes to treat in a fundamental way the saving 
and significance of the suffering and death of Jesus, one has to ask 
by what methodological right a theologian can insert his own 
theory into the history of theology without verifying its legitimacy 
for the church through a critical discussion with the mainstream of 
that church’s tradition.74  
Because Moltmann bases his theology in dialectical thinking he has 
difficulties with the concept of reconciliation.  Bauckham comments: 
For Moltmann, the cross and the resurrection of Jesus represent 
total opposites: death and life, the absence of God and the 
nearness of God, Godforsakenness and the glory of God.  Jesus 
abandoned by his Father to death and Jesus raised by his Father to 
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eschatological life in the divine glory represent an absolute 
contradiction…75 
The contradiction between cross and resurrection is the contradiction 
between the human and the divine, between this world and the new 
creation.  Suffering is a fact of the world and, through Golgotha, the triune 
God experiences this suffering.  Reconciliation will only be achieved in the 
eschaton, when God will be all.  Thus, the promise contained in the 
resurrection of Jesus continues to be the basis of Moltmann’s hope.  The love 
shown by the triune God’s participation in the cross and resurrection 
motivates us to challenge the evil still present in the world.  This is the basis 
for Christian praxis, the subject of the final section of this chapter.  
 
Humanity and Praxis in light of the Cross 
As we have seen above, Moltmann contends that the cross has never been 
given the weight of theology that it deserves, particularly in comparison to 
the resurrection.  And yet it is vitally important that we correct this 
imbalance in terms of the current twofold crisis within Christianity of 
relevance and identity.  Moltmann believes that there has been a turning 
away from the church in modern society because its members have 
experienced a crisis of relevance.76  Christianity has been seen to be a major 
western form of oppression.  Moltmann believes that the difficulty lies in 
Christian life with notions of sameness, with the safety of upholding ‘our’ 
beliefs instead of challenging the status quo.  He believes that it is essential 
that we learn to identify ‘with what is other, alien and contradictory’ because 
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that is Christ’s model. 77  Moltmann writes, ‘Whether or not Christianity, in 
an alienated, divided and oppressive society, itself becomes alienated, 
divided and an accomplice of oppression, is ultimately decided only by 
whether the crucified Christ is a stranger to it or the Lord who determines 
the form of its existence.’78  That forms of Christianity have, indeed, become 
such agents of oppression points to the lack of support in history for a 
theology of the cross.  Such a theology of the cross, according to Moltmann, 
is founded with Paul, leaps forward to Luther and in the present is 
supported only in the ‘persecuted churches of the poor and oppressed.’79 
The crisis of relevance becomes a crisis of identity. What is it to be Christian 
today?  One does not have to be Christian, after all, to fight against injustice 
or have a social commitment to the poor.  If the definition requires that 
‘social and political commitment is necessary, what is “Christian” about it?’80  
For Moltmann, Christianity must stand or fall with the cross of Christ.   He 
answers questions of relevance and identity with his own theology of the 
cross.  It begins with identification with the crucified Christ and continues 
with an acceptance of God’s proclamation from the cross.  A theology of the 
cross is the common denominator which must determine Christian identity 
and relevance. Christ has identified with the godless and the abandoned in 
his death on the cross and in his resurrection God has championed the 
godless and the abandoned. 
The human person seeking Christian identity and relevance is to follow the 
path of Christ in two processes: in suffering and in kenosis.  The world and 
humanity are suffering, as shown by war, famine, environmental 
degradation, (mis)use of nuclear technology, suicide, drug use, and much 
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more.  Furthermore, ‘capitalism, racism and inhuman technocracy quietly 
develop in their own way.  The causes of misery are no longer to be found in 
the inner attitudes of men, but have long been institutionalized.’81  However, 
unless Christianity ‘apprehends the pain of the negative, Christian hope 
cannot be realistic and liberating.’82   Recognizing the godless forsakenness 
of Jesus’ death, ‘arouses a love which can no longer be indifferent, but seeks 
out its opposite, what is ugly and unworthy of love, in order to love it.’83  
This is a mysticism of the cross that, through identifying with Christ’s 
suffering, can lead the poor and oppressed out of ‘their submission to fate 
and apathy in suffering.’84  Christianity also stands for all those ‘who have 
turned away from their inward and external forms of domination and 
oppression.’85  Jesus spoke out for the godless and the oppressed, thus we all 
must ‘take sides in the concrete social and political conflicts going on.’86 By 
entering into, but not submitting to, the suffering of our times, we follow 
Christ.  Christ in his suffering but also the historical person of Jesus provide 
‘the model of the life of liberating suffering that each man is called to 
emulate in history until, at last, new being is achieved and the provisional 
eschatological titles of Jesus (“Christ,” “Lord,” and so forth) become 
ontological realities that all people share in the community of the 
kingdom.’87 
The second way we follow Christ, through kenosis, is closely linked to the 
dialectical principle of knowledge.   For Plato, like is known only by like, but 
Moltmann prefers Hippocrates’ dialectical principle of knowledge: we know 
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something by its opposite.88  Knowing by its opposite is the epistemological 
principle of the world—by hot we know cold, by evil we know good, by hate 
we know love.  Moltmann acknowledges Plato’s principle of analogy but 
emphasizes the necessity of supplementing this with the dialectical principle 
of knowledge.  The contradictory nature of the cross supports this principle 
in that he who is righteous suffers an unrighteous death.   The process of the 
crucifixion is also kenotic, so that only when ‘with all the understanding and 
consistency he possesses, a man follows Christ along the way of self-
emptying into non-identity, does he encounter contradiction, resistance and 
opposition.’89  For Bauckham, what Moltmann calls “revelation in the 
opposite” (Offenbarung im Gegenteil) should more appropriately be called 
“revelation in contradiction” (Offenbarung im Widerspruch).90   
The following of Christ is necessarily political: only when the human person 
goes ‘out into anonymity of slums and peace movements…is he tempted 
and tested inwardly and outwardly.’91  With the challenge of dialectical 
thought and dialectical existence, one’s own identity ‘has to be recognized 
and set forth in what is different and alien.’92  Christian praxis, then, must be 
based on a theology of the cross.  This is because the cross is the one truly 
political point in the story of Jesus.93  We identify with the suffering on the 
cross and we initiate resistance to the world to facilitate the kenotic process 
of identifying with the other.  Moltmann expands upon the trinitarian 
principle of political theology in The Experiment Hope.94  The revelation of 
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God is to be found in the crucified one, not in the institutions of the day.95  
The task of Christians is to enter into solidarity with the oppressed, even if 
(particularly if!) the oppression comes from the civil religion of the society.96 
Together with political and social action, Moltmann supports the principle of 
resistance to institutionalized oppression.  Notions of resistance are framed 
by the negative dialectic and critical theory of T. W. Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer.  Horkheimer’s critique of capitalist society extends to religious 
idols which have the power to legitimize the church’s claim to represent 
truths.  Horkheimer also presupposes that we do not know what the 
“wholly other” is.  Moltmann sees the essence of Horkheimer’s critical 
theory as ‘a negative theology which prohibits images.’97  Adorno takes 
Horkheimer’s ideas into an imageless transcendence.98  Moltmann uses this 
principle of negative dialectic in his theology of the cross: ‘the physical pain 
and death of Christ is regarded as the negative side of its symbolism of God, 
resurrection, judgment and eternal life.’99   
The role of the church is to support the political and social drives of such a 
theology of the cross.  Douglas Sturm notes that Moltmann is ‘critical of the 
privatization of religion in modern society [and] argues that the central 
concept of Christian eschatology, the “kingdom of God,” is radically 
relational or public.’100  The kingdom of God is the consummation of 
righteousness or justice.  The promise of the kingdom of God is that which 
leads to action, the effort to overcome the dehumanizing conditions that 
                                                 
95 Ibid., 107. 
96 Ibid., 110. 
97 Moltmann, Crucified God, 224. Moltmann references Max Horkheimer, Die Sehnsucht Nach 
Dem Ganz Anderen (1970), Max Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie I. 
98 T. W.. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (1966), 392. In Moltmann, Crucified God, 283, f/n 66. 
99 Moltmann, Crucified God, 284, f/n 66. 
100 Douglas Sturm, "Praxis and Promise: On the Ethics of Political Theology," Ethics 92, no. 4 
(1982): 739.   96  
currently prevail.  The church represents a political factor for Moltmann.101  
Any hermeneutics or ethics within the church have a political thrust because 
they should be orientated towards social and economic change.102  The new 
political theology ‘is not concerned with the dissolution of the church into 
left-wing or right-wing politics, but with the Christianization of its political 
situation and function in terms of the freedom of Christ.’103  Freedom for all 
accords with supporting basic human rights.  The world has “vicious circles 
of death,” such as poverty, racial and cultural alienation, force, senselessness 
and godforsakenness.  The “demonic crisis”104 means that evil is not just 
personal but institutional.  The church should support democracy, economic 
co-determination, cultural integration (in the sense of acknowledgment), and 
peace with nature.  The church also has an obvious role in offering a 
meaning and purpose to life which overcomes the apathy and despair in the 
world. 
  
The central message of the church should be, according to Moltmann, the 
crucified God.  The cross has become an ameliorated symbol of the church. 
The original, scandalous message is blanketed beneath two thousand years 
of outward form and tradition.  The sacramental “cult” is particularly 
criticized by Moltmann.  He sees the form of the eucharist service as an 
expediency of the early church.  Because Christianity was born into an 
ancient world of religions that required sacrifice to the gods the church was 
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‘also obliged to fulfil this public need for cult and sacrifice.’105   The eucharist 
was offered as a symbolic representation of Christ’s sacrificial death.  The 
problem with this for Moltmann is that the crucified Christ should represent 
the end of cultic sacrifice.  Christ died “once for all” and his death ‘is not a 
sacrifice which can be repeated or transferred.’106  For Moltmann, ‘cultic 
religion must be replaced by the spreading of the word of the cross, the 
celebration of faith and the practical following of Jesus.’107  It must not forget 
what was ‘unique, particular and scandalous’ in the death of Christ.108 The 
eucharist should be like the meals shared with “publicans and sinners,” and 
so celebrated with ‘the unrighteous, those who have no rights and the 
godless.’109  Naturally, Sergei Bulgakov would not agree with this 
assessment of the eucharist.  In the Orthodox (and Catholic) church the 
eucharist is not only symbolic but also has transformative significance for 
the world (see Chapter 5, 199).   
Because all persons are equal before God, all people should be equal in the 
world.  The church’s mission and the mission of the Christian person are 
political: ‘Christianity must stay on this path of the secularization, 
desacralization and democratization of political rule if it wants to remain 
true to its faith and its hope.’110  In The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1975), 
Moltmann rejects the Protestant reformers’ critical distinction between 
salvation and welfare.111  For Moltmann, the Reformation ‘relativized the 
political orders, making them necessary orders in this world which can serve 
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the welfare of all, and ought to do so, but do not minister to salvation.’112  
Moltmann wants to combine the two in mission.  According to Stephen 
Williams, Moltmann’s eschatology ‘is about a single, undivided freedom and 
our quest for it must be one, its elements (fellowship with God, man and 
nature) equally weighted.’113  The struggles for equality are part of the 
anticipation of the kingdom of God: ‘They are to be apprehended as a 
process, which is unfinished and, historically speaking, unfinishable.’114  
Human struggles do not appear to be salvific since it is only God who 
“finishes” this “process.”  When God ‘brings his history to completion (1 
Cor. 15: 28), his suffering will be transformed into joy, and thereby our 
suffering as well.’115  Gutierrez acknowledges the importance of Moltmann’s 
work for liberation theology but feels that there is a tendency to replace ‘a 
Christianity of the Beyond with a Christianity of the Future…’116  By this he 
means that Christian praxis must be situated in a concrete present reality so 
that liberation is a hope for this life and not just a future hope.117 
The certainty of hope in Moltmann’s soteriological eschatology has been 
criticized for its repercussions for personal salvation.  As Jaeger 
demonstrates, Moltmann has no doubt that, in the end, there will be ‘an 
eschatological victory over all forms of evil.’118  But this could be taken to 
mean that there is no need for the human struggle against evil.  Jaeger 
continues, ‘if all persons and all creat i o n  a r e  d e s t i n e d  t o  b e  i n  G o d ’ s  
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kingdom of glory, they lack freedom to choose otherwise.’119  A n o t h e r  
problem is that this denies biblical teaching on the soteriological importance 
of the need for human endeavours to attain the kingdom of God.120  
Williams believes that, in fact, ‘the nature of our personal relationship to 
God  does  affect our entitlement to hope for its positive eschatological 
consummation.’121  For Williams, there is a process of personal reconciliation 
with God evident in the Bible, which distinguishes those who are worthy of 
the kingdom of God through their actions and attitudes from those who are 
not.    Although this may be an unpopular notion to the desire for salvation 
for all, it at least suggests the importance of one’s relationship to God as 
much as to one’s fellow human beings.  Moltmann acknowledges the 
importance of prayer—‘in the brotherhood of Jesus, the person who prays 
has access to the Fatherhood of the Father and to the Spirit of hope’122—but 
the connection between prayer and personal salvation is not made.     
Personal salvation is assured because it is in the hands of a loving God.   
This aspect of Moltmann’s theology does not change.  In The Spirit of Life 
(1992), the resurrection still justifies all despite the world.  Although the 
Spirit’s role is given more emphasis in the trinitarian event of the cross, it is 
God who reconciles the world into God’s self.  Even though the cross is an 
event in God, reconciliation and new life become possible for all humanity. 
Although Nancy Victorin-Vangerud supports Moltmann’s attempt to 
combine a liberation hermeneutic with justification, she finds the project 
flawed: ‘[l]ike an enabling, well-meaning parent, God serves as the 
intermediary, taking care of the situation and then expecting the family 
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members to live in peace.’123  The problem with this is that it does not take 
into account the possibility for reconciliation in the world: ‘[j]ustice, 
forgiveness, love, and reconciliation all have historical and institutional 
dimensions incorporating the transformed relations of victims and 
perpetrators.’124  Moltmann’s model of conformation ‘complicated by 
Moltmann’s language of surrender and self-sacrifice, tends towards human 
passivity, rather than the active labour of struggle.’125  Once again, human 
history is subsumed into God’s history. 
                                                             
Conclusion  
Moltmann’s theology of the cross is challenging but are the theological 
difficulties of Theology of Hope—determinism, absence of judgment, ontology 
of future, lack of reconciliation—addressed or answered in this later 
theology?  The question I posed at the beginning of the chapter—does 
humanity continue to stand separate, somewhat bewildered and 
unreconciled in earthly existence while looking for a distant hope?—must 
now be answered.  There is a basic similarity to Moltmann’s early theology 
reflected in the two major publications Theology of Hope and Crucified God.  
They are two sides of the same coin.  For Bauckham, these two books 
constitute the core of Moltmann’s early theology and have ‘a concentrated 
power of argument focused on their central integrating ideas…’126  Although 
these books ‘have a certain polemical extremeness…’ Bauckham prefers their 
intensity of vision ‘… to the greater breadth of view in the later writings.’ 127  
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The later work will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter.   
However, there are certain consistencies in this earlier theology which hold 
true throughout Moltmann’s career.  I suggest that none of the issues that 
were raised in the first chapter on Theology of Hope are addressed 
satisfactorily in Crucified God.  Despite Moltmann’s best intentions, humanity 
remains unreconciled in earthly existence.  Reasons for this include dialectic 
thinking that operates in terms of contradictions and a God-centred vision 
that fails to find any divinity in godforsaken humanity or the godless world.  
Although both of these particular reasons are softened in the ecotheology 
that will follow, there is, and there will be no sense of a mediating principle 
between the human and divine worlds.  Rather, Moltmann swings between 
total opposition between God and the world and collapsing God into the 
world.  He seems to be happiest writing from God’s perspective and 
uncomfortable writing from within the world. 
This God perspective is most obvious in Moltmann’s christology.  The only 
aspects of Jesus’ humanity which Moltmann allows are, one, his social and 
political challenge, and, two, his suffering and death on the cross.  Yet even 
these two aspects are largely developed in terms of their divinity.  The 
challenge to society is seen to be God’s condemnation of humanity and the 
world.  Jesus’ suffering and death on the cross are God’s suffering and death 
on the cross.  There is no interface between the divine and human worlds.  
Indeed, as we noted above, Christ is outside history, society and even 
outside humanity.128  The human world is everything that the divine world 
is not.  This is the ultimate conclusion that Moltmann takes because of his 
dialectical thought processes.  Any dichotomies that have arisen because of 
the resurrection are taken into the trinitarian Godhead—into the Father, Son 
and Spirit.  The divine and separate God acts from outside the world so that 
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all that is divine is external to the world.  As also noted above, creation, new 
creation and resurrection are external works of God against chaos, 
nothingness and death.129  Moltmann does not want to divide the earthly 
Jesus from the eschatological Christ130 but succeeds in doing just that.  In 
part this is because Moltmann’s trinitarian theology is weak in this early 
theology.  Moltmann accuses Barth as being not trinitarian enough but, as 
Braaten points out, ‘Moltmann, of course, does not himself hold on to his 
own rule about speaking of God in trinitarian fashion.  He reverts time and 
time again to a simple concept of God, where God is the subject of the 
sentence without any trinitarian differentiation.  It proves at last to be as 
unavoidable to him as it was to Karl Barth.’131 
There is still a fundamental lack of process, or indeed, of the world receiving 
any benefits from the resurrection.  Humanity must suffer until the 
apocalypse when this condemned world will pass away.132  Our only 
comfort is that God now suffers with us.  Although Moltmann has no 
explanation for evil he takes the godforsakenness of the world seriously.  He 
proposes a steadfast resistance against evil in its various forms as described 
in Christian praxis in the world.  Braaten believes that the boldest part of 
Crucified God is Moltmann’s treatment of evil and theodicy but here, he 
comments, ‘Moltmann is flying on his own, making no attempt to ground 
his resolution of the problem of evil in the Scriptures or the history of 
theology.  What to do about evil?  Moltmann takes care of it by putting it 
into God himself.’133  To suggest that God’s suffering is like human suffering 
is also problematic.  Jaeger notes that, on the contrary, human beings appear 
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to suffer randomly and have no choice in the matter.134  Despite such 
criticism, Jaeger believes that Moltmann’s theodicy ‘strives to balance 
present activism with future hope, social engagement with spiritual 
devotion, and human freedom with divine guidance.  In this sense, the 
theologian’s approach to the problem of evil is successful.’135   
Despite Moltmann’s God perspective, the knowledge of God remains 
mysterious for humankind and the relationship between the human person 
and God is not described in any detail.  Yet hope in the face of the world’s 
problems remains solely in the God of the future.  The premise of this 
dissertation is that hope arises because a correspondence can be found 
between the human will to live and the world that sustains humanity.  The 
theological hermeneutic of this premise is that there is also some 
correspondence between the God of the world and humanity.  Because of the 
lack of human agency in the world Moltmann’s theology of hope does not 
support these premises.  In the following chapter Moltmann balances some 
of the dialectical extremes of this earlier theology so that there is more of a 
sense of unity between humanity and creation and a purpose for the world.  
He consciously moves away from his “Yes or No” decisional dialectic, as he 
calls it, and embraces trinitarian thinking.136  In the worldview that has been 
outlined thus far Moltmann highlights the problems of both the world and 
the church in modern times.  Although his systematic theology may be 
unsatisfactory his sincere attempt to face the problems of the day is 
impressive.  Ultimately Moltmann grounds his theology of the cross in 
God’s love and answers Auschwitz with a theology of shared suffering.   
Jaeger believes that ‘no other major theologian has combined a theology of 
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eschatology with a theology of the cross in this manner.’137  I  c l o s e  t h i s  
chapter with a quote from Moltmann which, I think, demonstrates this 
sincerity, and summarizes the connection for him between love, suffering, 
and history. 
Where men suffer because they love, God suffers in them and they 
suffer in God.  Where this God suffers the death of Jesus and thereby 
demonstrates the power of his love, there men also find the power to 
remain in love despite pain and death, becoming neither bitter nor 
superficial…He who enters into love, and through love experiences 
the deadliness of death, enters also into the “history of God.”  On the 
other hand, he who recognizes the trinitarian history of God in the 
cross of Christ can live with the terrors of history and despite them 
remain in love.138 
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Chapter 3    God in creation:  humanity and ecology 
Introduction  
In Theology of Hope, Moltmann proposes that it is the task of theology ‘to 
expound the knowledge of God in a correlation between understanding of 
the world and self-understanding.’1  And yet, as we have seen in the earlier 
theology of Theology of Hope and Crucified God, the knowledge of God is a 
mysterious, unknowable entity,2 and the understanding of the world and 
humanity is only useful to dialectically understand what God is not.  From 
The Future of Creation, published in 1977, onwards, Moltmann’s theology 
changes direction to embrace an ecological theology.  The works that 
followed, including The Trinity and the Kingdom of God (1980)3 and God in 
Creation (1985), appear to be almost a complete reversal of his earlier 
theology.  Now Moltmann tentatively moves towards finding some 
knowledge of God in the created world.  Creation is good now.  The body 
now serves some purpose as a house of the soul and spirit.  Moltmann 
embraces an understanding of the human Gestalt, which he uses to explain 
the modern ecological crisis in terms of human unconsciousness.  If 
consciousness is reflective and reflected spirit, then the human being is 
largely unconscious, and the consequences for the world have been, and 
continue to be, catastrophic.   Thus, humanity remains the most problematic 
part of the equation in its quest for the knowledge of God, now seen in terms 
of humanity’s self-understanding and its alienation from the world. 
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According to Moltmann, the serious problems of today have their basis in 
how humanity has understood God as the absolute and transcendent subject 
of creation.  The world is God’s object, the object of God’s creation, 
preservation and redemption.  Humanity, as God’s image on earth, is the 
world’s subject, the ruler of the world, enjoined to dominate and subdue the 
created world.   The world is viewed through the polarizing lens of a 
subject/object dichotomy.  Moltmann suggests that the world, or any object, 
or even God, can better be understood within the context of its relationships 
and its environment. We need to ‘revert to the pre-modern concept of reason 
as the organ of perception and participation.’4  Our purpose becomes not 
one of domination but one of perception ‘in order to participate, and to enter 
into the mutual relationships of the living thing.’5  W e  m u s t  l o o k  t o  a  
trinitarian model of God to understand the essence of mutuality and 
relationship.  Moltmann maintains a dialectical view of the world but 
proposes that oppositions need to be viewed as complementary, as aspects 
of a common process.  As noted in the Introduction, this leads Moltmann to 
seek reconciliation between freedom and necessity, grace and nature, 
covenant and creation, being a Christian and being a human being.6   
Reconciliation becomes the new catchcry.  In his earlier theology, the world 
is an unredeemable place which will pass away, leaving room for the new 
creation of the eschaton.7  Now the world has changed from something that 
is condemned to pass away to one that needs saving.  The goal changes to 
peace with nature. Moltmann now gives a comprehensive survey of 
theological doctrines of creation in terms of their propensity to alienate and 
isolate humanity from the world.  These polarizing doctrines, where nature 
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is opposed to God, body to spirit, and so on, are now shown to cause the 
unhealthy state of the world today.  He offers an ecological theology of 
nature, with the central metaphors of openness and closedness.  Self-
transformation is achieved through developing openness to nature. It is 
humanity’s “closedness” that has created the environmental problems that 
we now perceive.  The sabbath’s time of rest and dwelling with the present 
is suggested as the antidote to closedness.   
By focussing on the trinitarian concept of relationality, and particularly the 
work of the Spirit, Moltmann attempts to correct the negative and polarizing 
dichotomies of historical doctrines.  The concept of Christ the mediator also 
appears.8  Moltmann’s ecological doctrine, God in Creation is, above all, his 
pneumatology.  His former theology, which may broadly be seen as 
addressing God the Unknowable Father in Theology of Hope, and Christ in 
Crucified God, has been criticized for its simple concept of God, where God is 
often the subject of the sentence without any trinitarian differentiation.9    
Moltmann begins to address this issue by developing a social doctrine of the 
Trinity in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God and he sees God in Creation as a 
continuation of this work.   The ecological ideas in God in Creation can also be 
seen to be a development of his work in The Future of Creation.  Moltmann 
develops his pneumatology further in The Spirit of Life, and this work will 
also be examined here. 
This chapter focuses on Moltmann’s new picture of humanity and its 
relationship to the world.  Moltmann insists that the ecological crisis must be 
addressed by any modern theology.  However, with Moltmann’s former 
assessment, this world was not a part of God and would pass away in the 
end times.  What has changed in his outlook?  Why should we look after this 
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world?  If, indeed, we learn about ourselves through understanding the 
world around us, does this give a new basis for a theology of hope?  In other 
words, in terms of my own thesis of hope, are we agents of change, and can 
a change of relationship to the world offer a basis of hope for the future?  We 
will discover that the ecological shift does offer a more connected picture of 
humanity with its world.  The more comprehensive worldview is enhanced 
by Moltmann’s trinitarian perspective, particularly the Spirit’s participation 
in creation.  Ultimately, the human person does not have a role in the 
transformation of the world but each person is urged to follow God’s model 
of love.  Moltmann’s strength is his recognition of the social, economic and 
environmental issues of his day, and his renewed theology of hope is a 
worthwhile theological engagement with them. The three sections to be 
covered in this chapter are: a theology of creation, which examines God’s 
relationship to the world, anthropology, that is, humanity as the image of 
God and the world, and a theology of hope revisited, exploring the 
relationship between humanity, the world and God.     109  
A theology of creation: God’s relationship to the world 
Moltmann’s aim in forwarding a new theology of creation is to address the 
modern ecological crisis.  His method is twofold.  He critically examines the 
historical unfolding of theological doctrines of creation in order to find the 
reasons for the current human understanding of the world.  Then, to form 
his own theology of creation, he takes positive aspects of historical 
theologies of creation (which have been passed over in time) and combines 
them with an engagement with new, post critical scientific methods and 
ways of thinking.   
Moltmann proposes that, since Augustine, Christian theology has seen 
creation as ‘an act of God outwards: operatio Dei ad extra.’10  This is 
distinguished from God’s internal act, which constitutes the divine 
relationships within the Trinity.  Creation is separate from God: non de Deo, 
sed ex nihilo (not from God, but out of nothing).11  Moltmann understands 
this “nothing” to mean that 
[w]herever and whatever God creates is without any preconditions.  
There is no external necessity which occasions his creativity, and no 
inner compulsion which could determine it.  Nor is there any 
primordial matter whose potentiality is pre-given to his creative 
activity, and which would set him material limits.12 
“Nothing” is intended to negate that there is a “something” from which God 
creates.  Platonic philosophy distinguished between the mhV ojn and the oujk 
ojn, the relative and the absolute negation of being.13  Any understanding of 
nothing is set against being.  The relative negation of being, the mhV ojn, 
defines nothing as being’s negation: it has no substance of its own, however, 
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it can appear in time as the potential for being in its becoming.  The absolute 
negation of being, the oujk ojn, opposes absolute Being with absolute 
Nothing.  Moltmann rejects this possibility because it suggests that absolute 
Being can be delineated by absolute Nothing.  The absolute Being, God, 
must be beyond any such defining in terms of opposition.  Moltmann 
favours the mhV ojn concept because the relative negation of being counters this 
‘mystical reversion to pantheism,’14 by excluding absolute Being, God, from 
the equation.   
Moltmann supports the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo as the mhV ojn in principle, 
but finds any language which suggests that creation is outside of God 
problematic.  Although creation out of Nothing is ad extra to God, Moltmann 
suggests that the Nothing is a realm set aside within God.  According to 
Moltmann, the idea of creation outwards and inwards is ‘a much discussed 
point in the Jewish kabbalistic tradition.’15  He uses Isaac Luria’s doctrine of 
zimsum,16 meaning a withdrawing of oneself into oneself through 
concentration and contraction, to support the concept of a within and 
without of God rather than an inward and outward act of creation. 
Moltmann sees the first act of creation as a setting aside of the nothing 
within God’s self.  God makes room for creation by ‘withdrawing his 
presence and his power.’17  This is an act of self-limitation and it is a space of 
non-God, non-being.  This space of nothing allows for the possibility of 
becoming yet also contains the possibility of the hell of annihilation through 
the creature’s own self-limitations or self-isolations. This separation protects 
God from a pantheistic connection to creation—creation is both “within” 
and “without” God.  
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God’s next act is creation itself.  Moltmann finds significance in the use of 
two different verbs in the Genesis account of creation.  In Gen. 1: 1 the verb 
bara’  (create) is used for the creating of the heavens and the earth.     
According to Moltmann, bara’ means a bringing forth in the sphere of 
history, nature and spirit, through which something comes into existence 
which was not there previously.’18  The other verb ‘asah (make) is ‘the term 
for the purposeful “manufacture” of a work, in which something is given its 
particular character and aptitude.’19  On the seventh day, God finished the 
work that was made (Gen. 2: 2).  In fact, the terms appear to be used more 
interchangeably than Moltmann suggests: the great sea monsters are also 
“created” and human beings are “made,” for example.  Moltmann’s point, 
however, is that the initial act of creation is unique, and it is unified: it 
happens ‘in a moment.’20  “In the beginning” does not refer to time or to 
eternity but it is ‘the sheer, unqualified precondition for all happening in 
time…’21  Time actually begins after this initial act of creation with the 
separation of night from day (Gen. 1: 4-5).  The uniqueness of the event of 
creation means that there is no human analogy for divine creation.   
Moltmann disagrees with Paul Tillich’s synopsis that creation is eternal. 22  
Tillich postulates that the eternal origin of God and creation are identical.  
Paradoxically perhaps, Moltmann proposes that ‘creation certainly has a 
beginning, but its consummation in the glory of God has no end.’23   
How and why does God create the world?  Traditionally, doctrines of decree 
begin with God’s will and name God as absolute subject.  Creation is then a 
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decision on God’s part.  For Moltmann, the problem with this is twofold.  
Firstly, as we have noted, God is seen as transcendent and distant, if not 
absent, from creation.  Secondly, as we have also noted, humanity has used 
this subject/object distinction as a model for its own subject/object 
relationship to the world and has used this distinction as a mandate to 
dominate the world.  Doctrines of emanation, however, are equally 
problematic for Moltmann.  They begin with God’s essential nature as 
supreme substance.   According to Moltmann, these doctrines were gnostic 
and Neoplatonic in origin and were condemned by the early church, but 
have appeared again more recently.  Tillich, for example, suggests that, it is 
God’s nature to create eternally.24  God’s nature is the inevitable source of 
the world.   This nature, which is love, overflows into creation.  The problem 
with this for Moltmann is that it is difficult to separate God from creation at 
all.   God cannot be equal to creation: ‘if God is supposed to be his own 
Creator, then he would also have to be his own creature.’25 
The question revolves around God’s freedom.  Was God free to create or is 
creation an inevitable outcome of God’s divine nature?  Moltmann wrestles 
with the two poles of decree versus emanation with a conversation between 
love, freedom and necessity.  Creation is, indeed, a disclosure of God’s very 
being.  Since God is love, God cannot help but confer God’s goodness on 
creation.  Because God’s nature is love, God has no choice but to reveal and 
share this divine nature.  God ‘cannot but love the world eternally...’ 26  This 
is seen as a divine “necessity.”  God is free, however, because God is 
‘entirely free when he is entirely himself.’27  Thus, God’s freedom, love and 
necessity are synonymous.  This conclusion is also reached Bulgakov, as we 
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shall see in the following chapter.28  Our human notion that freedom and 
necessity are opposites does not apply to God.  Love dissolves the 
dichotomy.  Yet creation is still a decision on God’s part, an act of God’s will 
first and foremost.  It is not an arbitrary act of will, it is a decision on God’s 
part to share the divine love.  Moltmann upholds the principle of a creation 
where God decides to share the Godhead’s nature of love with a world of 
God’s creation.  However, creation ‘is not an emanation from God’s essential 
nature [but]…a divine resolve of the will to create.’29   
In the end, Moltmann attempts to combine traditional doctrines of decrees, 
which understand creation as an act of divine will, with doctrines of 
emanation, which see creation as the overflowing of the divine nature, to 
propose that creation is a creative letting-be, to be seen more in motherly 
than fatherly categories.  God is absolute subject and shares God’s nature 
with creation.  God’s purpose in creation is to reveal the Godhead’s divine 
nature of love and glory.  Nature, once again, is not an ontological category.  
Moltmann removes any ontological categories of matter from the act of 
creation.  This enables a separation of God from creation but pays homage to 
God’s nature of abundant, overflowing love.  This is an important point.  
One could ask, why do we need this separation at all?  Bulgakov, for 
example, as we shall see in the next chapter, does not separate God from 
creation in this way.  For Bulgakov, creation is an act of God’s will and 
formed from God’s ontological nature.  I suggest that Moltmann needs this 
separation between God and creation to remove the responsibility for evil 
from God’s actions.  God can only be responsible for all that is good.  I will 
return to this point in the following section on the human world. 
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The distinction from and connection to creation is developed further in 
Moltmann’s understanding of the transcendent/immanent God.  In terms of 
connectedness, the God who is transcendent in relation to the world and the 
God who is immanent in the world ‘are one and the same God.’30  Moltmann 
develops his trinitarian theology to explain the transcendent/immanent 
God’s relationship to creation: ‘the Father is the creating origin of creation, 
the Son its shaping origin, and the Spirit its life-giving origin.’31  The Father 
is called the Creator, who then sends the Son and the Spirit to work in 
creation.  The Son ‘gathers the world under his liberating lordship, and 
redeems it.’32  The Spirit is the life of creation, both in the sense of 
quickening life and of eternal life.  Although each of the persons of the 
Trinity acts in unique ways, God cannot be divided.  The Father God is not 
separate but experiences the suffering of creation through the Spirit.  Thus, 
all three persons of the Trinity are immanent in the world.   
How is God still transcendent?  Moltmann is less clear on this in his efforts 
to bring wholeness and synthesis to his theology.  God appears to maintain a 
quasi-transcendence by dwelling in the heaven of God’s own creation.   
Heaven is created to be the complement of the earth.  Where the earth 
consists of created  potentialities and energies, heaven is the creative 
possibilities of God, which God can call forth in the future glory.33  God 
creates heaven and earth and chooses heaven as God’s dwelling place: 
‘God’s presence is understood spatially as being located in heaven—that is, 
in the sphere of his creative potentialities; and spatially it moves from 
heaven to earth.’34  Thus, heaven is the place of all God’s creative 
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potentialities for the world, but this means that it is the total of all earth’s 
potential yet to be realized.  God can and does work from within creation, 
that is, from heaven.  In fact, creation ‘lives from the continual inflow of the 
energies of the Spirit of God.’35  Moltmann allows for God’s freedom to work 
at any time in creation, but most particularly in the future eschaton when the 
world will be redeemed.   Indeed, it is important to distinguish between the 
kingdom of God and heaven: heaven is understood as the potential which 
will be fulfilled in the kingdom of God.  The kingdom of God is the kingdom 
of glory which will be the renewal of heaven and  earth.  It will be ‘the 
indwelling of the triune God in his whole creation.’36 
The indwelling of God in creation signals the new eternal eschaton. 
Following Augustine, Moltmann agrees that creation does not begin in time, 
time begins with creation.37   There is no place for circular notions of time for 
Moltmann, the idea that, as in begin n i n g  s o  a l s o  i n  t h e  e n d .   T h e  
consummation of creation ‘is something new  over against creation-in-the-
beginning.’38  The difference between the beginning and the end is the 
difference in the presence of God within creation.  In the beginning, God sets 
an independent creation in motion.  In the future, God joins fully with 
creation.  God eschatologically dwells within the new heaven and earth ‘in 
the space of his created beings.’39   There is a new relationship between space 
and time.  Eternity is ‘the fullness of time, not timelessness. If the beginning 
of creation is also the beginning of time, then time begins with the future out 
of which the present comes into being.’40  The incarnation of Christ is an 
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anticipation of this future event.  Using the metaphor of the menuha, or rest, 
Moltmann speaks of the fulfilment of time as the eternal peace of God with 
God’s  Shekinah (Spirit) and Christ within  the new, eternal creation.   
Moltmann does not specify the dynamics of the transition from temporal to 
eternal creation.  Indeed, the idea of ‘the fullness of time’ may indicate that 
eternity is still a function of time.   This would agree with Moltmann’s lack 
of separation between God and creation in the eschaton.  The eternal God 
can and will fully unite with God’s creation.  Creation, both temporal and 
eternal, is an act of God’s will in two parts. 
Moltmann’s whole theology of creation is an attempt to hold the oppositions 
of historical understanding together.  Since he now views oppositions as 
complementary, as aspects of a common process, the aim of the dualisms of 
creation theology—transcendence/immanence, freedom/necessity, 
grace/nature, heaven/earth—is reconciliation.   As we have seen, 
Moltmann’s doctrine of heaven attempts to preserve God’s distinction from 
earth and yet it is also meant to symbolically represent God’s openness to 
the created world.  However, heaven is also ‘the sphere of reality which is 
inaccessible and unknowable.’41  God may be open to us but humanity’s 
openness to heaven is a little more difficult.  The problem of reconciliation, 
both the how and the when, is God’s problem.  God holds the balance of 
these dichotomies in the Godhead’s self and true reconciliation will only be 
achieved in the end times.  This may be the reason why Moltmann appears 
to struggle with his own attempts to hold the dichotomies of his theology of 
creation together.  He admits that his aim is not to achieve a ‘well-balanced 
and harmonious synthesis’42 of doctrines of decree and emanation.  His 
                                                 
41 Moltmann, God in Creation, 159. 
42 Ibid., 85.   117  
purpose is ‘to find a deeper understanding of the creative God.’43  T h e  
problem for this dissertation is that, although Moltmann speaks of 
reconciliation, it is not apparent that any principle of reconciliation is a 
mutual one.  What is humanity’s relationship to God?  If hope is based in 
understanding that there is a purpose to one’s own life, what is humanity’s 
purpose in the world?  The question may also be asked whether humanity 
and the world have any effect on the Godhead.  The following section will 
examine Moltmann’s anthropology and seek the answers to these questions.  
We will see that humanity’s relationship to the world and to God is largely 
viewed through the lens of the creative God, primarily understood as the 
work of the Spirit.  The human perspective is more difficult to find. 
Anthropology: Humanity as the image of God and the world. 
For Moltmann, creation ‘exists in the Spirit, is moulded by the Son and is 
created by the Father.  It is therefore from God, through God and in God.’44  
Despite its creation out of Nothing, Moltmann is at pains to emphasize 
God’s connectedness to creation.  What, then, is creation’s—and 
humanity’s—connection to God?  This is somewhat difficult to ascertain in 
Moltmann’s theocentric theology.  The problem is, as Celia Deane-
Drummond suggests, that while Moltmann ‘says rather too little about 
creation itself, he says rather too much about God.’45  He is more comfortable 
coming from God’s point of view than humanity’s.  Humanity is God’s 
object and described from Moltmann’s understanding of God’s perspective.  
Moltmann distinguishes between God’s work in creation, which means that 
creation is ‘not essentially similar to the Creator’46 and God’s image in 
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creation, which is humanity.  As God’s image, humanity corresponds to God 
in God’s essence, which is love.  This element in creation is created to 
recognize God as Creator and creation as God’s creation.  Humanity is 
created to love God.  Humanity learns to love God through recognizing 
God’s deeds in the world, that is, through Christ’s sacrifice and the Spirit’s 
pervasive presence in creation.  Above all, humanity learns to love by 
mirroring the perfect relationality of the triune God.  Moltmann begins his 
anthropology with a theology of wholeness.  To understand humanity’s 
relationship to world and God is to begin with the whole of creation in order 
to understand the parts. 
Moltmann proposes that creation must be viewed as a whole, and that we 
need to start from the principle of complexity.  More complex systems 
explain simpler ones because they are capable of integrating them.  The 
highest model for this principle is the work of the Spirit in the Trinity.  The 
Spirit is the unifying person in the Trinity: ‘the Spirit always points away 
from himself towards the Son and the Father.’47  This holistic and 
perichoretic character of the Spirit also pervades creation.  The Spirit of God 
is the ‘”common spirit” of creation.’48  The Spirit holds creation together, yet 
the Spirit is also the principle of process, that is, of individuation and of 
evolution into wholeness.  Moltmann sees ‘each individual as part of the 
whole, and everything limited as a representative of what is infinite.’49  The 
process in time is an evolutionary movement towards complexity. At every 
evolutionary stage the Spirit ‘creates interactions, harmony in these 
interactions, mutual perichoreses, and therefore a life of co-operation and 
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community.50  The greatest complexity known in the cosmos presently is 
found in human and human social systems.51  Self-preservation and self-
transcendence are the two sides of this process of evolution.  Self-
transcendence is the movement towards complex open systems, ending in 
God as the transcendence of the world.  Indeed, this self-transcendence is 
only possible because of ‘the forecourt of an inviting and guiding 
transcendence.’52  Self-preservation is the maintenance of distinction.   
Humanity is on an evolutionary path towards both self-transcendence and 
self-preservation.      
The goal of creation is not a return to paradise but a new revelation of the 
glory of God.  This represents ‘the fulfilment of the real promise implanted 
in creation itself.’53  The cosmos is not a closed system but open to 
possibilities because of the Spirit.  Moltmann counters the deterministic laws 
of classical physics (of cause and effect) to support modern quantum 
theories of openness and change.  The future is not completely inherent in 
the present but includes randomness and newness.54  Timothy Gorringe 
supports Moltmann’s idea of open process as an appropriate response to the 
‘aggressive pluralism of beliefs and lifestyles’55 in a postmodern world.  He 
states, ‘[a] theology of open process is not only the necessary non-
fundamentalist response to the situation of postmodernity, it reads the 
whole of creation, including human nature, in terms of possibility.’56  In 
Moltmann’s thought, although creation is open, a design is in place.  The 
universe ‘contains within itself the trend towards the universal symbiosis of 
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all systems of life and matter.’57  Matter organizes itself and transcends itself.  
Through the Spirit, God is also present in the very structures of matter.   
Creation contains ‘neither spirit-less matter nor non-material spirit; there is 
only  informed matter.’58   There are different kinds of information in all 
matter, arriving at consciousness in the case of humanity.  Indeed, ‘every 
single person, and indeed every single living thing in nature, has a 
meaning.’ 59  This is possible because the Spirit is the coherence of the 
universe: it ‘moves and evolves in the energies and powers of the divine 
Spirit.’60  For Moltmann, this is why pantheism is such a plausible 
philosophy.  Knowledge of God, through the Spirit, is to be found in creation 
itself.   However, Deane-Drummond notes that, while Moltmann’s attempt 
to engage with new scientific thinking is worthwhile, his lack of empirical 
references leads to a speculative, quasi-scientific synthesis of science and 
Christian cosmology.61  The idea of a self-organizing universe, she suggests, 
would be more convincing if it were based on biological concepts rather than 
certain quasi-mathematical concepts of quantum physics.62 
Humanity’s role in the open process of creation is to become more conscious.  
Thus, conscious knowledge of God is the mandate for humanity.  This is 
possible because human beings are both created in the image of God (imago 
Dei) and in the image of the world (imago mundi).  Reminiscent of Aquinas, 
the natural knowledge of God is experienced directly through the testimony 
of the human conscience and indirectly, by observing the outer world.63  A 
reflection of the paradisal knowledge of God exists in the world, which also 
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reflects the glory which is to come.  It is this world which ‘is destined to be 
revealed in its eternal transfiguration.’64  For Moltmann, however, theologia 
naturalis ‘confers wisdom, but it does not confer salvation or blessedness.’65  
This comes solely from the revelation of God in Jesus Christ through 
scripture.  Before we review Moltmann’s christology let us understand what 
Moltmann means by imago Dei and imago mundi. 
From Moltmann’s point of view, if human beings are created in the image of 
God this refers to the whole person, that is, one’s whole existence, body and 
soul, and one’s relationship within community and nature.  This image is 
worthy when the whole Trinity is reflected in a perichoretic, communal, 
equal and holistic whole.  Thus, even human nature as a reflection of the 
imago mundi can itself reflect God.  However, the dualism that separates 
heaven and earth manifests in the earth itself, shown in the difference 
between good and evil, or natural and unnatural.  The natural world is good.  
The unnatural world, meaning human nature, has succumbed to evil.  God 
does not create evil.  God only creates all that is favourable and good. There 
is no “dark side” to God.66  Creation, as we have noted, is formed from out 
of nothing.  It is this separation from God’s goodness that allows the 
possibility of evil.  However, although creation is “inside” God, it effectively 
stands “outside” of God, and can succumb to evil.  Evil is ‘the perversion of 
the good, the annihilation of what exists, the negation of the affirmation of 
life.’67  There are obvious manifestations of evil in humanity, which appear 
as sin and death, and there are ‘apparently’ perversions of this kind in 
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heaven, in the angelic world.68  Although he does not elaborate, Moltmann 
maintains that this evil, too, is separate from God.  
If there appears to be an anomaly here between the God of love and creation, 
it is to be found in creation itself.  The creation that is good has its basis in 
the hell of nothingness.  Such an anomaly allows Moltmann to continue his 
indictment of humanity.  God may be love but humanity is inhumanity, 
demonstrating the perversion and nihilism of an ‘unnatural will to power.’69  
God may be eternally active in creation but humanity has damned, and 
continues to damn, both itself and the natural world.  Yet despite 
‘humanity’s history of disaster’ God continues in the Godhead’s great labour 
of salvation.70  Humanity is, after all, also created in God’s image.  There 
must be something about humanity that is worth saving.  In later works 
Moltmann places a greater emphasis on God’s love for creation.  The 
pneumatology, which he develops in The Spirit of Life and The Source of Life, 
and which will be addressed in this section, is a witness to God’s love.  The 
question must still be asked however: does humanity have the ability to 
contribute to its own salvation?  
Humanity, as imago Dei, represents God on earth.  We have noted that 
humanity corresponds to God in God’s essence, which is love, and humanity 
has the capacity to move towards the perfect relationality of the triune God.   
Likeness to God ‘can only be lived in human community.’71  The ‘socially 
open companionship between people is the form of life which corresponds 
to God.’72  The trinitarian model of perichoresis can overcome not just the 
egotism of the individual but also the egotism of the couple, because it is a 
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higher principle than a male/female dualistic image of God.73  T h e  t r u e  
image of humanity, however, is only to be found in the end times, in the 
imago Christi.  In Christ’s image, ‘people become what they were intended to 
be.’74  The conforming to the image of the Son means that humanity’s true 
image lies not with the Trinity but with the Son.  The resurrected and 
glorified Jesus is God’s true image, and humanity is also destined for 
glorification.   This salvation is in God’s hands.  For the human being there is 
another process, a becoming human, also consummated in time.  This 
process is a social one and it is here that humanity follows the whole Trinity 
for just as the Father, Son and Spirit are one, so human beings aim to be one 
in their social fellowship.75   
Where does the world fit into this picture of God and humanity? The world 
is in crisis because of humanity’s distorted picture of its own relationship to 
nature.  A positive and united concept of body is essential to redress this 
balance, together with a return to a cosmic understanding of spirit.   
Moltmann contends that modern understanding has lost sight of the spirit in 
nature, and therefore, body.  Indeed, the alienation of humanity from bodily 
existence is the inner aspect of the external ecological crisis.76  If spirit is 
understood at all it is related to the mind, that part of the human being 
which differentiates the human being from nature.  Moltmann, however, 
calls spirit ‘the forms of organization and communication of all open 
systems of matter and life.’77  Spirit is in everything, even matter.  Thus, he 
says, if ‘the spirit in the human being is once more to be integrated in the 
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surrounding field of nature, and in his own embodiment, we must go back 
to the full and comprehensive concept of the cosmic Spirit.’78   
Moltmann expresses his concept of spiritual embodiment in the Gestalt—the 
configuration or total pattern of the lived life, of the whole human organism.  
The  Gestalt emerges within one’s environment, with heredity, place and 
circumstances of birth, society and culture. It is the common task of the body 
and the soul to develop the Gestalt, which develops both inwardly and 
outwardly with exchange between what is conscious and unconscious.  The 
body ‘talks continuously to the soul, just as the unconscious influences what 
is conscious, and just as the involuntary is always present in all voluntary 
acts.’79  Exchange and dynamism are the characteristics of this process as the 
Gestalt develops through the myriad of inner and outer experiences.  The 
human person is both formed by and distinguished by these experiences, 
just as the Spirit is the principle of both cohesion and individuation.   
Moltmann gives no primacy to any part of the formation of Gestalt.  For 
example, soul experiences are not more important than bodily experiences.  
The Gestalt is an idea taken from psychotherapy.  Deane-Drummond notes 
that by introducing theological concepts of spirit, Moltmann takes his 
understanding of the Gestalt beyond its original meaning.80  His concept of 
spiritual embodiment is a theological addition, meaning that he introduces 
the Spirit’s presence into the Gestalt concept of the whole human person.  
Moltmann gives a positive, if not fluid, definition of the human person in 
terms of the Gestalt.  For Moltmann, ‘if the person is at one with himself—
and that means at one with the needs and powers of his body—he forms an 
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identity for himself and is worthy of trust.’81  If the Spirit is the ultimate form 
of communication between all forms of life, then human beings are 
conscious communicators only as much as they are aware of the myriad 
processes of communication in their inner and outer world.  Moltmann calls 
this consciousness of the Spirit, the spirit-body.  The spirit-body is the human 
embodiment that is ‘pervaded, quickened and formed by the creative 
Spirit.’82   I suggest that if we think of communication at a cellular level, we 
must conclude that we are mostly unconscious of our spirit-body at this 
stage of evolution.  Spirit-soul is the human soul (that is, feelings, ideas, 
intentions, etc) that is ‘pervaded, quickened and formed by the creative 
Spirit.’83  If we think of the alignment of our feelings with our actions then 
spirit-soul must also be seen as a largely unconscious entity. The 
combination of spirit-body with spirit-soul is the spirit-Gestalt.  Logically 
then, although Moltmann does not spell this out, human beings are a long 
way from being “at one” with themselves, their spirit-Gestalt.  This means 
that, according to Moltmann’s definition of the Gestalt, humanity is far from 
being dependable or worthy of trust. 
Despite his theology of humanity as imago Dei, Moltmann has a Gaia-like 
approach to the place of humanity within creation.  Body, or human nature, 
can be used to understand nature in a wider sense as environment.  The 
human person is not isolated from the environment but shares the very same 
spiritual essence.  This is the same Spirit that is the common spirit of 
creation, of the whole cosmos.  This spirit has hitherto been understood as 
that which sets humanity above common creation, and which differentiates 
humanity from a spiritless nature.  Moltmann rightly comments that the 
spirit of the human being must be ‘once more integrated in the surrounding 
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field of nature, and in his own embodiment.’84  However, for Moltmann, this 
means that humanity is just one life form in an infinite cosmos and certainly 
‘not the meaning and purpose of the world.’85  This is similar to the premises 
of the Gaian thought of deep ecology, which acknowledges the equal 
importance of all life forms.86  The extrapolation of this for Moltmann is that 
he can envisage a future where humanity has ‘disappeared from this 
planet.’87  Humanity may have been created to identify God, love God and 
praise God, but the rest of creation will still do this if humanity disappears.  
Moltmann calls this ‘a new theocentric interpretation of the world.’88   The 
meaning of the world is to be found in God, not in humanity.  Moltmann 
still maintains that ‘every single person, and indeed every single living thing 
in nature, has a meaning.’89   This meaning is in God.  While championing 
the cause of the natural world (and nature does, indeed, need champions) 
Moltmann effectively dismisses an important agent for change in the 
world—humanity.  As we shall see, this is a fundamental difference between 
the theologies of Moltmann and Bulgakov.  Bulgakov, with a similar 
understanding of shared spirit between God and the world, advocates a 
fundamental purpose for humanity in the world. 
If humanity is not the pinnacle of creation, what is?  For Moltmann, it is the 
sabbath, the seventh day of creation.  In Christian theology of the creation, 
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the seventh day has been ‘much neglected, or even overlooked altogether.’90  
With the emphasis on the six days of creation God is seen as a creating God, 
which, in turn, has meant that humanity feels justified in existence when it is 
busy “doing.”  If the emphasis is shifted to God’s joy and rest on the seventh 
day, then “not-doing” is given its rightful place.  The sabbath rest (menuha) is 
not created: it is ‘the uncreated grace of God’s presence for the whole 
creation.’91  Moltmann calls for the sabbath to be celebrated in stillness so 
that ‘men and women no longer intervene in the environment through their 
labour.’92  Moltmann proposes that the Jewish sabbath be honoured by 
beginning the Christian sabbath with Saturday evening devotions that flow 
into the Christian Sunday message.  It is through tradition that Sunday has 
become the day of celebrating Christ’s resurrection, but Sunday must also be 
seen as a celebration of the liberty of the new creation.  Sunday is a day of 
hope to be celebrated in stillness: a day ‘without pollution of the 
environment—a day when we leave our cars at home, so that nature too can 
celebrate its sabbath.’93 
Moltmann calls for an "ecological theology of nature," where humanity 
learns to adapt to its natural environment.  His former emphasis on 
liberating action and dynamic world transformation becomes "being," 
"dwelling," and "resting" in the world.  This emphasis could be seen as 
contradictory in Moltmann's "open system," which stresses God's 
transforming activity.  French highlights the radical shift Moltmann has 
made—but not acknowledged—in his theology in God in Creation.  For 
French, his earlier work constituted 'one of the most thoroughgoing and 
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influential attacks on creation and nature in the name of eschatology and 
"history" seen in modern theology. If Moltmann is right now, he was wrong 
then.’94  Indeed, Moltmann has overturned much of his earlier theology.  Yet 
the new emphasis on the ideal of passivity may be similar to his former 
stress on the human inability to transform the world. For Moltmann, the 
future lies in God's hand alone.  Humans do not seem to be able to work in 
the world without polluting it, “intervening” with their labour.  The only 
positive agency of transformation appears to be God, or more specifically, 
the Spirit.  Deane-Drummond assesses Moltmann’s change of direction more 
affirmatively by drawing out the implicit ecological themes of his earlier 
theology.95  She points out that the differences highlighted between God and 
the world in Theology of Hope and  Crucified God do not disappear in his 
ecological theology but more positive guidelines are given for living with the 
tensions of human existence.  Although there is suffering in the world there 
is also the presence of the risen Christ in his beauty and glory and this leads 
to doxological joy.96 
In The Spirit of Life, Moltmann continues his efforts to draw God and creation 
together, further exploring the role of the Spirit.  Perhaps Moltmann’s 
amelioration of his former position of radical discontinuity arises from his 
continued exploration of pneumatology.  Moltmann’s emphasis is on the 
work of the Spirit because the Spirit ‘is in all created beings.’97  In The Spirit of 
Life Moltmann constructs a unique argument of the presence of God in 
creation by exploring the ruach-Shekinah imagery from the Hebrew Bible.  By 
using the metaphor of Shekinah (Hebrew: presence of God), Moltmann 
wishes to emphasize three aspects of the Spirit.  Firstly, Shekinah emphasizes 
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the personal character of the Spirit.  The medium of ruach (Hebrew: spirit) is 
experience, present in every aspect of human life.98  Secondly, Shekinah is the 
efficacious presence of God in the world.99  This is a common theme in both 
God in Creation and Spirit of Life.  Thirdly, he continues the theme of the 
sensibility of God.  In the Shekinah tradition suffering is shared with 
creatures. Just as Moltmann maintains the Father God’s suffering in the 
crucifixion, God is also shown to suffer through the suffering of Shekinah.100  
Shekinah is a motherly presence, supporting early Christian communities 
which spoke of the Spirit of God as mother.101  The Spirit is the ‘universal 
undertow of the divine life which leads to a radical affirmation of life, in 
particular also in all its broken and damaged forms.’102 
Moltmann’s use of ruach-Shekinah imagery is both creative and constructive 
and forms part of his program to show a continuation from the Hebrew 
Bible to the New Testament.   
This idea about the God who suffers with us then inevitably leads to the 
bold concept that God’s self-deliverance goes together with the 
deliverance of Israel.  When Israel is delivered, God’s Shekinah will 
return home from its wanderings.103   
There are two concepts to be elucidated here.  The first one speaks of God’s 
self-deliverance, and the second one links this self-deliverance to the 
deliverance of Israel.  God’s radical discontinuity with creation is now God’s 
involvement with creation at such a level that God can only be “self-
delivered” in time.  This is personification of God at such an extraordinary 
level that God appears to be completely identified with the historical 
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progress of Israel.  Israel is transformed into a universal concept of the Holy 
Spirit.  According to Moltmann, the books of Ezekiel and Jeremiah 
emphasize ‘the corporate hope for Israel’s rebirth from God’s Spirit, not so 
much the coming of a messianic representative for Israel.’104  In Moltmann’s 
example from Ezekiel 37, ruach is poured out over all of Yahweh’s people 
and all are raised, not just representatives of the people.  Moltmann then 
moves from the particularity of the people to the universality of “all flesh” in 
Joel 2: 28.  The Spirit is universally poured out over “all flesh,” which now 
extends not just to humanity but to all of creation.  This, in turn, is 
encompassed by the metaphor of Shekinah returning from the wilderness to 
the Most High.  This is both a bold concept and a creative one. 
Ultimately, Moltmann’s anthropology is another dialectic category.   
Humanity is formed in God’s image yet it is not the pinnacle.  Moltmann 
suggests that we move away from an anthropocentric view of creation.   
Humanity is not the pinnacle of creation but one aspect of it.  The highest 
stage of creation, and therefore the universe, is not humanity but the 
sabbath.  Honouring the sabbath is the ultimate act within creation.   
Humanity is also created in imago mundi. There is an onus on humanity to 
challenge its own way of operating in the world, to learn to look after the 
world.  Consciousness of problematic thinking is a beginning towards a 
healthy human Gestalt and a responsible cohabitation of the planet. 
At this point we return to Moltmann’s theology of hope to elicit how his 
life’s work so far has affected his notions of hope.  Humanity’s hope remains 
in God’s promise but how much power does this faith give humanity to 
change its ways or the planet?  Indeed, is this so important if God is the 
ultimate power?  After all, God’s immanent transcendence now is not an 
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ontic but an eschatological presence.  In this last section we will examine 
God’s eschatological presence with a view to answering this question of 
human hope.  Is faith in God our only source of hope or can we hope in 
humanity’s possibilities as well?  Once again we will find that Moltmann’s 
faith in God is strong while his relationship to the human world remains in 
didactic categories.  Moltmann is clear on how humanity should act but it is 
not apparent that Moltmann has any faith in humanity’s capacity to act 
responsibly.  Despite this, all will be saved. 
A theology of hope revisited.  The relationship between 
humanity, the world and God. 
In addressing hope, what can be said about Moltmann’s program for living, 
both on the level of the individual and of the Church?  What does a 
Christian theology of hope have to offer the world?  This last section will 
look at the practical outcomes of Moltmann’s theology of hope.  His earlier 
theology of hope will be revisited in the light of his later work to give a fuller 
picture of Moltmann’s worldview and what that means for human action in 
the world.  Although hope is still contained within the eschatological 
horizon of the future, this hope is Moltmann’s incentive for Christian praxis, 
for celebrating God’s creation while also challenging the injustices of the 
world. 
Moltmann’s intent in Theology of Hope, according to Geiko Müller-
Fahrenholz, is ‘to overcome the abstract opposition between God’s action 
and human action by a dynamic and kairological theology of the Spirit.’105  
God comes from the future in the form of the Spirit to offer ‘charisms of the 
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spirit on the whole front of creaturely misery.’106  The Spirit aims to inspire 
us with hope, a hope that challenges the front of present reality, knowing 
that this reality is not the eschatological reality for which we await.  This is 
the field of Christian praxis, taking up the cross of existence, knowing that in 
this opposition arises the possibility of spiritual transformation.  As we 
noted in Chapter 1, for Moltmann, it is faith and hope ‘that make experiences 
and bring the human spirit to an ever new and restless transcending of 
itself.’107  As an individual, and as part of the church, this dissatisfaction 
with the present leads to the fight against injustice and inhumanity in the 
world.   In Theology of Hope there is an opposition between this world and the 
world of the future.   Human action is a part of this world whereas God’s 
action is effective in the eschaton.  The abstract opposition between God’s 
action and human action that Müller-Fahrenholz raises is not  overcome.   
They are different in terms of their transformative effects: God transforms 
the world, the human person acts in the world.  In later work, such as God in 
Creation and The Way of Jesus Christ,108 Moltmann does attempt to realign 
God with creation and humanity and gives further indications of the role of 
the Spirit in sustaining human hope, but, once again, I suggest that God’s 
action and human actions are dissimilar and unconnected. 
Future hope is ever of vital importance to Moltmann.  In God in Creation 
Moltmann correlates hope with meaning and intention.  We understand 
someone if we understand ‘the purpose of his life, his project.’109  Without 
direction or purpose one’s ‘essential hope in life is disappointed’ often 
leading to physical illness.110  Openness to the future is spirit.  Closedness is 
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a “dis-spirited” condition.111  Of course, in any one life there is both 
openness and closedness at different times.  A true life is one which 
experiences the highs and lows of exist e n c e .   I t  i s  l o v e  t h a t  m a k e s  o n e  
‘capable of happiness and at the same time capable of suffering.’112  F o r  
Moltmann, this is an ‘insoluble paradox’ that the more a person loves, the 
more intensely that person experiences both life and death.113  Health is not 
about staying happy or even staying healthy.  Moltmann believes that the 
World Health Organization’s definition of health as the state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being114 is an unrealistic and unsustainable 
ideal.  It is not even ‘a particularly humane ideal’ because it produces false 
hope.115  Moltmann prefers to understand health as an attitude.  ‘Health is 
not the absence of malfunctionings.  Health is the strength to live with 
them.’116  T h e  s t r e n g t h  t o  b e  h u m a n  i s  t h e n  ‘ d i s p l a y e d  i n  t h e  p e r s o n ’ s  
capacity for happiness and suffering, in his acceptance of life’s joy and the 
grief of death.’117  Otherwise, every illness or physical or emotional suffering 
is seen as an insufficiency which has the power to rob one’s confidence in life 
and destroy one’s sense of self-worth.118  When hope becomes disappointed 
the ‘history of their lives takes its impress from what they expect of life.’119   
Thus, it is important to see thwarted hope in one’s personal life as part of the 
fabric of life, yet not allow it to form the basis of future expectations so that 
one becomes hope-less.   
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Suffering is part of the very fabric of the world.  Moltmann suggests that the 
systematic unfolding of evolution, that process of increasing complexity, is 
driven by suffering.  In the natural world, the more a life system is capable 
of suffering, or bearing strain, the stronger and more capable of survival it 
shows itself to be. However, this is not necessarily a positive concept when 
applied to the human world.  It is only because of the creature’s sin that God 
needs to enter into creation through Christ’s passion.   The ‘transforming 
power of suffering [becomes] the basis for the liberating and consummating 
acts of God.’120  God sustains the world in spite of its sin with long-suffering 
patience: God ‘suffers the contradictions of the beings he has created.’121  
Suffering has become necessary for God.  God guides this process, not 
through supernatural interventions, but through the continued experience of 
Christ’s passion, through ‘the opening of possibilities out of his suffering.’122  
Again: God’s inexhaustible patience and active capacity for suffering is ‘the 
root of his creative activity in history.’123   In my opinion the concept of the 
“opening of possibilities” of Christ’s suffering is not sufficiently defined or 
clarified.  Nor does Moltmann clarify what the opening of possibilities 
means for humanity.  If he is referring to his definition of health as the 
strength to live with difficulties (see above) then how this, in turn, becomes 
“creative” is not clear.  In The Way of Jesus Christ it is through faith that one 
must discover ‘the therapeutic powers of Christ in the world’s present 
situation, and allow them to be experienced.’124  
For Moltmann sin has taken hold of creation beyond personal sin alone right 
into the very structures of society.  The unjust structures in political and 
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economic life are deadly forces in the world. 125  It is these structures which 
Moltmann called for a need to challenge in Theology of Hope, and it is a 
feature of his theology that he continues to challenge the injustices of the 
world.  Moltmann’s intent to challenge the problems of our times is 
laudable.  His voice on behalf of the powerless is an important one.  He gives 
some indications of what needs to be done. He calls for the need to work out 
the relationship between traumatization and avoiding new injustice, thus 
breaking, in Müller-Fahrenholz’s words, the ‘vicious circles of collective 
hurts and patterns of retaliation’126  In his later theology of reconciliation 
Moltmann looks towards the justice of compassion as the highest form of 
justice.127  However, as Müller-Fahrenholz points out, he does not detail 
what this means in terms of human justice.128   
Because of such omissions and lack of concrete examples, it is easy to 
imagine that justice and reconciliation is in the province of God alone.   
Moltmann separates creation itself from creation in time.  Creation in time is 
God’s history.  This is described in prophetic theology as God’s burden and 
weariness (Isa. 43.24).129 
Through the Son, God creates, reconciles and redeems his creation.  
In the power of the Spirit, God is himself present in his creation – 
present in his reconciliation and his redemption of that creation.  
The overflowing love from which everything comes that is from 
God, is also the implicit ground for God’s readiness to endure the 
contradictions of the beings he has created.130 
Once again, God is the active subject of creation.  This statement could 
almost be a summary of Moltmann’s entire theology.  And again: ‘God has 
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created the world, creates the world in the present moment, and will fulfil it.’ 
131   God is the one who will actively reconcile and redeem creation.  This 
raises the question of just how active God is in creation and whether creation 
itself has its own impetus or self-regulation.  Despite Moltmann’s own 
description of the symbiotic nature of the cosmos, 132 there still appears to be 
no transformational purpose for any reconciliation between human beings 
or between human beings and God.  The dialectic of divine responsibility 
and protest has no resolution until the eschaton.133  
Moltmann’s God-centredness has often been criticized.  Müller-Fahrenholz, 
for example, points out that, in Moltmann’s theology, only God can atone, 
God raises up, judges and puts right. God carries human history of suffering 
and injustice.134  For Müller-Fahrenholz, if only God can atone, human 
reconciliation becomes superfluous.135  The problem is manifold, and is to be 
found in Moltmann’s anthropology, his pneumatologia crucis, and his 
eschatological understanding of history.  The first problem lies in 
humanity’s contradictory nature.  Moltmann cannot overcome a belief that 
humanity is at best, passive and at worse, perverse and nihilistic.  In 
Moltmann’s view of creation, God must ‘endure’ (German: ertragen)136 
contradictory humanity.  I would like to suggest that love never has to 
“endure.”  Love is love.  Love may suffer for another but suffering done out 
of love is not the same as enduring the existence of someone.  Moltmann’s 
God is at times the Yahweh of the Hebrew Bible, who can be irritable and 
angry with his people! 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 83. Original emphasis. 
132 See above, 158. 
133 See Bauckham, Theology of Moltmann, 90. 
134 Müller-Fahrenholz, Kingdom and Power, 191. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Jürgen Moltmann, Gott in Der Schöpfung: Ökologische Schöpfungslehre, 3rd ed. (Munich: 
Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1987), 29.   137  
The second problem is that history remains an eschatological category.  It is 
the future which determines time and all things become contingent on the 
future.  This is a messianic approach.  History is God’s history.  Human 
history and the particularities of human life are transitory.  It is the love of 
God who ‘reaches out beyond the limits of death and snatches all that is 
transitory and fragmentary into his loving fullness in order to put right what 
has never achieved its rights.’137  By “rights” Moltmann is applying personal 
judgment to what a human life should encompass.  However, can we really 
judge what another person’s life is meant to achieve?  It may be a judgment 
made when, for example, a child dies.  The mourners judge a life cut short or 
not achieving full potential, and so choose to place their hope in a God who 
will raise the dead in the end times.  When Müller-Fahrenholz speaks of 
Moltmann’s process leading to the “kingdom of glory” this is what he 
means: God’s transformation of all of creation from a lower state to a future 
form of glory.138  Bodily death is part of the process of resurrection which 
remains an eschatological process.  Until then we are “anticipatory” beings 
of time, looking to the God of the future.   
Müller-Fahrenholz uses the word “process” to describe Moltmann’s 
principle of transformation.  This term applies only to God’s transformation 
of the world in the eschaton. There is no process or progressive 
transformation until the eschaton, which leads inevitably to a divide 
between now and the future.  Thus, the divinization of the human being 
(theosis) is an event of the eschaton alone.  The process which Paul names, 
from predestination to calling to justification to glorification (Rom. 8: 30), is 
summed up by Moltmann thus: 
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(A)s God’s image human beings conform to the presence of the 
Creator in his creation, and as God’s children they conform to the 
presence of God’s grace; but when the glory of God enters creation, 
they will become like God, and transfigured into his appearance…The 
eschatological becoming-one-with-God of human beings (theosis) is 
inherent in the concept of ‘seeing’, for the seeing face to face and the 
seeing him as he is transforms the seer into the One seen and allows 
him to participate in the divine life and beauty. Participation in the 
divine nature and conformity to God…are the marks of the promised 
glorification of human beings.  The God-likeness that belongs to 
creation in the beginning becomes God-sonship and daughterhood in 
the messianic fellowship with the Son, and out of the two springs the 
transfiguration of human beings in the glory of the new creation.’139  
I quote this passage at length because it demonstrates the basic imbalance in 
Moltmann’s theology.  He does not explain the meaning of predestination or 
calling or justification.  There is a “God-likeness” that belongs to creation in 
the beginning which makes glorification possible.  Human beings are a part 
of this.  The middle phase is conforming to the presence of God’s grace, 
presumably meaning Christ.  Does conforming mean to accept Christ as the 
messiah?  The last phase is glorification.  The glory of God appears to be 
withheld from creation until the end times.  There are no clear indications of 
process between any of these three states.  Moltmann skips over the 
beginning and the middle to weight his “process” in the end.  If there is any 
process at all, it is confined to the eschatological end times. In this process, 
the emphasis is on God’s saving actions and the glorification in the eschaton. 
In summary, our hope is in the future and in our faith in God.  For 
Moltmann, this hope and faith in God, in the promise of the resurrection of 
the dead and the transfiguration of all creation, is enough.  He writes,  
Only the love which passionately affirms life understands the 
relevance of this hope, because it is through that this love is liberated 
from the fear of death and the fear of losing its own self.  The 
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resurrection hope makes people ready to love their lives in love 
wholly...It does not withdraw the human soul from bodily, sensory 
life; it ensouls this life with unending joy.140 
God’s love for us is the basis for our hope.  Hope in this future is 
accompanied by joy and our own love for life.  Because we are created in 
God’s image God will glorify humanity in the end times. Meanwhile, we 
take up the cross of existence by proclaiming Christ and following his path.  
The Spirit is also with us in our suffering and gives us the strength to 
challenge the injustice and inhumanity all around us.  Existence is weighted 
with sin, both personal and institutional.  God’s immanent transcendence is 
not an ontic but an eschatological presence.   There is some sense of the 
possibilities of spiritual growth in the individual but transformation at a 
bodily level is a part of the future.  The ultimate power of transformation lies 
in the eschaton in the hands of the Creator.   
Conclusion  
There is much to be said for Moltmann's 'thorough scholarship, creative 
insights, and prophetic energy.'141  Moltmann engages with the theology of 
the day as well as biblical exegesis and historical theology.  Theology of Hope 
was an inspirational text for many.  His later pneumatology has also 
inspired many with its grounding of the Spirit in creation.  He highlights a 
daily experience of the Spirit by which he means ‘an awareness of God in, 
with and beneath the experience of life, which gives us assurance of God’s 
fellowship, friendship and love.’142  This turn to the Spirit has given 
Moltmann’s theology a more positive basis because the Spirit is the one who 
conveys God’s love to us.  Over the course of his lifetime, Moltmann’s main 
theme has been a consistent emphasis on an eschatological framework.  The 
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God of the future beckons.   Moltmann’s faith in the God of the future 
remains his greatest strength. 
There have also been major shifts.  His earlier dualistic notions of God and 
creation were dropped in favour of a transcendent/immanent God.  An 
eschatological dualism remains but the dualism of creation moves into God.  
His later theology is an attempt to rework concepts of history and creation 
into an inclusive model of God.  He has done this by subsuming them into 
God’s history.  History now has importance because God has joined with 
creation through Christ’s passion and suffers with creation until the end 
times.  Bauckham believes that Moltmann is the contemporary theologian 
who has ‘most successfully transcended the dominant (theological and non-
theological) paradigm of reality as human history…and attempted to enter 
theologically into the reciprocity of human history and the rest of nature as 
the history of God’s creation.’143  However, we have also noted that the 
problem with this theocentric picture is that it fails to give much meaning or 
credence to human history.  The relationship between God and the world, or 
more precisely, God and humanity, is still fundamentally at odds.  Indeed, 
creation, or the natural world, has its own impetus and appears to operate 
on a healthy basis as long as humanity leaves it alone.  Thus, the importance 
of the sabbath as a day of rest.  Rather than suffering with creation then, God 
“suffers” humanity until the end times. 
If Moltmann has successfully integrated God into the world, he has been less 
successful at integrating the world into God.  When approaching the world 
from a worldly angle, there has been no fundamental change in Moltmann’s 
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eschatological outlook.  Even if humanity is now persuaded that looking 
after planet earth is in their best short term interests, the end results will still 
be the same: God will fix it all up in the end times.  There is no fundamental 
purpose for human existence, or even human effort.  Our hope is in God 
alone.  Despite the perversion and disastrous nature of humankind, God will 
save us.  Humanity can (and must) have faith in this God who loves us.  If 
one is searching for a reason for God’s love of humanity, one will not find it 
in Moltmann’s theology.   Yet God’s love is the ultimate basis of Moltmann’s 
hope.  However, is the picture of an ultimate transformation of the world in 
the future by God enough to give us hope and sustain us in this time and 
place?  My thesis is that it is not.  It is for this reason that I place an 
alternative theology next to Moltmann’s.  Moltmann offers many pictures 
and possibilities in his work without giving any kind of integrated system.  
Sergei Bulgakov aims to give such a synthesis in his sophiology. Because 
Bulgakov’s system gives an integral and effective place to humanity in 
creation I will argue that it is a more effective theology of hope for the 21st 
century.   142  
Part 2: An Eastern Perspective:   
Sergei Bulgakov and Sophia 
Chapter 4   God in creation:  Sophia and humanity 
Introduction 
We turn now to a different perspective on hope and meaning in the world.  
The following three chapters examine the work of Sergei Bulgakov (1871-
1944), the Russian Orthodox priest and scholar.  As stated in the 
Introduction, my intention in examining this particular eastern perspective is 
to introduce the theory of sophiology as a theology of hope.  Bulgakov does 
not write about hope (надежда, nadezhda) in any great detail—in fact, hope 
is rarely mentioned.   However, I will present Bulgakov’s sophiology as a 
theology of hope because it supports the definition of hope offered in this 
dissertation—that there is some correspondence between the human will to 
live and the world which supports and sustains life.  Bulgakov’s 
understanding of Sophia, the Wisdom of God, is one which offers a different 
understanding of the role and purpose of humanity in creation from that 
encountered in Moltmann’s theology, and in this sophiology I find a basis 
for hope.   
For Bulgakov, the basis for creation is a God of love and it is this love which 
permeates God’s creation.  His faith in the God of love infuses his theology 
with hope.  His faith in the ultimate goodness of creation is linked to God’s 
purpose, the abundant overflowing love which creates a world to share in 
God’s love.  Humanity is made in God’s image and this is ontologically   143  
significant for creation.  Indeed, for Bulgakov, the world is created for 
humanity.  Sophia may be understood as the bridge between the divine and 
human worlds, sharing aspects of each.  Humanity has a personal 
relationship to the world and to God through Sophia.  The world is 
immersed in a temporal process of becoming and there is a beginning, 
middle and an end to this process.  For Bulgakov, the middle is no less 
important than the beginning or the end.  Understanding the connectedness 
between the world and humanity in the context of God’s great love for and 
faith in humanity is the basis for hope.  Hope is both personal, giving each 
life particular meaning, and universal, hope for the future of humanity and 
the world.  When humanity understands the basis of Wisdom of the world 
and experiences the hope that this worldview gives, hope becomes a 
motivation to live well and responsibly within the world.   
In Moltmann’s theology there appears to be little reason for existence as such 
and there is a time of waiting until the eschatological end.  Yet, as we have 
seen, Moltmann’s God is also a God of love and Moltmann’s hope is based 
on faith in the God of love.  I see the major difference between Moltmann’s 
and Bulgakov’s theologies in humanity’s purpose in creation.  Moltmann’s 
humanity is seriously flawed, has no ontological purpose in the world yet is 
the cause of all the world’s problems.  Humanity’s greatest hope is that God 
is trusted to act in the world on its behalf.  Bulgakov’s humanity is integral 
to the cosmos and is created to be the highest possible manifestation of 
God’s love.  Most importantly, humanity is God’s co-worker in a process of 
theosis.  Humanity works with the triune God in a process of 
transformation.  Humanity is an important part of the world’s readiness for 
transfiguration in the eschatological end.  Like Moltmann, God is the 
ultimate power of transfiguration for Bulgakov, but unlike Moltmann, God 
is not the only source of transformation.     144  
The issue of theodicy is also important because it raises questions of how a 
God of love can allow evil in the world.  Bulgakov will also answer this 
question with love.  God’s love is always evident because love is the 
ontological reality of existence.  The opposite of love is not evil because love 
has no opposite, it simply exists.  Evil becomes an oppositional force within 
the good but it has no ontological reality.  For this reason, the good must 
always be stronger than evil.  The existence of evil in God’s creation also 
means that it has a purpose, or at least that God (re)turns it to God’s 
purpose.  I have proposed that Christian hope is about meaning, and that 
this meaning must incorporate present existence.  Hope is based on an 
understanding that all the elements of each person’s life have significance.  
For Bulgakov, each human life is no less than a part of a process of cosmic 
transformation, but each element within that process is no less significant 
despite the grandness of the enterprise.  His theology of Sophia allows such 
an interpretation of hope and meaning.  For this reason, I present Bulgakov’s 
theology as a theology of hope. 
I will delineate the above elements of Bulgakov’s systemic endeavour in the 
following three chapters.1  These chapters, chapters 4—6, will chiastically 
mirror the themes in the previous three chapters and will be followed by 
Chapter 7, which compares the theologies of Moltmann and Bulgakov.   
Thus, the theme of Chapter 3, God in creation, is addressed in this chapter, 
Chapter 4, which will focus on Bulgakov’s understanding of God’s 
relationship to creation and humanity through Sophia.  The subject of 
Chapter 2, the crucified God, is reflected in Chapter 5, which will examine 
Bulgakov’s interpretation of Christ, particularly his understanding of the 
crucifixion and evil and their effect on Sophia and humanity.  The last 
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chapter in this set will interpret sophiology as a theology of hope, 
addressing Sophia’s history, past, present and future, with particular 
reference to the work of the Spirit, and this follows the theme of Chapter 1, 
which examined Moltmann’s theology of hope, and his pneumatology in 
Chapter 3.      146  
A sophiology of creation: God’s relationship to the world 
As noted in the Introduction, Sophia is not unique to Russian theology and 
philosophy.  Mikhail Sergeev demonstrates her centrality particularly in 
Russia’s so-called “Silver Age” from the 1880’s to 1930’s but also in recent 
times.2  In fact, Bulgakov writing during the Silver Age could not avoid 
sophiology.  Sophia was both a literary-mystical image and a religious-
philosophical concept.  Bulgakov endeavoured to give Sophia a defined, 
systematic place within theology.  In this task, he was following Nikolai 
Losskii who, according to Paul Valliere, shaped up ‘sophiology by trimming 
away undisciplined, subjective romantic elements.’3  Despite the many 
writings on Sophia, she remains a complex and elusive entity.  As Valliere 
also notes, ‘the idea of Sophia—Holy Wisdom, or the Wisdom of God—is 
one of the least clarified concepts in modern religious thought, but not 
because it is rarely discussed.’4  Bulgakov attempted to systematize and 
clarify the concept of Sophia which he had inherited from Soloviev, Losskii, 
Florensky and others and he also added new and radical elements of his 
own. The most significant of these new elements is his understanding of 
Sophia as God’s nature.  It is Bulgakov’s neo-Chalcedonian interpretation of 
the two natures, human and divine, and how they co-exist which forms the 
basis of how God is connected to creation through Sophia.   
In a Christianity with a transcendent God, the problem is age old: how can 
divine and human meet?  For Bulgakov, it is the existence of Jesus Christ 
alone that challenges the notion of a completely transcendent God: ‘God is 
born with the world and within the world…Here begins the possibility of 
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defining God as being immanently-transcendent…’5  In his quest for a 
positive theology of the credal formulations of the fourth and fifth centuries, 
Bulgakov develops two broad areas – that concerning the understanding 
that God is one ousia (nature), three hypostases (persons) and that of the two 
natures, human and divine, existing in the one hypostasis of Jesus Christ.  
The Chalcedonian “problem” of divine-humanity is resolved through an 
understanding of ousia. 6  The starting point for the idea of Divine-humanity 
is the possibility that the divine and human are not opposite but have 
something in common.  For Bulgakov this is nature.  The divine and the 
human share a sophian nature.  The two natures expressed in the Creed in 
the person of Jesus Christ are, in fact, two expressions of the same nature of 
God.7  Bulgakov begins his analysis with the divine, examining the 
transcendent God.  He takes a literal interpretation of the understanding that 
God  has  a nature.  God possesses something that is other than the three 
persons.  The trinitarian God is three hypostases, or persons: the Father, the 
Son and the Spirit, with one ousia, or nature.   
Some clarification is necessary on Bulgakov’s understanding of the terms 
ousia and hypostasis.  The ousia of God—named by Bulgakov as Sophia—is 
the linkage between the absolute and the immanent God.  Part of the 
difficulties of the early debates in Christianity occurred because of the 
introduction of nonbiblical terms words such as ousia, phusis, hypostasis, and 
prosōpon.  Not only were the terms non-biblical but there was no consensus 
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on what they meant.  The terms ousia and hypostasis, for example, were even 
used interchangeably.8   These two particular terms become mainstays in 
Bulgakov’s work with ousia used to describe the nature of being and 
hypostasis used to describe the person or spirit of being.  The hypostasis is 
the “I” and the ousia is the descriptive nature of the individuality described 
by Bulgakov as the “theme.”9  According to Bulgakov, the understanding of 
nature developed in the early theology of the Church Fathers was used 
principally for the doctrine of the Trinity to establish the connection of the 
three persons.10  God has one nature.  Bulgakov takes the additional step of 
personalizing this connection in Sophia.  God has one nature and this nature 
is Sophia.  
But Sophia is more than God’s nature—she is the basis of creation.  Bulgakov 
believes that the Church Fathers’ understanding of the nature that connects 
the Trinity should have then been applied to understanding God’s 
relationship to creation.11  For Bulgakov, the connection between God and 
the world begins with the sharing of God’s nature and this begins with the 
creation of Sophia from out of this nature.   The divine nature is both ousia 
and Sophia: ‘both represent the same nature of God in relation to the Creator 
himself (ousia) or the creature (Sophia).’12  Sophia has to be part of ousia but 
ousia is more than Sophia.  In Bulgakov’s later theology it is, however, 
difficult to distinguish God’s ousia from the divine Sophia because Sophia is 
the absolute content of God’s life.13 Vasilii Zenkovsky calls this sophiological 
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monism,14 but Bulgakov maintains the radical nature of God’s 
connectedness to creation in Sophia.  
In his earlier theology Bulgakov uses the problematic language of a fourth 
hypostatic element in God.  Here he is supporting Pavel Florensky. For 
Florensky, Sophia is a fourth hypostatic element: she has being but is not a 
fourth person of the Trinity.  He understands Sophia as the foundation and 
unity of creation but remaining distinct from the Creator.  Bulgakov 
attempts to systematically develop Florensky’s efforts to place sophiology 
within Orthodox theology.  To do this, Bulgakov returns to the Fathers and 
supports St Augustine’s synthesis of Sophia into the whole Trinity.15   
Wisdom resides in the whole Godhead, not just in the person of Christ.   
Wisdom is more than an attribute, however; she is the nature of the 
Godhead and forms a unique relationship with each person of the Trinity.  
Sophia discloses different aspects of each person of Trinity according to 
creation itself, as described below.  In order to clarify Sophia’s relationship 
to God Bulgakov employs a further term here: иростасность (ipostasnost’), 
variously translated as “hypostaseity,”16 “hypostasizedness”17 and 
“hypostaticity.”18  Hypostaticity is a quality of the divine Sophia.  She is not 
a hypostasis separate from God; she is a hypostatic principle, and able to 
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receive love and give love in return.19  This is an important distinction 
because it allows a separation between God and Sophia—they are not the 
same being—yet Sophia is in God.   
This concept may be further clarified by differentiating Sophia from God in 
terms of God’s essence of love.  If ousia is the “theme” of God then this 
theme is love.  The three persons share this nature of love.  Love ‘is not a 
quality or an attribute, or predicate, but rather the very essence of God.  In 
this divine Love each hypostasis gives itself in love and finds itself in the 
other hypostases.’20  L o v e  u n i t e s  t h e  p e r s o n s .   T h e  n a t u r e  o f  l o v e  i s  
superabundance and a desire to share that love with another or others.   
Therefore, although the love of the Trinity is complete in itself in the 
Godhead, it is a quality of love to ‘diffuse itself.’21  T h e  l o v e  o f  G o d  
overflows to find itself within a vehicle of utter receptivity.  God as “Subject” 
creates an “Object” to experience God’s love.  From out of the Subject of God 
arises an Object, which Bulgakov names as Sophia.  She is God’s love of 
Love.22  Rowan Williams expresses it thus: 
The divine triunity, God-as-love, complete in itself, sufficient to itself, 
the eternal divine actuality, substantive love, posits (in the 
metaphysical sense) an object for this divine love beyond itself; it 
loves this object and pours into it the lifegiving power of the 
trihypostatic love itself.23   
Sophia arises from God’s nature, from love.  Because she is the perfect 
expression of God’s love, God’s desire to give love fully is mirrored in 
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Sophia.  She receives the love that comes from the three Persons and returns 
it completely, emptying herself in turn.  A continuous cycle of love is formed 
from the kenotic impulse to give love.  Williams also notes: Sophia ‘as the 
eternal object of divine trinitarian love reflects the divine nature, its eternal 
ground, so faithfully that we can speak of Sophia within God.’24   Sophia is 
within God yet she also has an identity.  She ‘is hypostatized by the three 
persons and, in this sense, has being – the divine Sophia.  Thus, God has a 
trihypostatic hypostasis and a nature, the three persons united by Sophia.’25  
She is not a hypostatic being but she has the characteristics of hypostaticity. 
Bulgakov further distinguishes a divine and a creaturely manifestation of 
Sophia.  It is from the divine Sophia, from God’s nature, substantial love, 
that creation is formed.  As God is one being with three persons, so too, 
creation is one being, Sophia, with, in this instance, a multiplicity of persons.  
Creation is ‘the first principle of the new, created plurality of hypostases; the 
multiplicity of hypostases (human and angelic) is its consequence, a 
multiplicity existing in sophianic relation to the divine.’26  The basis of this 
creation in Sophia means that creation is no less than the sum total of all 
possibilities to freely experience God’s love.   
Although the language is complex, Bulgakov is doing no more than 
personalizing God’s nature using the biblical figure of Wisdom, already 
personalized in the Wisdom literature of the Hebrew Bible.27 As in Proverbs, 
Bulgakov gives Wisdom an integral part both in her relationship to God and 
in the formation of creation.  Thus, Sophia is not internal to the divine world 
but, from God’s grace, Sophia is granted access, and then is ‘able to reveal 
the mysteries of the Godhead in its depths, and to rejoice, to “play” in God’s 
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presence.’28  This idea parallels the thought of Florensky: Wisdom-Sophia ‘is 
not consubstantial to the Trinity but “admitted within divine life through 
divine condescension.”’29  One can also see Florensky’s influence on 
Bulgakov as he describes Sophia’s connection to God through love: Sophia is 
‘not love but only enters into the communion of Love, is allowed to enter into 
this communion by the unexpressed, unfathomable, unthinkable Divine 
humility.’30  It is from Sophia, from God’s nature of love, that creation is then 
formed.   With his sophiology Bulgakov attempts to explain God’s intimate 
relationship to creation: creation is formed from God’s very nature, from 
Sophia, out of and because of God’s love.31   
What has been described here is the divine Sophia, from out of whom the 
creaturely Sophia, the world, will be created.  The creaturely mode of Sophia 
is creation as mythically described in Genesis, with its relativity and its 
multiplicity.  The world is posited outside the Absolute as self-sufficient and 
relative.  Creation is a creative sacrifice of love.  It is ‘the sacrifice by the 
Absolute of Its absoluteness, a sacrifice which is caused by nobody and 
nothing.’32  The purpose of creation is to freely experience God’s love.  In the 
act of creation, from the principle of love’s abundance, God gives Sophia an 
independence of being.  This is the corporeal, or creaturely, Sophia.  “In the 
beginning” (Genesis 1: 1) is not a temporal state but an ontological state.  The 
divine Sophia is submerged into the multiplicity, temporality and relativity 
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of particular being.  This sophian mode is the creaturely Sophia in a state of 
potential, of “not-yet.”  The purpose of this creaturely mode is also based in 
love.  Love is only possible in relation, as witnessed in the primary ideal of 
love in the Trinity.  As the divine Sophia shares in this love so, too, does the 
creaturely Sophia.  For Bulgakov, the different manifestations of love—love 
as Trinity, love of Sophia and love of the creaturely Sophia—contain all the 
possibilities of love.  Bulgakov asserts that it is impossible for the world not 
to have been created, and it is impossible for the world to have been created 
in any other way. There is only one world and it contains all the potential of 
God’s possibilities that it possibly can.  God “needs” the world in a certain 
sense to realise all the possibilities of love:   
But it is by the necessity of love, which cannot not love, and which 
realises in itself the identity and fusion of freedom and necessity.  For love 
is essentially free, but its freedom is not arbitrary.  It is determined by 
an internal structure, a 'law' of love.  This is why creation and relatedness 
to creation are an integral part of the very idea of God.  They cannot be 
rejected as contingent, non-essential, as if they might or might not 
have existed.33   
The act of creation is not just a manifestation of divine might but also a 
sacrifice of divine love in Bulgakov’s theology of divine kenosis.  The whole 
Trinity, not just the Son, ‘stands in a kenotic relationship to the world.’34  The 
creation of the world is ‘a revelation of the trinitarian life, so that the world’s 
life is shown to be established on the same (sophianic) foundation as 
God’s.’35  Thus, there is a triune expression of divine Sophia in creation.  The 
threefold God has one nature, one ousia, named by Bulgakov as Sophia.  Yet, 
for Bulgakov, the quality of threefoldness in God is also reflected in Sophia, 
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giving rise to three different expressions within the unity of Sophia.  Sophia, 
as God’s world, contains all that the three hypostases give to her so that she 
is formed from the three unique expressions of the Persons of the Trinity.  
Sophia, as Wisdom, has most often been associated with the Son, the second 
hypostasis, yet this was not a universal patristic position.  Irenaeus, for 
example, identifies the Spirit with Sophia, and Athanasius argues that the 
Son is the Father’s Sophia.36  For Bulgakov, Sophia’s essential nature, as 
receptor, has three different expressions as she receives love from each of the 
hypostases of the Godhead, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.   
Because it is the triune God that creates the world, Bulgakov distinguishes 
between the actions of each Person of the Godhead in creation and how they 
manifest in the divine Sophia.  The Father God is the Creator, who creates 
the world by the Word and Holy Spirit, his “hands” according to patristic 
tradition.37  For Bulgakov, the qualities of the first hypostasis are divine 
fatherhood, outpouring and substantiality.38  The first aspect, fatherhood, is 
related to the beginning of creation as an act of will. The Father is ‘the 
hypostatic Creator of the world, that Divine I that addresses the world with 
the creative word: let there be all things.’39  Creation is an act of the Father’s 
will from his own Personhood, here qualified as Fatherhood.  He addresses 
the divine Sophia, his own substance and world, and gives to her a new 
mode of being, the created world, the creaturely Sophia. Sophia is the “the 
beginning” of creation. “The beginning” is not a temporal category but an 
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ontological category. Barbara Newman describes the distinction between the 
Father and Sophia: 
Although the world was created ‘in the beginning,’ in Sophia, it was 
created by the personal will of God.  Fr. Bulgakov thus distinguishes 
between personal or ‘hypostatic,’ and natural or ‘sophianic’ 
revelation.  While Sophia is the world’s ontological ground, God the 
Father is its Creator, and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in the patristic 
phrase, serve as His ‘hands.’40 
It is this relationship which also establishes the difference between God and 
the world.  The creation of the world ‘is not an inner self- positing of Divinity, 
which is God in the Holy Trinity, but a certain work of God...’41  God and the 
world are not synonymous.  The category that ‘preserves the positive 
connections between God and the world and the ontological distance 
between them’ is creator and createdness. 42  The Father God is the creator of 
the world.  
Bulgakov rejects the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of God as prime mover 
or first cause because ‘the idea of the prime mover and first cause contains a 
contradiction that Aristotle and his Christian followers evade sophistically, 
b y  s p e a k i n g  o f  a n  unmoved mover or an uncaused cause.’43  Bulgakov’s 
critique of Aquinas’ first cause is that neither God nor the human being has 
freedom – in Tataryn’s words: ‘once [God] had set the world in 
motion…everything was simply the consequence of what went before.’44  
However, Bulgakov may not be entirely fair in his critique.  Aquinas, in fact, 
does have an understanding of free will in both God and in the human 
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being.  Creation is an act of God’s will out of freedom and not through any 
necessity of God’s nature.45  Robert Slesinski considers that Bulgakov 
reduces the notion of causality to mechanical causality alone and yet can not 
himself avoid the idea of creation as some form of causality.46  Indeed, the 
prototypes within creation ensure that there is a process in creation from 
germinal to ideal forms (see following pages). 
The connection between God’s grace and the human will for Aquinas can 
also be interpreted more kindly.  For Aquinas, the human will is so damaged 
by the Fall that God uses divine grace to heal the will and turn the human 
being towards God.47  As Aidan Nichols points out, however, this is not God 
despising our freedom (as Bulgakov seems to think) but God acting ‘to 
release the spontaneity of our wills, to renew our freedom from within.’48  
The drive of our freedom is first of all in the will and this needs to be 
unblocked.  This is not so very different from Bulgakov’s notion of freedom, 
which also belongs in the sphere of divine/human relationships.  Christ 
stands at the door and knocks and if the human being opens the door, then 
Christ “will come in to you and eat with you, and you with me” (Rev. 3: 
20).49  
Returning to Bulgakov’s trinitarian creation, the second quality of the Father 
God is outpouring.  Bulgakov states, ‘there is the sheer impulse of self-
giving, the life of God as “Father,” emptying himself in letting the Other be, 
just as he does in the generation of the Son.’50   The Other is the divine 
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Sophia released into creaturely being.  It is an action of kenotic love. The 
Father’s kenosis in creation ‘consists in this going out of Himself, in which 
He becomes God for the world and enters into a relation with it as the 
Absolute-Relative.’51  Indeed, for Bulgakov, this is who God is—the creator 
of the world who is the Father of the world, in intimate relationship with the 
world.  The Absolute who is beyond the world is in the apophatic realm for 
humanity, the unnamed essence of Gregory Palamas.52  God is the name 
given to us in revelation to describe this relationship, God of the world, the 
Absolute who chooses to become Absolute-Relative. 
Substantiality is the third quality of the Father.  The sophianic expression of 
the Father is the primal ousia, the substance of God before its revelation in 
the dual working of Son and Spirit. For Bulgakov, there can be nothing 
extra-divine, nothing outside of God.  Indeed, there is no such thing as oujk 
ojn: ‘There is only God, and outside of and apart from God there is nothing, 
just as there is not even any “outside of” or “apart from”…’53  The created 
world is formed from the very substance of God – the divine Sophia.  It is 
the Father who calls creation into being from his sophianic substance.  He 
kenotically gives his substance to the world as an act of will and as an act of 
love.  This creation from God’s substance constitutes one of the positive 
connections between God and the world.  This substance, which Bulgakov 
calls the Ousia-Sophia is the foundation of creation.  In Genesis 1, it is 
written that “In the beginning . . . the earth was a formless void and 
darkness covered the face of the deep.” (1: 1-2).  The darkness here, 
according to Bulgakov, is ‘the transcendental unfathomability of the divine 
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Ousia-Sophia.’54  The earth is no less than the eternal divine Sophia.  God 
creates ‘the world from out of Himself, out of His essence,’55 from the Ousia-
Sophia. 
This ousia, as God’s world, is not an empty slate.  It is the foundation for the 
acts of creation that follow.  In the continuation of Genesis 1, Bulgakov sees 
this creation of the world as a “secondary” creation: the created Sophia 
formed from the divine Ousia-Sophia.  The creaturely Sophia is a special 
mode of being of the divine Sophia.  In the creaturely Sophia ‘the entire 
fullness of creaturely being already exists in its foundation, pre-exists 
ontologically’56 in the divine Sophia.  Genesis 1: 2-27 records the calling forth 
of creaturely being from the ousia, the earth.  God summons the earth to 
bring forth plants and animals (Gen. 1: 11-12, 20, 24) and the earth does so 
from the fullness that already exists in the divine Sophia.  As we shall see, 
the form of the contents of the divine Sophia comes from the Logos. 
The Spirit and the Son also have a specific relationship to the divine Sophia 
in creation.  The Father creates hypostatically, that is, in his Person, but 
Bulgakov asserts that the Son and Spirit participate in creation sophianically 
‘through the self-revelation in Sophia, who is the self-revelation of the Father 
in the Holy Trinity, the divine world.’57   The qualities of the Spirit given to 
Sophia are reality, life and beauty.  The Spirit does not act hypostatically, as 
the Holy Spirit, but sophianically as the Spirit of God: “the Spirit of God 
swept over the face of the waters” (Gen. 1: 2b).  In the economy of salvation, 
the Spirit will form a different hypostatic relationship with creation through 
Jesus Christ but in the initial creation the Spirit imparts her qualities only.  
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Thus, “and it was so” (Gen. 1: 7, 9, 11,15, 24, 30) refers to the reality of 
creation.  From out of the sophianic substance of the world, life arises.  And 
the statement that it was “good” (Gen. 1: 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31) attests to 
both beauty and joy.  The Spirit remains sophianically in the world as 
beauty, as that ‘which urges forward and completes the world on its way to 
perfect relation with God.’58  That is to say, it is not the hypostatic Holy 
Spirit that is united with the world’s substance, but the action of the Spirit in 
founding the world with reality, life and beauty.  The Spirit is also the 
Creator’s joy in the whole of creation.59 
As does Moltmann, Bulgakov points to a maternal aspect of the Spirit here. 
The Father calls creation into being and the Spirit answers the call by giving 
reality to the world, giving the world a form and being.  The Spirit is 
Mother.  The Spirit ‘manifests its maternal character in the revelation of 
Sophia during the creation of the world: it manifests itself as the maternal 
womb in which the forms of this world are conceived.’60  The Spirit as 
Mother joins the Father of creation to birth the world.  Here Bulgakov ‘takes 
the patristic theme of the divine image (Gen. 1: 27) as a hint of divine 
androgyny.’61  It is worth noting that translators of Bulgakov’s works into 
English employ the masculine pronoun for Spirit.  Although this is 
grammatically correct—spirit (дух,  dukh) is a masculine noun)—Barbara 
Newman believes that Bulgakov’s understanding of the Spirit working in 
the world is feminine.62  I agree and prefer to follow the sense of the 
feminine nature of the Spirit by employing feminine pronouns in relation to 
both the Spirit and Sophia.   
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The Spirit as “womb” also points to an aspect that is closely connected to 
spirit’s relationship to matter.  Spirituality forms a body for itself and, in 
turn, spirit is given form by corporeality.  Spirit ‘is the union of an act of self-
awareness, conscious independent existence, with the “nature” of which it is 
conscious.’63  Thus, spirit needs a body for consciousness.  It is the Spirit who 
forms the body of the world, the creaturely Sophia, out of the divine Sophia, 
God’s nature.  This body is not to be thought of as ‘flesh that suppresses and 
shuts off the life of the spirit.’64  Rather, the perfect body consists of a 
substance that is ‘the image and self-revelation of the spirit,’65 a 
spiritual/substantial body.  This same body is the foundation of the world. 
The Son has ‘the quality of distinctness, the power to structure and order.’66   
In creation, the actions of the Son follow the actions of the Father and Spirit.  
The order of creation is Father, Spirit and Son.  Like the Spirit, the Son works 
sophianically in creation, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  The 
Son as Other demonstrates the sacrificial nature of the Son.  The Son, ‘the 
Lamb of God, is pre-eternally “sacrificed” in the creation of the world.’67  
The Father’s outpouring is the sending of the Son, the eternally begotten 
Word.  This action of the Father towards the Son is based in love.  Bulgakov 
asserts,  
There is the sheer impulse of self-giving, the life of God as ‘Father,’ 
emptying himself in letting the Other be, just as he does in the 
generation of the Son.  But this in turn means that the Other always 
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has the form of the Son for the Father; it cannot be but that he is at the 
heart of creation’s otherness.68 
The Son as Logos also ‘comprises the ideal content of Sophia.’69   I n  t h e  
Logos, or Word, Bulgakov distinguishes between he who speaks and what is 
spoken. The ‘words of the Word. . . [are] certain intelligible essences, which 
can best be described as, like the Platonic ideas, ideal and real at the same 
time, and endowed with the power of life.’70  Sophia is the words of the 
Word.  These words then reveal the very substance of God, his ousia, the 
Wisdom of the divine world.  This, too, is an interrelationship of love: the 
love of the hypostatic Word for his Word of words—for Sophia.  The divine 
Sophia receives this ideal content from the Logos and this becomes the sum 
of possibilities for a creation in becoming, for the creaturely Sophia.  The 
prototypes existing in God’s world, Sophia, are given expression in creation.  
Bulgakov follows some patristic thinking in the principle of prototypes as 
arising from within God.71  The divine world contains the prototype of the 
creaturely world.  John of Damascus writes, ‘For images and examples of all 
that shall be created by God are simply his thought in him of these 
objects…in his counsel we see traced out and represented what he has 
foreordained; this is his thought of each such object.’72  The Son, as Logos, 
thus provides the distinctive content of creation, the prototypes of God’s 
world.  For Bulgakov, this is the meaning of “All things were made by him 
and without him was not any thing made that was made” (Jn. 1: 3).  This 
does not mean that the Word is the creator but that the Word is the 
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‘fundamental content of the creation called into being by the Father.’73  
Bulgakov takes the additional step of ascribing the realization of this content 
in time to the medium of Sophia. 
We can summarize the relationship of the triune God to creation: the Father 
creates the world by the Holy Spirit and by the Son, as they are manifested 
in Sophia.  In the language of Genesis 1, “Let there be” refers to the Father’s 
will and “and it was so” refers to the sophianic working of the Spirit and 
Word.  Genesis attests to two aspects of creation.  The earth as a “formless 
void” is already in existence, is, indeed, the divine Sophia.  From out of the 
divine Sophia the Creator brings forth the creaturely Sophia.  The creation of 
the world, the creaturely Sophia, is formed from the divine Sophia, God’s 
Ousia, Substance and World.  The divine Sophia is given to temporality but 
in the process loses none of her divine attributes.  The divine Sophia now 
‘exists in a dual mode: in her own mode, which belongs to her in eternity; 
and in the creaturely mode, as the world.’74   Nichols believes that the idea of 
Bulgakov’s Sophia  
is invaluable, since it enables us to say that, in creating the world, God 
does not produce a reality which stands over against him. If he did so, 
he would cease to be Absolute. For the Absolute, of its very nature, 
must constitute the reality of everything else that is.75 
Bulgakov’s vision is gnostic, understood in a broader sense as ‘speculation 
about intermediaries between the Creator and the creature.’76   In this sense, 
theologians have questioned the need for Sophia at all within the realm of 
dogmatic theology, even beyond the charges of heresy in the “Sophia 
                                                 
73 Bulgakov, Comforter, 191. 
74 Bulgakov, Bride, 46. 
75 Aidan Nichols, "Bulgakov and Sophiology," Sobornost 13 (1992): 27. 
76 Ibid.: 25.   163  
affair.”77  Does the world need a mediator other than Christ?  Frederick 
Copleston in his assessment of Bulgakov’s Sophia has argued that  
it does not seem obvious that the concept of creation is substantially 
clarified by introducing the idea of an intermediary being.  Nor is it 
clear, in my opinion, that in treating of the spiritualization of 
humanity the theologian cannot get on well enough with the 
doctrines of the Incarnation and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.78 
John O’Donnell agrees that sophiology is not needed to validate the 
trinitarian foundation of the world.79  For O’Donnell, following Hans Urs 
von Balthasar, creation does not exist outside of the Trinity but in the infinite 
love between the Father and Son, held open and bridged by the Holy Spirit.  
Valliere concedes that Sophia may not enhance the concept of 
spiritualization of humanity but Bulgakov is unique in his concept of 
humanization of the spiritual.80  Bulgakov’s sophiology is a theology of 
Athanasius’ famous maxim: ‘God became a human being so that human 
beings may become God.’81  Humanization of the spiritual means that 
humanity reflects its Logos, the Word of God, in its free, creative power, 
transforming the world.  Sophia is the agency of creativity.  Valliere says that 
‘one may call the fairy of creativity by another name if Sophia is disliked for 
some reason; but then the quarrel is about names, not substance.’82 
I think Bulgakov’s sophiology gives a positive, systematic theology to the 
possibility of human meeting divine and how that manifests in creation.  The 
question of how Christ enters into creation has been addressed by 
theologians perhaps at the expense of how humanity enters the divine.  For 
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Bulgakov, the world is connected to God in its very substance, in its sophian 
nature.  Human and divine nature shares the same sophian substance and 
for this reason the person of Christ can enter into the world and humanity 
and the world can be divinized, can enter God.  Indeed, the uniqueness and 
importance of Sophia lies with this bridging principle between God and the 
world.  In his early work Bulgakov speaks of Sophia as existing ‘between God 
and the world, Creator and creation being [herself] neither the one nor the 
other but something completely peculiar, simultaneously connecting and 
separating the one and the other.’83  Rowan Williams notes that Sophia is a 
way of speaking about the non-arbitrariness of this relation between God 
and the world because God and the world share a sophianic foundation.84  
For Myroslaw Tataryn, Bulgakov’s sophiology is about God’s love 
encompassing what is not God—creation—without compromising God.85  
Because humanity is formed from Sophia, humanity is also a part of God 
and of God’s love.  
Bulgakov devotes much theology in the support of his unique hypothesis 
because it is the basis for him of God’s connection to, yet distinction from, 
creation. The Western tradition since Duns Scotus has seen creation as the 
result of God’s will, not God’s essence, or nature.   The Eastern tradition also 
supports creation from God’s will.  Bulgakov upholds the notion that 
creation is created by the personal will of God, but he adds that creation is 
formed from God’s very nature, from Sophia.86  Bulgakov thus distinguishes 
between personal “hypostatic” and natural “sophianic” revelation.  God’s 
personal revelation arises from God’s will and results in a revelation of 
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God’s nature.  As Barbara Newman notes, ‘The paradox of distinction-in-
unity, which lies at the heart of trinitarian and christological dogma, also 
marks this doctrine of creation.’87   Mikhail Sergeev highlights Bulgakov’s 
consistency in his efforts to portray an organic sense of universality together 
with particularity.88 
However, Bulgakov’s efforts to introduce Sophia into the Trinity have also 
been challenged within the Orthodox tradition.  His contemporary, Georges 
Florovsky, proposes that there is an infinite distance between God’s nature 
and natural creation.89  The difference between Creator and created is the 
difference between creating (a bringing into being from “outside”) and 
begetting (producing from the same substance).  God creates out of nothing, 
not out of God’s essence.  In Russian theology there have been two main 
streams in the 20th century.  For Rowan Williams, the debate has been 
between those who have, broadly speaking, followed Vladimir Soloviev and 
those who have repudiated sophiology in favour of a more traditional and 
Church-based style.90  Many of Bulgakov’s ideas of Sophia are developed 
from Vladimir Soloviev’s work: the idea of Sophia as the creative love of 
God become the ideal substance of creation; Sophia as the meaning and truth 
of creation; Sophia as the spirit of creation, as its ideal and its beauty; Sophia 
as the Body of Christ and the Church; and Sophia as the body and soul of 
humanity.91  Soloviev’s concept of Divine-humanity, noted in the 
Introduction (p. 27), of the Logos with Sophia (the world soul) is also 
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integral.  Florovsky spearheaded the repudiation of sophiology and is 
representative of the second stream.  For Florovsky, the eternal idea of 
creation is in God but is not creation itself.   
The line between negative and positive theology is drawn following a 
different interpretation of Gregory Palamas’  distinction between God’s 
essence (or nature), that which is inaccessible and unknowable to creation, 
from God’s energies, the trinitarian manifestations of economy.92  The basis 
of the problem is in how God communicates with creation, or, in the words 
of Peter, how we become “participants of the divine nature” (2 Peter 1: 4).  
How does God remain distinct from creation while also offering divine 
union?  For Vladimir Lossky, like Florovsky, God communicates through 
God’s energies not from God’s essential nature.93  Bulgakov’s theology of 
God’s nature can be seen as quite modern (mostly in a western sense) in his 
interpretation of the “nothing” of creation as something within God.   
Creation is a substantial part of God, anticipating the later theologies of 
creation of Moltmann (from God in Creation on), Thomas Berry, Sally 
McFague, and others.94 
The balance between positive and negative theology is firmly weighted in 
the positive, kataphatic realm for Bulgakov.  He believes that knowledge of 
God is to be found in the world.  Bulgakov defends his kataphatic theology 
and considers that both positive and negative theology is necessary.  He 
describes himself as ‘neo-Chalcedonian,’95 and he believes the challenge for 
modern theologians is to engage positively with the credal dogma that could 
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only be expressed in negative terms in the fifth century.96  Whereas dogma is 
‘an inspiration from the Holy Spirit…theology is the work of human thought 
illuminated by faith and grace.’97  Dogma has an immutable core but its 
philosophical perception changes as thought and contexts change.  The 
challenge for each generation is to understand anew its inherited dogma.   
The concern to safeguard the divinity of Christ, which led the church Fathers 
to express God’s relationship with the world in terms of otherness, is 
countered today by the need to understand God’s positive connection with 
the world, or, expressed differently, Christ’s humanity. We still need the 
boundary of apophatic theology as a necessary corrective to 
anthropomorphism, ‘the assertion that the human knowledge of God is 
perfectly adequate,’98 but our understanding of the boundary has changed.  
For Bulgakov, ‘the NO of apophatic theology is necessarily connected with a 
certain kataphatic YES.’99  Kataphatic theology can talk about God because 
God is a transcendent and a n  i m m a n e n t  b e i n g .   I n  t h e  r e v e l a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
immanence we know that the divine and human natures can coexist in Jesus 
Christ, therefore the divine nature is not foreign to us. 
Sophia is not only the positive connection between God and the world.   
What is also important is that Sophia has being in herself.  Sophia is not an 
abstract emanation of God’s nature but a personal nature.  God’s nature is 
personal.  Bulgakov has been critiqued for a tendency to ‘confuse 
personhood and nature.’100  He has been accused of reducing God’s 
connection to the world with an impersonal entity, that is, nature rather than 
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person.    Yet, for Bulgakov, Sophia is far from impersonal.  Bernice Glatzer 
Rosenthal understands Bulgakov’s Sophia as ‘a subjective, personal, world-
forming principle.’101  Personhood, God’s nature, must be personal.  The 
relationship between God and Sophia is the macrocosmic reflection of the 
relationship between God and the human being.  One could imagine, 
perhaps, concentric spheres, beginning with a human being (or all of 
humanity), enclosed by Sophia and finally, enclosed by God.  A wonderful 
image of this is given in Hildegard of Bingen’s second vision.102  Here Sophia 
is shown as the Cosmiarcha and co-creator of the world and humanity.   
Sophia does not displace the Trinity or Christ or the human being but is an 
intrinsic part of creation. 
The next section explores the nature of humanity and its connection with the 
world.   Sophia’s connection with Christ and the Church will be examined in 
the following chapter.  This chapter thus far has introduced the ideal of 
creation: the divine Sophia as God’s nature which then becomes the basis of 
creation, complete with multiplicity and relativity, created to experience 
God’s love.  The basis of this connection means that the Creator is closely 
connected to creation.  However, the world also has a relative independence.  
Now we will further examine the creaturely Sophia in her independent 
form.  The purpose of this section is to understand the mechanics of 
existence, beginning with the natural world and concluding with the integral 
place of humanity within that natural world.  Humanity’s position as God’s 
hypostatic representative in creation means that humanity’s every action 
affects world evolution.  Human beings are created to be the bearers of 
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God’s love to the very ends of the cosmos through ages of time and space.  
Although humanity has sunken into material existence, it retains its link to 
its divine origins through Sophia.  It is Sophia who helps humanity onward 
in a process of remembering and re-creating its human world.  Such 
knowledge, I suggest, is a helpful antidote to any suggestion of 
meaninglessness or powerlessness in a modern worldview. 
Creaturely Sophia 
Sophia as the principle of mediation holds within herself the newly created 
dichotomies of existence: she is divine and creaturely, uncreated and 
created, heaven and earth, and contains both chaos and order.  The creation 
of the creaturely Sophia expands the possibilities for the experiencing of 
God’s love even further into a multihypostatic world.  However, the oneness 
that the divine Sophia has with God is lost in this new state of relativity.  The 
creaturely Sophia is a less than an ideal form of the divine Sophia, a 
‘diminution,’103 because she is unrevealed in full as yet.  The creaturely 
Sophia is a state of potential, of “not-yet.”  She contains both chaos and the 
principle of order within herself so that the full potential of creation can be 
revealed as chaos is transformed into order.   Chaos is a state typifying a lack 
of unity.  It is a neutral force, neither separating nor connecting.104  Yet it is a 
force of abundant life, filling the world with a countless diversity of life 
forms, animal and vegetable, in different states of life.105  Creatureliness is   
the loss of the Divine Sophia’s ‘integrity’ through her submergence in 
the multiplicity, temporality, and relativity of particular being.   
Because of this, the world’s sophianicity loses the clarity and self-
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evidentness of its manifestation; the chaotic element, raised by cosmic 
storms, its waves thrashing furiously, is unleashed. 106 
Despite this cosmic chaos the world retains an ordered structure. The 
principle of order is inherent in Sophia as prototypes, Plato’s “ideas-
energies.” The creaturely Sophia contains all the divine prototypes of the 
world within her being, the “words of the Word.”  A prototype ontologically 
precedes its being in the world and remains in the divine Sophia as the ideal 
form of that being.  The main trait of these prototypes of creaturely being is 
that, in a sense, they are not created, but have a divine, eternal being proper 
to them.  This is the uncreated heaven, the glory of God.  But these 
prototypes, or ideas, can also be considered as created  by God as the 
prototypes of the world before  creation in the divine Sophia.  They 
ontologically precede creation but are connected with it.  This is the heaven 
of creation: “In the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth” (Gen. 
1: 1).107   
This uncreated/created dichotomy is observable in the distinction between 
eternity and temporality in the divine and the creaturely Sophia. The divine 
Sophia, the glory of God, is the eternal “heaven,” containing all the 
prototypes of the world.  The earth is eternally created also but has a 
temporal manifestation.  The eternity of heaven and earth is not the same as 
God’s eternity. For Bulgakov, there are two modes of eternity. 
The first is the eternity of the unchangeable, immobile, divine peace, 
fullness, absoluteness, integral wisdom, aeternitas.  The second is 
creaturely eternity, aeviternitas,  infinity, not “bad” or contentless 
infinity, but good infinity, for full of content and creative.108  
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The two modes are linked so that God’s eternity is revealed in God’s 
revelation to creation.  Creaturely eternity means that all the prototypes of 
the world have their life, their immortality, in this eternity.  Thus, eternal 
life, as in Bulgakov’s understanding of “in the beginning,” requires an 
ontological basis rather than a chronological one.109  
The prototypes within the divine Sophia are given earthly existence in the 
creaturely Sophia.  Prototypes are manifested in creation as genera: ‘And 
God said, “Let the land produce living creatures according to their kinds”’ 
(Gen. 1:24a).110  Plants and animals are created after their “kind” or genus. 
Bulgakov looks to Plato’s ‘world of ideas [to explain] the metaphysical basis 
for the hereditary character of life in general and human life in particular; 
heredity executes by biological means the task set by ideas-energies.’111 
Prototypes, the “ideas-energies,” contain the hereditary basis for 
reproducing within a genus. Heredity is ‘the empirical expression of a 
prototype, of a unitary nature.’112  Bulgakov sees the evolution of species as 
progression towards their already existent prototypes and this will be 
discussed further in the following chapter. 
The creaturely Sophia is the body and soul of the world but she is not 
spiritual in herself.  She has a natural existence as a being which is alive and 
organized on many different levels according to biological processes of 
life.113  We have noted these biological processes. Sophia is the organizing 
principle inherent in these processes, maintaining order in her capacity as 
the body and soul of the created world. Bulgakov calls soul ‘the substance of 
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the world.’114  It is God’s living substance, Sophia-Ousia, translated into 
creaturely existence, “flesh.” There is self-transformation of the natural 
world at the level of body and soul.  This transformation can occur because 
the world is founded on Wisdom.  The creaturely Sophia in her 
submergence into temporal existence does not completely lose her 
connection with her ideal state in the divine Sophia.  As body and soul of the 
world she retains a unity, a certain self-aware sensuality. Sophia as the 
natural world has her ‘own persuasiveness and authenticity, [her] own 
thought and beauty.’115 Sophia retains a consciousness of her divine origins 
at the level of soul, a consciousness that extends to her material, bodily 
manifestation.  For Bulgakov, all ‘earthly realities are grounded in an ideal 
reality that is also a kind of eternally self-aware materiality, since there is no 
thought without matter and concrete action.'116  I n  B u l g a k o v ’ s  
understanding of corporeality, bodiliness, or nature, is the necessary ground 
for consciousness. At a level of body and soul, Sophia has self-awareness.  
Bulgakov describes this as divine providence.  Divine providence in the 
natural world is the divine power within the world that is the source of the 
world’s order.  Creation ‘has its own divinity, so to speak, which is the 
creaturely Sophia.’117  The world acquires an identity in creation and 
‘receives an independence to follow its destinies.’118  Rosenthal also 
interprets Bulgakov’s Sophia as an active force and although ‘the empirical 
world is fragmented and broken, it cannot totally tear itself away from its 
cosmic harmony.’119 
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Bulgakov uses Soloviev’s terminology of world soul to describe the 
creaturely Sophia.120   The world soul unites the world but Sophia also 
becomes the source of the multiple soul existence for all ensouled animals, 
including humanity.  Thus, the soul ‘belongs to the divided multi-unity that 
has fallen from the state of integrity and that the soul unites.’121  The nature 
of soul as a multi-unity is seen in individual existence. Every living being 
that is part of a genus conforms to certain particularities of its genus but each 
form is also unique, an individual.  There is no generic being which fully 
represents its ideal form.  Therefore, this represents a certain limitedness to 
individuality in that each form remains separate from the whole.  This is a 
necessary state of creatureliness—it is becoming, it is “not-yet.”  The 
movement in time for creation is from the limitedness of psychic (soul) and 
individual bodily existence towards the fullness of spiritual and personal 
existence.  It is through association with hypostatic spirit that the world can 
be raised to spiritual and personal existence.  The world ‘cannot accomplish 
this passage from the psychic to the spiritual by its own powers.’122  
However, the world soul is a living being, and is able, in and through 
humanity, to associate itself with the life of spirit.123  Thus, as the creaturely 
Sophia, the world soul has the capacity to be hypostatic, to be ‘a world of 
agents and subjects.’124  
We have noted that the creaturely Sophia is a natural body, that is, body and 
soul organized as a natural world. Yet a life of body and soul is divided and 
limited because no one form of a genus fully represents its ideal form, its 
prototype.  There is limitedness to individuality in that each form remains 
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separate from the whole.  To overcome this limitation the soul consciousness 
of the world, of the creaturely Sophia, needs a principle of hypostatic, or 
personal, spiritual consciousness to evolve.  This principle is humanity. We 
observed that in the divine world Sophia is hypostatized by the Persons of 
the Trinity.  In the created world, it is humanity that is created to be the 
hypostatic centre of the world, to mirror the relationship between Godhead 
and Sophia.  Humanity is the place of the personal and the spiritual in the 
world.  Now we can examine the creation of humanity and its relationship to 
the creaturely Sophia.  Through this relationship, we will come to 
Bulgakov’s understanding of humanity as a microcosm of the world.  This is 
an important aspect of this dissertation on hope because humanity proves to 
be central to the world and its evolution.  If hope resides in the wager that 
there is some correspondence between humanity and the world then 
Bulgakov’s theology of the created world is, indeed, a theology of hope.     175  
Humanity 
Humanity, according to Bulgakov is ‘the representative of all creation, 
including in itself all the fullness, a microcosm, a world in little, according to 
the expression of the Fathers.’125  Humanity is an image of God in two 
specific ways: in terms of personhood and in relational terms.  Thus, the 
human being is a twofold creation, with a hypostasis and with a nature. 
Human beings are hypostases given a sophianic nature from the world.   
Humanity is both a part of yet distinct from the created world just as Sophia 
is a part of yet distinct from the Trinity.  We will examine this twofold 
structure further, beginning with the natural aspect that humanity shares 
with creation. 
Humanity is formed from the dust of creation (cf. Gen 2:7).  In its biological 
aspect humanity follows the laws of the creaturely Sophia.  Thus, in its 
sophianic nature, humanity is a prototype, encapsulated in the divine 
Sophia, to which all human beings conform.  Although in humanity there 
are multiple expressions of hypostatic persons they all belong to a prototype, 
which Bulgakov calls “Adam.”  For Bulgakov, ‘what makes an individual 
human is not the individual principle but his expression of that which is 
common to all of humanity.’126  As with all species, the empirical life of each 
human being is a part of meta-empirical prototype, Adam.  Each individual 
reflects this Adamic prototype and ‘partakes of a larger humanity, regardless 
of how long s/he lives, how much or how little s/he is able to experience his 
or her empirical life, or which corner of the world kaleidoscope is revealed 
to him or her.’127  The empirical life of each human being contributes to the 
meta-empirical Adam. Bulgakov writes, ‘it seems to me that only the 
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acknowledgment of a prior unified humanity—a metaphysical forefather, 
Adam—can explain the characteristic connection of the individual and the 
all-human in the human personality.’128  Adam exists meta-empirically and 
it is possible for this integral humanity to determine itself in relation to the 
world and to God.  Thus, humanity conforms to its bodily and psychic 
existence as a prototype in Sophia.  It is this ontological unity that makes 
both original sin and universal salvation possible.129  
Humanity’s  hypostatic existence resides in personhood.  According to 
Bulgakov, humanity is distinguished from the rest of creation by its 
hypostatic being. Humanity is formed i n  t h e  i m a g e  o f  G o d .   A s  T a t a r y n  
suggests, this is ‘a profoundly positive statement about the potential for 
human participation in divinity: participation in the uniqueness of God, the 
hypostatic nature of the Godhead.’130  God as the divine “I” imparts 
hypostatic being, an “I,” to humanity. This is the uncreated aspect of human 
beings, received ‘at the time of their creation by the breath of the spirit of 
God…their Ego, in which, and through which alone, their humanity lives.’131  
Human beings receive a human spirit.  A human being is a hypostasis, an 
ego, granted at creation, in which human nature (the creaturely Sophia) 
exists.  
We have noted above that God’s hypostatic involvement in creation has 
been in the Father’s act of will, a calling forth of creation out of the divine 
Sophia.  But here in the creation of humanity God adds a ‘wholly new and 
original’132 factor to creation. Bulgakov writes, ‘what we have here is God’s 
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direct hypostatic participation in the communication of His image to man.’133  
Creation, according to Bulgakov, is a givenness: ‘its ontological foundation, 
the creaturely world, is wholly determined, from beginning to end.’134  The 
world is created in its fullness but it can only unfold according to the inbuilt 
Wisdom of the world “according to its kind.”  Humanity is also subject to a 
certain givenness but it is distinguished from creation by its hypostatic life.  
In this sense, humanity is an addition to the world and distinct from the 
world in this aspect.  
The characteristic of hypostatic being is self-determination, seen in freedom 
and creativity within the limits of its nature and practised in relationship. 
This freedom is not the absolute freedom of God but a creaturely freedom 
‘expressed as an infinite series of different possibilities.’135  Freedom 
always introduces something new,  which is synonymous with 
creativity. But this new thing is not absolutely new. It is not creativity 
out of nothing, but is determined within the general limits of the 
proto-images of being in the Divine Sophia.136 
Humanity’s freedom is a freedom within the world, working in the created 
order, a free re-creation.   This freedom involves relationship – a working 
with, a transforming of, a creating out of.  To be a person is to be in 
relationship. God as Persons imparts personhood to humanity: ‘the image of 
God reveals itself, above all, in personhood, which is the beginning of 
creativity and freedom.’137  The image of God for humanity is also ‘the image 
of the Holy Trinity, which is hypostatically multiple in consubstantiality.’138  
The Godhead, which is perfect relationship in three Persons, confers the 
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potentiality of personal relationship upon humanity, the revelation of love 
through communion. 
It is interesting to note that, for Bulgakov, perfect relationship is to be found 
in this original humanity, which is created male and female.  In Genesis 1:24, 
God says “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness.”  
Bulgakov understands the plural referent for God, the “us”, to refer to the 
three persons of the Trinity.  But therein lies a great mystery: the God that is 
triune creates humankind in a duality – “male and female he created them” 
(Gen. 1: 27b).  In what way, then, is humanity created here in the image of 
God?  We have seen that, for Bulgakov, creation is a threefold deed of the 
Father, the Son and the Spirit.  The hypostasis of the Father remains 
transcendent to creation. The Son, however, as Logos or “heavenly man”, is 
the prototype, or proto-image, for Adam.  This allows for the ‘humanization 
of the Logos,’139 the incarnation into (a male) Jesus Christ.  The third 
hypostasis, in turn, has relationship with the female because of the Spirit’s 
descent upon (but not incarnation into) Mary, ‘the second Eve.’140  Bulgakov 
is careful not to reverse this proposition – the Logos and the Spirit are not 
the male and female hypostases within the Godhead.  Nevertheless, ‘in 
translation into the language of creation or with reference to man, the 
qualities of the second and third hypostases correspond to, are analogous to, 
are parallel to (but by no means identical to) the male and female principles 
in it.’141  For humanity to be created male and female means, then, that the 
masculine and feminine principles are present in God, correlating to the Son 
and the Spirit.  It also means there are two kinds of persons in humanity.  
Humanity is not an abstract “it”; humanity is male and female. 
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In Bulgakov’s thought this signifies that all ‘humankind in the male image is 
the one hypostasis of Christ, is Christ, [while all] humankind in the female 
image is the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit.’142  While possibly problematic in 
its gender assumptions, this statement can also be read as one of equality of 
the sexes since the Son and the Spirit share equal divinity.143  The Son and 
the Spirit, too, work as a dyad—both are essential in their hypostatic 
difference.  However, Bulgakov is influenced by a neoplatonic 
understanding of archetypal masculine and feminine principles, previously 
expounded upon by Soloviev.144  The Spirit is essentially receptive while the 
Logos ‘operates  or  accomplishes.’145  Bulgakov then posits a hierarchical 
relationship between male and female humanity. Brenda Meehan, writing 
from a feminist perspective, mitigates the potential gender problematic by 
suggesting that, for Bulgakov, ‘both the masculine and feminine principles 
[are] present in humankind and, though in varying degrees, in each 
individual human being, just as both [are] present in the prototype of 
Divine-humanity.’146  An additional problem to the male/female dichotomy 
is, however, signalled by Rosenthal, who suggests that Bulgakov’s 
association of the feminine with the passive presents an ambiguity within 
Sophia, ‘passive with respect to the Logos but an active world-forming 
principle all the same.’147 
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Conclusion 
I have presented Bulgakov’s understanding of the trinitarian God as a God 
of Persons in relationship.  I then examined the connection between God and 
the world and the ontological difference between Creator and created.  God 
is the world’s Creator.  For Bulgakov the similarities and differences 
between Creator and created are also the similarities and differences 
between the divine and the creaturely modes of Sophia. The world is no less 
than God’s own nature, Sophia, given to temporality to experience God’s 
love in boundless multiplicity.  God loves this world, formed from God’s 
very substance, with the same love that is shared within the triune Godhead.  
God gives creation an independence to achieve its potential while giving the 
world a foundation in Godhead’s very nature, in Sophia.  The divine Sophia 
forms the positive connection between God and the world.  In the divine 
Sophia, God unites the world with God’s own divine life.  In the Trinity, the 
Father works hypostatically to call creation into being.  The Spirit answers 
the call of the Father and births the world into reality, continuing to abide in 
the world qualitatively as life and beauty.  The Son also works sophianically 
in creation by giving the world its ideal content, Sophia: the words of the 
Word.  God is intimately connected to creation through Sophia.  The 
addition of Sophia as a mediating principle to other theories of creation 
allows for a world which is both independent in its processes and absolutely 
connected to God.   
The divine Sophia of God exists in a dual mode: as divine Sophia and as 
creaturely Sophia.  The two modes form the one Sophia, with the creaturely 
Sophia in a process of realizing the full potential and possibilities given to 
creation.  Humanity is a hypostatic creation given to the creaturely Sophia to 
realize these possibilities. Humanity is the ego of the world, of Sophia, its 
body and soul.  This is the ideal of creation, of humanity and the world.    181  
How this changes, mythically described in Genesis 2-3, is the subject of the 
following chapter, “Christ, Sophia and Evil.”  What is important in this 
chapter is to note the positive nature of creation.  The world has its basis in 
goodness.  Sophia is the living being of creation and the nature of the 
cosmos.  She is a description of the wholeness and unity of the world.   
Nonetheless, the processes within Sophia allow for change and 
transformation.  Indeed, the purpose of the creaturely Sophia is to allow for 
this change, with humanity created to be the active agents of transforming 
the creaturely Sophia.  The divine Sophia is both the original unity and ideal 
of the world, and the being within creation who leads humanity forward to 
this ideal.  Humanity, formed with its sophian nature, is given the world in 
order to fulfil all possibilities to freely experience God’s love.  Because love is 
only possible in relationship, in giving, then the task before humanity is to 
understand and experience love in relationship.  Humanity is called to 
mirror the Godhead in its relationship to Sophia, in love.     182  
Chapter 5   Christ, Sophia and Evil 
Introduction 
What happened to God’s perfect world of creation, and why?  After all, it is 
not at all obvious that the world is based in goodness, as Bulgakov asserts.  
Or, if we acknowledge the beauty and wonder of the natural world, it is not 
obvious that humanity itself has its basis in goodness.  Quite the opposite.  
The issue of theodicy addresses the existence of God together with the 
presence of evil and suffering, either human or natural in origin, i.e. war, 
murder, even “natural” death, as well as drought, floods, and other natural 
disasters.  In this chapter, Bulgakov’s understanding of evil and its presence 
in the world will be examined.  As will be described, for Bulgakov evil enters 
the world because of humanity and the angelic world and causes a terrible 
imbalance in the created order.  Evil is more than the chaos of creation.  Yet 
evil can never be greater or stronger than the good of creation.  Christ’s 
incarnation and resurrection ensures that the imbalance in the world will not 
overcome humanity and the world.  Christ overcomes the evil present in the 
structures of human nature.  He does not, however, overcome personal sin.  
There is still a necessary process of redemption in the continuing 
spiritualization of the world until the end times.  Humanity is—and has 
always been—the place of this transformation and works with Christ and 
the Spirit in this process.  If Bulgakov’s arguments are convincing then this 
would support my thesis of hope.  There is hope because there is a purpose 
to human existence.  Humanity is important to the world, indeed, integral to 
the world, and its collective actions are a part of the world’s evolution.   
There has been a rupture in the connection between God and the world; 
nevertheless, the rupture is slowly but surely healing, through the presence   183  
of Christ and the Spirit, and through the continuing sophianization of the 
cosmos.  Hope lies in God’s goodness and love that is the basis of creation.  
Hope also lies in realizing humanity’s purpose, and in knowing the strength 
that has been given to it by Christ.  Faith is maintained in this 
understanding, despite appearances to the contrary, and faith supports hope 
in the present and in the future. 
The chapter will begin with Bulgakov’s understanding of the “Fall,” the 
rupture between the human and divine worlds, examining the nature of evil 
and its effect on creation.  It will then examine the role of Jesus Christ in the 
restoration of the image of Divine-humanity through the incarnation, death, 
resurrection and ascension.  Christ joins with humanity and ensures the 
continuing presence of the Word and the Holy Spirit since Pentecost in the 
process of the spiritualization, or humanization (sophianization) of the 
cosmos.  This knowledge is the basis of faith.  Even without faith it is the 
basis for Bulgakov of a certain reality: the strengthening presence of Christ 
and the Spirit in the world, joined with the destiny of humankind.  The last 
section examines humanity’s task, with the getting of Wisdom and the 
conforming to Christ through obedience of the will.   184  
Humanity and the Fall 
In the previous chapter Bulgakov’s theology of creation was introduced.   
God created the perfect world.  God created the world out of the Godhead’s 
divine nature, Sophia, and God created humanity to be the consciousness, or 
ego, of the world.  Humanity was created to know God, to love God and to 
realize God in the world.  Humanity was given body and soul from the 
world, from Sophia, and ego consciousness from God’s hypostatic being.   
Humanity was different from the rest of creation in that it was given 
freedom to realize its task and its potential.  Now I will examine this 
theology of creation further to include the “Fall” of humanity and the world. 
The story of creation in Genesis 1-3 is the mythic representation of the 
beginning of the natural world and humanity.  For Bulgakov, the biblical 
story is not to be thought of as historical or empirical, but as meta-history.  A 
myth ‘in the positive sense of this concept, is a story, expressed in a language 
not proper to the empirical domain, about what lies beyond this domain, 
about what belongs to the meta-empirical domain and meta-history.’1  What 
can be found in the measurable, material world does not exhaust all 
possibilities of the life of the world.  Indeed, the basis of the material world 
is contained within a higher reality, a meta-reality.  Thus, the story of 
creation in Genesis points to this higher reality yet can only be expressed in 
the language of this world.  The first account of creation, the six days, is not 
to be taken literally but does represent for Bulgakov a natural hierarchy of 
nature leading up to the creation of humanity.  It demonstrates the 
phylogenesis of humanity, because humanity includes all the forms of being 
within itself.   
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However, in this beginning, humanity has not yet embraced its proper 
relationship to these forms of being in the natural world.  Adamic humanity 
is placed next to its nature, to the creaturely Sophia, to embark upon its task 
of humanizing the world, of bringing all forms of being to consciousness 
through its own being.  Bulgakov speaks of ‘the Edenic economy as the 
selfless loving effort of man to apprehend and to perfect nature, to reveal its 
sophic character.’2   In the language of Genesis, humanity is set to have 
“dominion” over the world (Gen. 1:28).  This means that humanity is ‘the 
logos of the world, the one who realises it, as cosmos, as a work of art.’3  
Humanity is a microcosm of the divine world.  The great Artist has created 
the cosmos as a work of art and placed humanity within the cosmos as a 
reflection of the love and joy of creation.4  Humanity is enjoined to create 
within this world as its logos.  Adamic humanity in its entirety is the ego 
consciousness of the world just as the triune God is the ego consciousness of 
its own nature, the divine Sophia.  Humanity is given freedom in its 
undertaking, in its journey.   
What is described in the account of Adam and Eve in Genesis 3 represents 
what happens to the world as a result of this freedom.  Humanity has been 
placed in the world to know the world, to re-create the world, which is also to 
remember.5  Humanity cannot create out of nothing but must use the 
materials from the existing world.  The perfect world has been given to 
humanity to reveal the sophianicity of the world, to work towards open 
communion with God in a process of becoming.  Two paths are open to 
humanity in realizing this task of re-creation and actualization.  One path is 
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a direct acceptance of God’s will, growing in increasing conformity as nature 
is given full transparency by the action of the human spirit.6  In this path 
there is still the possibility of mistake or error because of the freedom of 
humanity, but error is not yet sin.  The second path is ‘the path of relative 
good through the overcoming of its negations,’7 that is, the path of good and 
evil.  This is the path chosen by humanity, which has drastic consequences 
for both the human and the natural worlds.  This path results in the absolute 
heightening of the oppositions in creation.  Evil enters the world.   
Evil is not created by God.  Evil does not arise from out of God’s being, or 
from out of Sophia, from out of the nothing from which creation is formed.  
For Bulgakov, ‘[e]vil is not a substance but a state of creaturely being.’8   It 
has no actual existence in itself but causes the oppositional relativity of the 
world—the world of good and evil.  According to Bulgakov, the 
philosophers of antiquity, the church fathers, and the scholastic theologians 
all agree that evil does not exist as an independent principle.9  Evil has no 
ontological existence.  It is ‘a parasite of being; it arises in being as its sickness; 
its gets its strength from being.’10   It is a product of creaturely being and 
arises in time.  It begins in time just as it will end in time.  Evil asserts its 
(temporary) rule over the “nothing.”  This force of nonbeing becomes 
dominant in the world bringing about a catastrophic imbalance between 
humanity and nature.  The neutrality of chaos, the “not-yet,” becomes a 
sheer force of materiality, impenetrable to the spirit. Because of the Fall, the 
shadows of the “not-yet” become the darkness that overcomes (cf. John 1: 5). 
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11   Celia Deane-Drummond calls this state of being “shadow sophia.” 
Shadow sophia ‘expresses the dark possibility of evil in the world.’12  What 
is unique in Bulgakov’s view for her is the distinction between the divine 
Sophia and the shadow side of the creaturely Sophia so that evil has no 
ontological existence in God. 
Evil, however, does originate in the spiritual world in the first angelic 
challenge to God’s sovereignty.  The “prince of this world,” who is not a god 
but a rebellious creature, has a reign on earth correlative with the temporal 
existence of the world.  Humanity joins with Satan in its initial rebellion.  
Humanity challenges God and rejects its proper destiny.  However, 
Bulgakov does not see humanity’s rebellion as evil in intent but as a 
misunderstanding.  Freedom is given to humanity but humanity 
misunderstands what freedom means.  Myroslaw Tataryn describes it thus: 
It was only God’s freedom which was truly absolute - absoluteness 
did not lie in power, but in freedom.  Human freedom, being created 
and part of a contingent world, was limited and dependent. Adam’s 
(and humanity’s) unwillingness to recognize this contingency and 
limitedness lay at the root of original sin.’13 
Humanity rebels against givenness and fails to see that creatureliness is a 
union of freedom and givenness. To create in the creaturely world does not 
mean that the creature can change its nature to become anything it wants. In 
its fallen state, humanity remains itself but ‘turned inside out.’14  Givenness 
becomes the predominant characteristic of both humanity and the world.   
The world is not a dualism of good and evil.  The world is created good.  
Good and evil arise only as ontological poles within the creaturely Sophia 
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for a period of time.  However, because humanity is created to be the 
hypostatic centre of the world, all existence is affected by this event.  The Fall 
‘appeared as a religious catastrophe. Direct and genuine communion with 
God, as experienced by our first parents in paradise, ended.  For the world 
and for humanity God became distant “transcendent.”’15  Now there is an 
‘ontological abyss’16 between the creaturely Sophia and her divine 
counterpart.  The sophianic quality of nature is hidden more deeply and 
closed off.17  Humanity no longer has a balanced relationship to nature.   
Nature is deprived of its hypostatic centre and humanity is subject to the 
weight and power of the forces of natural chaos.  Because the hypostasis of 
world is “blindfolded,” nature loses its centre.  Nature is ‘left to its own 
powers and to the instinct of the world soul, in its sophianic wisdom but also 
in its nonhypostatic blindness.’18  The task of revealing the sophianicity of 
the world is made so much more difficult because the strength of nature is 
now greater than the hypostatic strength of humanity.  Humanity becomes 
subjected to the chaotic forces of nature.   
Death enters the world.  Death is a direct consequence of this imbalance 
between the human spirit and its nature.  The substance of the world 
experiences a “darkening,” a fall into material existence. Inner disharmony 
‘results in a disordering of the relations of man to his own body, which has 
become the body of death, owing to the insufficient power of the human 
spirit to master it.’19 God does not create death but death enters the world.20  
Death is the quality of matter that is impenetrable to spirit. The Fall results 
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in the inability of humanity to spiritualize the substance of the world. 
Because we are “all in Adam” (cf. 1 Cor. 15: 22), all of humanity and the 
world experiences the consequences of the Fall.  Sin becomes ‘a hereditary 
illness to all nature and to all human beings’21 and death is the consequence 
of this.   
In contrast to Satan, however, the knowledge of evil for humanity is also the 
beginning of the introduction of good, ‘a new, special awakening of the 
principle that constitutes the positive essence of man’s being.’22  The goal for 
humanity remains the same, only the means has changed.  Humanity’s 
desire for divinity is proper but the path is now the path of oppositions: 
good and evil, life and death, spirit and matter.  Humanity’s task is now one 
of attaining a different form of knowledge and transformation.  Evil or death 
or matter are merely darkened forms of a higher reality, of the good, of life, 
of the spirit.  There are not two realities, or a duality in existence: there is 
only one whole, one Sophia.   
Bulgakov believes that certain forms of western theology have exaggerated 
the power of sin in the world.  In Luther’s doctrine of the servum arbitrium, 
he sees a belief in the complete loss of the image of God in the human being, 
meaning that humanity is powerless to do the good.23  In Orthodox and 
Catholic doctrine, however, he sees a belief in the weakening, and not total 
loss, of human freedom.  This difference could be a crucial difference in the 
basis of the theological anthropologies of Moltmann and Bulgakov.   
Moltmann supports the understanding that evil is introduced into the world 
through humanity.  However, Moltmann’s Reformed background possibly 
influences his belief that humanity has little power to affect its own 
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destiny.24  Humanity must look to God for redemption in the end times.  
Bulgakov believes that God’s intention in creation is to create free hypostatic 
beings in God’s image and that all possibilities are placed into that creation.  
God not only foresees the possibility of the Fall, God institutes the economy 
of salvation in the very beginning.  In other words, humanity’s task remains 
unchanged and the possibility of completing this task is ensured in the 
divine plan.  For Bulgakov, in creation God ‘gives everything for the 
deification of the world and its salvation; there is nothing that is not given.’25  
The Fall is not determined, according to Bulgakov, yet God’s offer of 
salvation is rooted in the very act of creation and God’s plan is ready for 
such a possibility.26   The divine plan entails the incarnation of the Logos into 
a human person, forming the ultimate divine/human union. 
The Incarnation 
Christ’s incarnation is pre-eternally predestined, and would have occurred 
regardless of the Fall because it is necessary for the final outcome, ‘so that he 
may gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which 
are on earth (Eph. 1: 10).’27  Because of the Fall, the incarnation gains a 
soteriological purpose but remains pre-destined, decided before the 
foundations of the world.  Christ’s incarnation is an integral part of God’s 
plan, which has the goal of reconciliation of the world to God’s self, but with 
human freedom and out of God’s love.  God gives everything to the world 
for this, but it is up to humanity to fulfil its own destiny.  As well as this, it is 
                                                 
24 For a synopsis of the power of sin that is a fundamental of Moltmann’s Reformed thought 
see, for example, Lyle Dabney, Jürgen Moltmann and John Wesley's Third Article (Wesley 
Center for Applied Theology, 2009 [cited March 2 2009]); available from 
http://wesley.nnu.edu/wesleyan_theology/theojrnl/26-30/29-09.htm. 
25 Bulgakov, Lamb of God, 171-2. 
26 For this idea, see Ibid., 171. 
27 Pavel Igumnov, "Christology: On the Development of the Ontological Meaning of the 
Divine Incarnation in the Theology of Archpriest Sergy Bulgakov," Journal of the Moscow 
Patriarchate 10 (1989): 67.  Cf. Eph. 1:10. Original emphasis.   191  
not possible to imagine that a God of love would set an unattainable goal 
before the creation of God’s own making.  For these reasons, the effects of 
evil can never be stronger than the good.   
Bulgakov distinguishes between original sin (‘amarthma, hamartāma) and 
personal sin  (paraptwmata, paraptōmata).  Original sin is the consequence of 
the Fall and affects the very fabric of existence.  It is an hereditary illness that 
affects all.  Personal sin arises after the Fall.  It is the empirical or historical 
expression of individual existence after the expulsion from Eden.  Each 
person by agreeing to enter the world affected by the Fall becomes a 
personal expression of sin, in varying modes and intensity.28  T h u s ,  t h e  
whole is affected because each person is a part of the Adamic prototype.  
The power of original sin is overcome by Christ’s deed on Golgotha.  It is 
‘completely, ontologically wiped away by the new Adam, whereas [personal 
sin] is a living bridge between the old Adam and the new Adam in the 
acquisition of the gift of redemption by human freedom.’29   This bridge is to 
be understood in the sense of the place of transformation from one state to 
another.  This bridge is Sophia.30  Once again, this is not a dualistic model.  
As Pavel Igumnov explains, ‘There is no need for any ontological bridge 
between the Creator and creation because Christ is “the deepest foundation, 
the most intimate essence of man”; He has become absolutely immanent to 
man and, through him, to the world.”’31 
Christ restores the balance between God and Sophia.  But, for Bulgakov, God 
does not do anything that is against the natural working of the world.  The 
world is a whole.  The original sin of the old Adam has a quantitative 
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influence on humanity’s freedom, for it multiplies its dependence on nature.  
This dependence on nature remains as well as the effects of personal sin.   
Because of this, there is still a historical process which humanity is working 
through towards its own freely accepted fullness in Christ, a process of 
assuming its sophian nature.  Bulgakov writes, ‘[o]nly through a long and 
laborious process does [humanity] escape from this slavery.’32  Sophia is the 
living bridge which must be crossed towards freely chosen redemption.  In 
the following section on sophian humanity, we will elaborate what this 
process entails.  
To understand how Christ restores the balance between God and the world, 
we need to return to the concept of Divine-humanity, Bogochelovechestvo.  
Divine-humanity encompasses both the humanity of God, seen in the Logos 
as the Son of Man, and the divinity of the human being, made in God’s 
image.  The Logos is the proto-image of humanity, humanity’s true image in 
God.  The fact that the Word is made flesh should be, according to Bulgakov, 
accepted ‘in the full measure of its content – theologically, cosmically, 
anthropologically, Christologically and soteriologically.’33  I n  B u l g a k o v ’ s  
assessment of patristic theology, he believes that the church fathers did not 
address what the human essence meant for the divine world.34  The question 
was posed by Leontius of Byzantine and Pseudo-Dionysisus and taken up 
by John of Damascus but remains a christological problem.  How does the 
human essence of Jesus influence the divine essence?  
For Bulgakov, the incarnation is not an action of God that is imposed upon 
the world.  It is possible because of the identity between the Logos and 
humanity in both their natures and in their hypostatic being.  The hypostasis 
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of the Logos is ‘the Divine Man.’35  This means that humanity has its divine 
image in God: the Son of God is also the Son of Man.36  T h e  L o g o s  i s  
Humanity in God, and it is this identity between the Logos and created 
humanity that allows the Logos to incarnate hypostatically into a human 
person.  Igumnov calls this an ‘extremely original and unexpected 
conclusion.’37  Valliere, however, says that it is ‘seriousness’ about the 
humanity of God that distinguishes Bulgakov’s dogmatics from patristic 
dogmatics38:   
When Bulgakov postulates a world in God, he does not mean a world 
with the human or personal element filtered out . . . 
[B]ogochelovechestvo,  the eternal humanity of God [is the] profound 
link between divinity and humanity in the creation of human beings 
and in the incarnation ‘signifies not just the divinity of human beings 
but also a kind of humanness (chelovechnost’) in God.  God’s world, or 
Sophia, is a humanized world.39 
It is the humanity of God that allows the Son to become ‘the representative 
human being on earth.’40  The Son’s ‘all-humanity in His proper hypostasis 
is directly analogous to Adam’s all-humanity in his hypostasis.’41  T h i s  
hypostasis is the Logos and the Logos incarnates into a human person to 
unite his nature with human nature, both hypostatically and naturally 
‘bringing with Himself His own divine life, or divine nature, into this 
entity.’42  This is the union of the two natures, human and divine in the one 
hypostasis.   
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We have discussed previously the connection between the divine Sophia and 
the creaturely Sophia as the nature of God from which creation is formed 
(Chapter 4, 169).  When assessed christologically, Bulgakov’s presupposition 
is that there must be an ontological prerequisite for Christ’s incarnation in 
the flesh.  There must be an aptitude in the human being to receive the 
divine Word. Bulgakov states that the union of natures without separation 
‘presupposes their original conformity. And we discover this conformity in 
interpreting the two natures in Christ as the two forms of the one Wisdom of 
God.’43  The divine nature of Christ and human nature are not ‘alien’ but 
‘two kinds of existence of the same Wisdom of God.’44  Sophia is one nature 
in two modes: Christ unites his divine nature, the divine Sophia, with the 
corporeal Sophia of his human nature.  By his hypostatic union, Christ 
restores the damaged nature of the creaturely Sophia to its original glory, 
and, as the first fruits (1 Cor. 15: 23), restores the possibility of humanity also 
being in right relationship with its nature.  Human nature ‘is healed by the 
Incarnation inwardly, organically, by a new creation of it, as it were, a 
creation that will be revealed in its power and glory beneath a “new heaven” 
on a “new earth.”’45   
It is the entire incarnation of Christ, including the death, resurrection and 
ascension, that heals and restores the image of God in humanity.  Humanity 
has deviated from its image of God in the Fall by immersing itself into the 
soul and body of the world before it has the strength of spirit to incorporate 
them properly.  The imbalance between spirit and body and soul means 
death enters the world.  Christ’s redemptive feat is the overcoming of the 
powers of death of the flesh, allowing, henceforth, the continuing 
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spiritualization of matter in the body.  Bulgakov emphasizes the humanness, 
and yet universality, of Jesus Christ in this soteriological task.  The new 
Adam must take on the form of the old Adam completely in order to restore 
it.  Christ must fully incarnate into a human being, a person in a particular 
time and place.  Christ lives a fully human life and his divine will is never 
used to overpower his human nature.  He lives from the measure of his 
humanness.  The struggle against the inertia of the flesh by the human Christ 
Jesus is, therefore, a real struggle.  The temptations are real temptations, and 
received in the measure of his humanity, because the new Adam has to 
follow the path of the old Adam, working to conform his human will to the 
obedience of the Father.  The sufferings and the feelings of forsakenness 
during the Passion are real experiences. 
Bulgakov believes it is the principle of kenosis which underlies the whole 
ministry of Christ.  Indeed, Paul Gavrilyuk demonstrates that kenoticism is 
central not only to Bulgakov’s doctrine of creation, as we have seen, but also 
to his Christology and his trinitarian theology.46  He believes that Bulgakov’s 
contribution to kenotic theory has been a largely neglected aspect of his 
theology.  For Bulgakov, Christ empties himself of his divine power and 
assumes the human form of Jesus.  The divine in Christ never overpowers 
the human freedom or will of its human self but undertakes a voluntary self-
limitation until the human essence is healed.  Because of this self-limitation, 
Christ needs to be sent by the Father.47  Thus, the Father is the determining 
principle in the entire ministry of the Son and the Spirit (who is also sent by 
the Father), and the principle of obedience is uppermost in redressing the 
initial disobedience of the first Adamic humanity.  In the economy of 
                                                 
46 See Paul L. Gavrilyuk, "The Kenotic Theology of Sergius Bulgakov," Scottish Journal of 
Theology 58 (2005): 251-69.  
47 Bulgakov, Lamb of God, 306.    196  
salvation, Christ obeys his Father’s will, accepting the path of incarnation 
which will lead towards the death on the cross.   
For Bulgakov it is important that Christ, who Bulgakov calls the God-man 
(Богочеловѣкѣ,  Bogocheloveke48), is neither God nor a human being but a 
complex hypostasis of both.  This hypostasis is only possible because the 
Logos is the image of the heavenly human being.  The Logos assumes the 
likeness of his creaturely form.49  The ontological bridge that allows this to 
occur is, once again, Sophia.  The two natures of Christ are two forms of the 
one Sophia.  The creaturely Sophia, or human nature, is a likeness of its true 
image, the divine Sophia.  Christ takes on the likeness of the human form 
but never loses his own divine image in the economy of salvation.  Christ is 
two natures in one hypostasis.  This hypostasis must feel like one person and 
enjoy a unity of life (единство жизни, edinstvo zhizni).50  Bulgakov treads 
closely to a form of Apollinarianism by maintaining that the divine 
hypostasis of Christ replaces the human hypostasis in the one hypostasis of 
the God-man.51   However, this is not a violation of the human hypostasis 
because the human hypostasis of Adam is the creaturely form of the divine 
hypostasis of the Logos.  Rowan Williams also points out that Bulgakov’s 
insistence that there is a union of spirit and nature in the one person of Jesus 
Christ meets the formal conditions for human subjectivity in the God-man.52  
Christ is both God and human. 
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Bulgakov supports the 6th Ecumenical Council in its naming of two wills in 
Christ.  He uses an analogy, picturing the divine and human wills woven 
together like two strands into a single rope.  Thus, Christ as ‘the single 
theanthropic person wills by a single act of will, even though this comes 
from a double source in his divine and human essences.’53  Yet there is 
concurrently a process whereby the human will increasingly conforms to 
obedience of the divine will.  In his human life, Christ is aware of his own 
divinity only ‘to the extent that his human essence could receive and contain that 
divinity.’54  Through kenosis there is a voluntary process of suppressing his 
divine will which allows this fully human experience.  Christ, as God-man, 
‘co-lives, co-suffers, and is co-present’55 with his humanity.  As Aidan 
Nichols suggests, the life of a human being is a process of coming to 
consciousness of one’s relation to the divine.  So, too, the life of Jesus Christ 
is a process of coming to increasing consciousness of his divinity as the Son 
of God.56   
The passion of Christ is a testimony to the kenotic suppression of his 
divinity.  Divinity is incompatible with sin and so Christ must completely 
empty himself of his divinity to take sin into his being.  Christ takes upon 
himself the sin from the human essence that he has assumed.57  The struggle 
of the flesh intensifies towards the end of his human life, witnessed in the 
events of Gethsemane and Golgotha.  Yet the God-man is not just the human 
individuality of Jesus but also the New Adam.  In the Passion, Christ 
experiences qualitative sin into his whole being.  Because there is no 
ontological limitation to his being, Christ is the universal or cosmic 
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foundation of the human being (as microcosm) and takes all human 
conditions of suffering into his being.58  In his sacrificial role, ‘the God-man 
fully suffers the equivalent  of the punishment for universal human sin.’59  
Therefore, since that time, anyone who approaches Christ in any time or 
place ‘will experience and find in this sorrow [their] own sin experienced 
and redeemed by the sufferings of the God-Man.’60  Because of Christ’s 
assumption of sin into his being, this suffering is for all time: Christ still 
suffers today when anyone sins.  Like Moltmann, Bulgakov also speaks of 
the suffering of the Father.   It is love of the Father and the Son that is ‘co-
offered in sacrifice for the sin of the world and thus co-participates in the 
suffering of the cross.’61  The Father is part of the agony of the cross but the 
whole economy of salvation is necessary in this form so that sin could be 
overcome.  Sin must be lived out in its human form and then destroyed.  
How sin is taken on remains a mystery.62  The mystery of the time between 
the death and resurrection of Christ is shrouded in this mystery.  The divine 
cannot die but the divine and human work together in this time to overcome 
the death forces in the material human body. 
One of the great insights of Christianity for Bulgakov is that it not only 
speaks of the salvation of the soul but also of the glorification of the body.63  
Christ is, above all, the Saviour of the body, expressed by Paul as the church 
(cf. Eph. 5: 2364).  Bulgakov rejects any position that opposes body and spirit.  
In the crucifixion, Christ’s body, together with the blood and water from the 
piercing of his side, joins with the earth and gives an undying corporeality to 
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the whole cosmos.  The humanity of Christ ‘invisibly lives in the world and 
is inwardly transfiguring the world toward a new heaven and a new earth.’65  
This connection makes the process of transmutation possible not only in the 
sacrament of communion but also in the body of the world.  Through the 
Resurrection and Ascension, Christ abides in the earth ‘essentially and 
really’66 as the power of transformation.  Christ’s ‘high priestly ministry is 
completed in heaven,’67 in the Ascension.  For Bulgakov, heaven is  the 
created aspect of the Divine Sophia.  When God creates heaven, this is ‘the 
hypostasized ideas of creation, the heavenly “project” of the latter, which 
can be understood only with reference to the world,  or the “earth.”’68  
Heaven is ‘complete and self-sufficient,’69 the model of the perfect earth.   
Christ reunites the bond between heaven and earth, between the creaturely 
Sophia with her ideal, divine form.  Thus, Christ abides on earth and in 
heaven, holding the heavenly and earthly worlds together in his one Person. 
Rosenthal comments that Bulgakov envisions ‘the entire world as “one 
corporeality and one body.” Whether this body is that of Sophia, or of 
Christ, or of both united at the end of time, is not clear.’70  This is an 
interesting comment.  Because of the fluidity of the sophiological enterprise 
any one of these three positions is possible.  Christ is the prototype of 
Divine-humanity, and thus he can be understood as the body of the world.  
Sophia, however, is the content of the world, the words of the Word, the ‘all-
organism of ideas . . . pre-eternal Humanity.’71  As the content of creation, 
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Sophia can also be understood as the body of the world.  Finally, body is not 
possible without spirit, so Christ together with his divine nature, Sophia, 
form the body of the world.  Christ can be thought of as the head and Sophia 
as the body of Christ, his nature, his divine corporeality.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 4 (p. 168), Hildegard pictured Christ within Sophia in her second 
vision, yet one can just as easily imagine Sophia within Christ.  As Robert 
Slesinski suggests, such sophian polyvalency readily makes for confusion 
when trying to elucidate the relation between God and creation.72 
Nonetheless, in Bulgakov’s concept of Divine-humanity he aims for a 
positive theology of the Chalcedonian Creed that acknowledges Christ in 
two natures, human and divine, ‘without confusion, without change, 
without division, without separation.’73  Divine-humanity is the humanity of 
God and the divine in humanity.  However Christ and Sophia are imagined, 
Christ’s deed restores the connection between the heavenly and earthly 
worlds, between the divine and the creaturely Sophia.  Christ overcomes the 
power of original sin and restores the divine image in humanity.  The 
incarnation ‘was an act of the new and final creation of the world’74 which 
had been harmed in its nature.  Igumnov points out that it is the ontological 
principle that dominates over the moral one in Bulgakov’s determinations 
on God’s plan for salvation. 75  Humanity is a part of the being and becoming 
of the world.  To fulfil this task, human beings need to become conscious co-
workers with Christ, to conform to the human proto-image in Christ.   
Humanity begins, through a process in time, to reveal the world’s 
sophianicity, the mystery and wisdom of the body.  Each person is a part of 
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this process, and each individual may be moved to hope by understanding 
the plan.   
Sophian Humanity—Conforming to Christ 
Humanity is on a path of revealing the world’s sophianicity, the wisdom of 
creation.  True wisdom is to be found in understanding the world around us, 
of what it means to conform to Christ, to be in Christ.  The first part of 
w i s d o m  i s  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  w h a t  i t  m e a n s  t o  b e  h u m a n .   H u m a n i t y  a s  a  
hypostasis of body, soul and spirit is given freedom. Our Adamic ancestors 
misunderstood the nature of creaturely freedom. Dominion does not mean 
having the knowledge and power of God.  True freedom is ‘divine-human 
cooperation.’76 In the resurrection, Christ’s human will conforms to the 
divine will, just as his human nature conforms to his divine nature.  The 
world, the creaturely Sophia, reflects ‘an established divine ordering’77 and 
the goal of creation and humanity is ‘cooperation with divinity or obedience 
to this fundamental inter-relatedness and dependence.’78  This goal reflects 
the very premise of this dissertation: that there is a fundamental relationship 
between the human will to live and the world that supports it.  Humanity is 
to follow Christ in Christ’s complete transparency between will and nature, 
Sophia.  
Humanity is a microcosm.  For humanity, the outer world is intimately 
connected to our inner world.  Although there has been a sundering, our 
goal is to overcome the separation until nature conforms to our wills, until 
our sophian nature is completely transparent.  It is God’s will for the world 
is that all possibilities of love are actualized.  It is humanity that has the task 
to transform the world, to work with Christ’s powers of transformation 
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within the world so that it truly reflects God’s love.  We learn to ‘struggle 
with the world out of love for the world.’79  We are not separate from the 
world.  Humanity is reminded of the first principle of ecology:  ‘that all 
natural phenomena are ultimately interconnected.’80  This interconnection is 
seen in the physical universe. Bulgakov uses the analogy of an organism to 
demonstrate interconnectedness: 
The unity of the universe, the physical communism of being, means 
that, physically, everything finds itself in everything else, every atom 
is connected with the entire universe; or, if we compare the universe 
to an organism, we can say that everything enters into the makeup of 
the world body.81  
Indeed, it is this unity and interconnection that enables transformation to 
take place on the level of cosmos right down to the atomic level.  Every 
action, positive or negative, affects the world. Bulgakov sees the unity of the 
world as the ontological basis for synergism, the interaction of God with 
humanity.82  The perichoresis that is at the heart of the relationships between 
the three persons of the Trinity is the highest model for humanity.   
Perichoresis ‘expresses the fullness and unity of that life, at once divine and 
human, which Christ now lives, and which is to be extended, in the final 
fulfilment, to the whole world, the whole of Divine-humanity.’83  Humanity 
is destined for a fully conscious, perichoretic existence. 
The complete content of the world, the words of the Word, has been given to 
creation by God.  The cosmos is a “closed” system.  God rested on the 
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seventh day “from all the work that he had done in creation” (Gen. 2:3).  The 
relationship between the heavenly and the earthly states is retained on this 
level and maintains a sense of unity.  It is this unity that allows any 
transformation within the many forms of the world to take place and so add 
to Sophia’s transformation as a whole being.  Difference is also preserved in 
this new world order.  As in God, who is three distinct persons in one 
nature, so also in the world with a multi-unity of persons in nature.  Union 
does not blur the distinction of difference. The world and humankind 
constitute ‘an organic symphony of diversity, which resounds both in the 
whole, in the world soul, and in every creature.’84   As Thomas Aquinas 
suggests: ‘the whole universe together participates in the divine goodness 
more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.’85  
Each part is necessary to make the perfect whole. 
The notion of deification, the assimilation of all creatures to God, is an 
intrinsic part of Bulgakov’s theology.  Anthony Baker proposes that 
Bulgakov (and Schelling) are unique in their revival of the traditional 
Christian doctrine of the path of transcendent perfection, or deification.   
Baker traces the history of this doctrine which he believes ended its tenure as 
a central position in theology with Nicholas of Cusa.86  Bulgakov’s ontology 
of perfection allows both the divine to be active in the human and the 
human to be active in the divine in a divine/human poesis.  Some 
correspondence can be found with Alfred North Whitehead’s process 
theology in which God creates an interdependent and interrelated world 
with all processes and potentialities built into the whole.  Process thought 
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conceives of the world as an organic whole moving in a purposeful way 
towards the gaining of values thus taking ‘the human experience of being 
mind and body and possessing creativity as a clue to the whole nature of 
reality.’87  God “persuades” rather than coerces creatures with love, towards 
an ultimate goal of beauty and maximum satisfaction.  God is at once 
transcendent and immanent, independent in God’s primordial nature yet, 
because God also absorbs the effects of the world into God’s self, God is also 
‘the fellow-sufferer who understands.’88  Divine and human interact 
purposefully, yet, for Whitehead, becomin g is under stood by change and 
event rather than a metaphysical transformation of substance.  Bulgakov’s 
notion of deification shares the principle of the organic whole but includes a 
transformation of substance. 
Humanity is an integral part of the cos m o s  b u t  i t  i s  a l s o  u n i q u e  i n  i t s  
freedom.  With freedom comes a responsibility for one’s way of being or 
becoming. For Bulgakov, “Wisdom has built her house.” (Prov. 9: 1)  ’Oikos, 
the Greek word for house, is the root word for economy.  Bulgakov speaks of 
a sophic economy that is an ordering of the world, a creating out of the 
world.  However, the nature of the world is both chaotic and ordered.  The 
chaotic state of the empirical world is the result of a falling away from the 
sophic world in its complete and absolute harmony, where everything finds 
itself in everything else and ultimately in God.’89  Humanity’s task is to 
restore the Edenic harmony of the created world. In the nature of human 
creativity, human beings are not all-powerful, they cannot create out of 
nothing.  Humanity must create out of the world.  The full measure of 
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human freedom in this sophic economy is found in following God’s will, 
“thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven” (Mt. 6: 10).90  Freedom is found 
in love and love is only found in communion.  This perception is echoed by 
John Zizioulas: ‘it is communion that makes things be: nothing exists 
without it, not even God.’91  Bulgakov suggests that “self-love” is a 
contradiction in terms, and it is a symptom of isolation as well as blindness 
to the reality of the world’s foundation of love.92 
This world is a human world.  The responsibility for care of the world is in 
human hands.  Notions of both dominion and anthropocentrism have been 
problematic in the way humanity’s relationship to the world has been 
perceived and acted upon.  However, both concepts can be reclaimed in a 
positive sense.  Colin Gunton maintains that we ‘should not be afraid to 
appropriate the notion of dominion . . . in terms of a re-establishing and 
perfecting of the dominion given to the first human creatures.’93   Dominion 
does not mean domination.  We live in a world of divine providence but the 
spiritual world does not have the hands to be the agents of re-creating.  The 
creation, too, “waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of 
God” (Rom. 8: 19).  Paul links this revelation with “the redemption of our 
bodies” (Rom. 8: 23) and it is this transforming of body that is our task, a 
transforming of the world of matter into a spiritual body that is fully 
transparent to the spirit.  Dominion signals a restoring of the balance in the 
world between humanity and nature, with responsibility residing in 
humanity.  For Bulgakov, 
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[t]his body of ours is not separated or isolated from the world.   
Rather, it is connected with it, for the world is the peripheral body of 
man.  This change is not a physical but a metaphysical act: the 
substance of the world is brought into a new state by the Holy 
Spirit.94    
The transfiguration of the world in the end time, achieved through the 
agency of the Spirit, will be addressed in the next chapter.  However, it is 
important to note here humanity’s role in the world.  Humanity is part of a 
gradual transformation that works with the Spirit, moving forward to meet 
the end times.  
Bulgakov’s notion of a human-centred world is at odds with a modern 
worldview that sees humanity as just one more life form, neither more nor 
less important than any other.  The first principle of the deep ecology 
movement, for example, states: ‘[t]he well-being and flourishing of human 
and nonhuman life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic 
value, inherent value).  These values are independent of the usefulness of the 
nonhuman world for human purposes.’ 95  The fourth principle recommends 
a reduction of the human population so that nonhuman life can flourish.  
There is no denying that the balance in the natural world is seriously 
disturbed by human practices and most probably because human beings 
have measured the outer world in terms of its “usefulness.”  However, I do 
not imagine that Bulgakov would see the lessening of the human population 
as a solution.  While supporting the principle of intrinsic worth for all of life, 
Bulgakov sees the outer world itself as an intrinsic part of the human being.  
The human problem is that we have forgotten our connection to the natural 
world. The growing environmental consciousness may at least point to a 
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remembering of some intrinsic truth of the connectedness of all, even if the 
suggestion of the world as human might still be viewed as negatively 
anthropomorphic to many.   
Henryk Skolimowski comments that the modern idea of anti-
anthropocentrism itself ‘has been cherished unanalysed, and, therefore, has 
tended to be treated as a sacred cow.’96  In fact, as he points out, we cannot 
move outside a human viewpoint, even if we endeavour to make claims on 
behalf of other species.  Indeed, it is our humanity that allows us to do this: 
‘taking responsibility for all is (paradoxically) an expression of our 
anthropocentrism.’97  In Bulgakov’s sophiology, this is no paradox because 
the world is a part of humanity.  The concept of a human-centred cosmos 
proposed by Bulgakov does not have to be viewed as a form of destructive 
anthropocentrism but can be understood positively in terms of humanity’s 
responsibility for its own world.  Human destiny and the natural world are 
conjoined, to be transfigured in their joint materiality, as espoused by the 
Orthodox doctrine of theosis.  Biblical passages, such as Rom. 8: 18-25 and 
Col. 1: 15-20, intimate the link between humanity and nature.  Although 
western commentators mostly hesitate at the principle of theosis, some 
within the area of environmental ethics have supposed that Christian 
humanism and an active care for the environment can be important 
partners.98   
For Bulgakov, human history is cosmic history.  Evolution stands with 
history as part of the gradual transformation of the cosmos.  As with 
Moltmann, history is a cosmic category, but Bulgakov views history as a 
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divine/human interaction, not just as Christ’s history.  For Bulgakov, ‘the 
task of the cosmic and historical process is to expand the flame of life, so that 
it penetrates, warms, illuminates all of creation.’99  H i s t o r y  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e 
sophic process, part of divine providence in the world.  Divine providence is 
also found in God’s direct relation to humankind, attested to in the history of 
revelation.100  This process is the ongoing sophianization of creation. The 
relationship of God to humankind is not an unnatural one, but part of the 
v e r y  f a b r i c  o f  t h e  w o r l d .   B u l g a k o v ’ s  v i s i o n  i s  a  p o s i t i v e  o n e .  I n  w h a t  
Rosenthal calls a ‘mystical version of Hegel’s dialectic,’101 the world becomes 
a living organic whole through the direction of Sophia’s providential 
guidance.  
The world as cosmos and the empirical world, Sophia and humanity, 
maintain a living interaction . . . Sophia, partaking of the cosmic 
activity of the Logos, endows the world with divine forces, raises it 
from chaos to cosmos.  Nature always perceives her reflection in man, 
just as man, despite his faults, always perceives his own reflection in 
Sophia.  Through her he takes in and reflects in nature the wise rays 
of the divine Logos; through him nature becomes sophic.102 
Bulgakov’s vision of the sophic world and humanity’s place within it is a 
positive one.  It is hopeful.  Barbara Newman calls this a ‘cosmic 
optimism.’103  The question remains, does the world truly reflect the 
beneficence of a sophianic conception of the world?  Celia Deane-
Drummond wonders whether ‘there is sufficient consideration given to evil 
present in the universe.’104  It is a ‘problem of reconciling the cosmism of 
sophiological faith with the anti-cosmic phenomena in the world, such as 
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disorder, evil, sin and finitude.’105  Such reconciliation may be more difficult 
to achieve as we move into the 21st century yet this is a very important 
challenge.  It is a matter of perspective, which may or may not be more 
distorted by the ready access to worldwide events presented to us by the 
media.  Is the evil greater than the good?  Bulgakov says “no,” and suggests 
that this is the basis of Christian faith: belief in the good.   I suggest that the 
key word here is faith.  Deane-Drummond mentions sophiological faith.   
Bulgakov lived in a time of revolution, war and exile.  Despite this, or even 
because of it, his faith in God and Sophia was strong.  Bulgakov’s favourite 
biblical phrase is “The Spirit and the Bride say, “Come.”  And let everyone 
that hears say, “Come”…“Amen. Come, Lord Jesus” (Rev. 22: 17, 20).106  
Bulgakov’s hope for the future never wavered.  The Bride is sophian 
humanity joined with the Spirit and waiting with joyful expectation for the 
consummate union with Christ. 
Although the foundation of the world is good, this is not to suggest that 
there are no consequences for sins committed in Bulgakov’s understanding 
of theodicy.  There are consequences yet sin may also be part of the road to 
love through repentance.  In his sermon of the Last Judgment, Bulgakov 
intimates a direct relationship between God’s love, sin and forgiveness: ‘the 
greater the fall of the penitent, the heavier the sin, the greater the joy of 
[God’s] forgiving love, the greater the love itself…’107  T h i s  p o i n t s  t o  a n  
unfathomable paradox that the greater the evil committed the greater the 
possibility of repentance and love: “But the one to whom little is forgiven, 
loves little.” (Lk. 7: 47).  However, every person is a mixture of good and 
evil, and there are opportunities for repentance and pardon in this life, as 
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well as the end times.  No one is completely good and no one can know how 
God sees us: we must guard against the arrogance that assumes we know 
when we are doing God’s work (cf. Mt. 7: 22).  Our highest aim, after loving 
God, is to love our neighbour.  In the Last Judgment, according to Bulgakov, 
Christ  
will not question us about a burden too heavy for us to bear, one 
which we cannot lift without the grace of God.  He will ask us about 
our charitable deeds towards our neighbour, about our willingness to 
love, about our desire to love.108 
It is the intention that is important—even if we have not been able to love, if 
we have at least performed charitable deeds then the judgment will be less 
harsh.  One does not have to be a Christian, of course, to do good deeds and 
to love one’s neighbour but, according to Bulgakov, all deeds of love are 
done in the love of Christ whether one is aware of it of not.  Every human 
being is held in the humanity of Christ.109 If one has consciously encountered 
Christ in this life, however, there is a mandate to live consciously by faith, 
hope and love in Christ’s name.  
For Bulgakov, God’s justice is inscribed into the very world: every thought 
and deed is recorded ‘on the tables of our hearts and in the eternal memory 
of the world.’110  As we shall investigate more closely in the following 
chapter on eschatology, every person will have to address his or her actions, 
weighed up against the model of true humanity, Christ.  Through the 
incarnation, Christ is present in the world and all eyes will be opened in the 
Last Judgment.  Forgiveness cannot simply wipe away sinful deeds but the 
consequences will have to be faced.  In his earlier theology Bulgakov 
                                                 
108 Ibid.: 4-5. 
109 Ibid.: 6. 
110 Ibid.: 2.   211  
considers that eternal damnation is a possibility.111  The threat of hell, 
however, is not to create fear in us but is to be thought of in terms of love, as 
a call to repentance and to love one another in order to be worthy of eternal 
life.  In his later theology, as discussed in the next chapter, Bulgakov rejects 
eternal damnation and presents the final judgment as a process of disclosure 
and purging all that cannot be reconciled to Christ, with all of humanity and 
the world eventually brought into the kingdom of God.  The need for 
repentance in this life is not lessened in this theology—it will ease the 
purging process that all will experience. 
Bulgakov’s sophian worldview gives a purpose to humanity and a purpose 
to the world around us.  It is Sophia who holds the world’s memory.   
Humanity and the world are intimately connected to God through Sophia.  
Arguably, Bulgakov’s whole sophiology is about how the God of creation 
maintains relationship with God’s own creation.  God does not create evil. 
God does not create the possibilities for good and evil: they arise within 
creatures.  All humanity is created in love and this love is free: ‘it is given 
and actualized by freedom.’112  But creaturely love cannot be demanded.   
Creaturely love for God ‘must be realized in time, in becoming.  If divine 
love is unchanging and eternal, creaturely love is characterized by increase 
and decrease.’113 The world has a history because human beings have 
freedom, and the world is therefore a process in time.  Humanity may still 
appear to be far from its goal but we can only “hope for what we do not see 
[and] we wait for it with patience” (Rom. 8: 25).  Thus, Bulgakov retains his 
positive vision of the world:  
Humanity is and always remains the unifying centre of the world in 
the eternal harmony and beauty of the cosmos created by God.  The 
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empirical world is immersed in process, in time and space, in history, 
and as such is imperfect and disharmonious; yet, like humanity itself, 
it is never wholly separated from a higher metaphysical reality, from 
the divine Sophia that ever soars above the world, illuminating it 
through reason, through beauty, through . . . economy and culture.114 
Conclusion 
Bulgakov’s faith in God gives him a positive referential and whatever 
happens in the world cannot undermine this.  He does not address the issue 
of theodicy in any great detail because, in a sense, it is not an issue for him.  
Full theodicy will be revealed in the Parousia: God “will wipe every tear 
from their eyes. Death will be no more; mourning and crying and pain will 
be no more…” (Rev. 21: 4).115  Bulgakov experienced pain and suffering, the 
death of loved ones, revolution, exile and war.  But for him this is a part of 
the human condition in process.  It is a part of the blindness that entered the 
world with original sin.  Original sin is the deviation of humanity from the 
path of union with God, but it is only a deviation, not an unredeemable end.  
Bulgakov does not consider this deviation as evil in intent, yet through 
humanity’s wilfulness, evil enters the world and the balance between chaos 
and order is lost.  Chaos dominates the forces of nature and overcomes the 
ability of humanity to govern and transform them.  The natural world 
becomes a body of death.  Yet all of this is a part of a much greater picture.   
In Bulgakov’s worldview he presents a cosmic picture of the world which 
has its foundation in goodness.  Nothing that happens in the world can 
overcome or defeat this ontological basis of the good. 
Humanity is created to be the logos of the world, of the creaturely Sophia.  
In the beginning, the world is a balance of chaos and order and humanity’s 
                                                 
114 Bulgakov, Philosophy, 145. 
115  See Bulgakov, Bride, 524.  Bulgakov’s eschatology will be addressed in the next chapter.   213  
role is to transform the chaos into transparency in a process over time.  The 
grace of God gives the unimaginable gift of freedom to humanity yet God 
also anticipates the possibility of original sin.  Christ’s incarnation is 
predestined, part of the salvific plan of the reconciliation of God with the 
world.  The incarnation is possible because of the ontological similarity 
between divine and human nature, two forms of the one Sophia.  Christ is 
Divine-humanity and in the incarnation Christ reunites the heavenly and 
earthly world in his one divine person.  Christ becomes a real presence in the 
world, the first fruits of the new heaven and earth.  Through the resurrection 
Christ overcomes the evil present in the world and redeems the Adamic 
prototype of humanity in its nature.  Christ (and the Spirit) then 
accompanies humankind on its path of the continuing sophianization of the 
world, as the power of transformation of the body of the world.  
Christ does not wipe away all sin.  The personal sin that is empirically 
contained within Adamic humanity is the responsibility of each human 
being who transgresses.  Because all human activity has an effect on the 
world, the world is still subject to the consequences of human sin.  History is 
the process of the sophianization of the world but within this process is a 
working to redeem the sin of humanity.  The darkness is strong but Christ is 
stronger.  Most importantly, the goal given to humanity—to reveal all forms 
of God’s love in the sophianicity of the cosmos—is within human 
capabilities.  Hope is found in the bigger picture: in the goodness of creation   214  
and in God’s love.  Bulgakov offers a picture of the interconnectedness of all 
within Sophia.  Sin has its effect but all positive actions also have an effect.  
Love, harmony and beauty are stronger forces than hate, discord and 
cruelty.  They have the power, together with Christ and the Spirit, of 
transformation.  Humanity also works with the substances of the earth in a 
process of sacramental transmutation, preparing the world for the 
transfiguration of the end times. 
The next and final chapter on Bulgakov’s theology focuses on the role of the 
Holy Spirit.  We have examined Bulgakov’s model of the triune God in 
God’s self and in creation.  Sophia is God’s divine nature given a temporal 
expression in creation as the creaturely Sophia.  Christ and the Spirit work 
sophianically in creation, birthing the world in its reality and its entirety.  
Christ’s incarnation into the world is the beginning of a new creation, that is, 
of a new possibility for a damaged creation.  The sending of the Holy Spirit 
at Pentecost is an intrinsic part of this new creation.  Christ and the Spirit 
now work hypostatically, out of their being, in creation, and this aspect will 
now be investigated.  Like Moltmann, Bulgakov’s theology is eschatological.  
It is faith in God and hope in the promise of the kingdom of God that 
strengthens and supports the Christian life at all times.  Prayer for the 
indwelling of the Spirit, for inspiration, is a fundamental necessity in the 
new creation, which began at Pentecost.  The Spirit is the being who conveys 
all that is beautiful and good to humanity and to the world.  Consciousness   215  
of the Spirit’s place in the world as the Comforter is also an important part of 
Bulgakov’s affirmative worldview.  Christ and the Spirit have joined with 
creation and suffer with the whole of creation in absolute empathy.
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Chapter 6   A theology of hope? The Spirit, Sophia and 
the future 
Introduction 
Bulgakov’s vision of the sophic world and humanity’s place within it is 
optimistic.  This chapter will examine Bulgakov’s vision for the future and 
how such optimism may be justified. It is interesting to note that the word 
“hope” rarely occurs in Bulgakov’s extensive body of work and yet all his 
words are infused with optimism.  He holds no doubts for the future 
kingdom of God when all will be in all.  It is, above all, the work of and faith 
in the Holy Spirit, working with Christ, that engenders Bulgakov’s optimism 
and this chapter will examine the Spirit’s role in the cosmos.  We have 
previously noted in Chapter 4 that the Spirit has a significant role in 
creation.1  Bulgakov distinguishes between hypostatic and sophianic actions 
of the Spirit.  The Spirit acts sophianically in creation to reveal the reality, life 
and beauty of Sophia. It is the Spirit who forms the body of the world, the 
creaturely Sophia, out of the divine Sophia, God’s nature.  The world is a 
spiritual body—body and spirit are not separate entities.  Spirit, in this 
sophianic sense, is, as also noted, ‘the union of an act of self-awareness, 
conscious independent existence, with the “nature” of which it is 
conscious.’2  The body can be, in its highest form, an image and self-
revelation of the spirit.   In Chapter 5 we observed the effects of evil entering 
the world through the self-determination of the human being.  The Fall 
brought about an unbalanced relationship between matter and spirit, and 
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the purpose of the incarnation of Christ was to redress this imbalance, 
restore the image of Divine-humanity, and work with humanity in its role 
within cosmic evolution.  It is through Christ that the Spirit also works in the 
world. 
The Spirit has continued to act sophianically within the world since creation, 
but has a new role since the incarnation, which this chapter will examine.  In 
this new role, the Spirit now acts hypostatically as the Holy Spirit, the third 
Person of the Trinity, in a dynamic union with Christ.  The Spirit holds back 
from her fullness until the eschaton to allow humanity to fulfil its own role 
in creation as the spiritual hypostatic beings that will bring consciousness to 
the cosmos, to the creaturely Sophia.  The Spirit, however, aids the human 
spirit with inspiration and continues her role in the sanctification of matter 
until the final glorification of the world.  
For Bulgakov, the world is a mirror of the divine world.3  It is necessary, 
therefore, to understand what the divine world is so that humanity can more 
and more faithfully reflect the ideals within the divine world.  In terms of 
this dissertation, such knowledge leads to empowerment and to hope.  The 
more an individual feels that his or her life is important and integral to the 
world, the more positive and hopeful one is likely to be and the more able 
one is to work positively in the world.4  This chapter will examine the 
dynamics of the triune God more fully and particularly explore Bulgakov’s 
pneumatology.  Bulgakov suggests that pneumatology has been a 
problematic area in understanding the Spirit’s divinity and relationship to 
the world ever since the beginnings of Christian theology. The church 
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fathers proclaimed Christ’s equi-divinity within the Trinity so that an 
economy of salvation was possible.  The Spirit’s equi-divinity is also an 
important concept for the Spirit’s salvific function in the world.  Bulgakov 
distinguishes between the Spirit’s actions within the immanent Trinity and 
within the economic Trinity to overcome some of the problems in historical 
pneumatology.  The importance of the Spirit is manifold, not only because 
she is one of three persons of the Trinity but most importantly because she is 
the helper and healer of humankind.  The Spirit has also joined with 
humanity in its pain and suffering and is the Comforter of humanity.   
This chapter is in three sections.  The first section considers Bulgakov’s 
understanding of the place of the Spirit in the immanent Trinity.  Bulgakov’s 
defence of the equi-divinity of the Spirit leads to the Spirit’s salvific 
capability in the economy of salvation.  The second section concerns the 
Spirit’s role in the economy of salvation, working with Christ and humanity 
in a new way since Pentecost.  The final section looks at the anticipated 
future of humanity and the world, including the time of judgment and the 
eschatological end.  The conclusion summarizes this pneumatology and 
eschatology but also places them in the context of Bulgakov’s whole 
sophiological enterprise.  With this completed picture of Bulgakov’s 
worldview, I present my rationale for proposing Bulgakov’s sophiology as a 
theology of hope. 
The Place of the Spirit  
Pneumatology has been a comparatively under-represented area in Christian 
theology although there has been renewed interest in the Spirit since the 
latter part of the twentieth century.  Yet historical pneumatology, although 
modest, has had the power to change the face of the church.  In particular, 
the filioque addition to the Nicene Creed in the 11th century contributed to 
the final split between the east and the west, and continues to be part of that   219  
division.  Vladimir Lossky asserts that ‘the question of the procession of the 
Holy Spirit has been (whether one likes it or not), the one dogmatic reason 
for the separation between East and West.’5  Bulgakov’s pneumatology 
proposes a new way of viewing the place of the Spirit both within the 
immanent God and within the economy of salvation.  His proposal supports 
the equi-divinity of the Spirit in God, and steers a path away from what he 
sees as the subordinate tendencies inherent in most pneumatologies.  The 
importance of this theology is that it places the Spirit within the Trinity as an 
intrinsic and essential Person and this, in turn, gives power and authority to 
the Spirit’s role in the salvation of the world. 
For Bulgakov, the Spirit completes the perfection of the immanent God as 
one of the three persons of God.  The immanent God is defined by its very 
trinitarian nature, by the ‘inner necessity and perfection of the number 
three.’6  God is not just three Persons, God is a world: not one, not two, but 
three.  Or rather, because God is three, God is a world.  Threeness does not 
mean three gods in one.  Nor does three refer to a numerical property or to 
an order in the sense of first, second and third.  Threeness means a 
trinitarian relationship between three distinct entities, that is, Persons or 
hypostases.  There is no disjunctive or conjunctive “and” between the 
Persons.  God is the interrelationship ‘which is trine and integral in all Its 
definitions.’7  The first hypostasis, the Father, is defined by relationship with 
both  the Son and  the Holy Spirit, and so also with the second and third 
hypostases.  All ‘the hypostases are equally eternal, equally divine, and 
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equally important.’8  This interrelationship is defined by perichoresis, by the 
circle of love that moves between them.  Thus, God is ‘three Persons, Who 
exist for us as such, Who are distinct in prayer, in life, in thought, but Who 
are never separated from one another and transformed into three.’9  
Bulgakov sees a fundamental weakness in Cappadocian theology which, in 
its articulation of three hypostases united in one essence, tends towards an 
impersonalism in God.  Because the three persons are united by nature alone 
God is ‘only the divine It, not the trihypostatic I, the divine triunity.’10  
However, this tendency can be countered by balancing ‘a unity in nature, 
[with] a unity of Personhood, a trihypostatic One.’11  There is a unity of 
personhood in God as well as a unity of nature, a three-centred union.   
Bulgakov, in his positive pneumatology, restores the Spirit as person to equi-
divinity and personhood in the triune God. 
Nor should the use of ordinal indicators—first, second and third—imply the 
subordination of the second and third person of the Trinity.  Bulgakov 
suggests that it is the problem of the origin of the Son and the Spirit that has 
produced a theology which tends towards subordination not equi-divinity.  
For Bulgakov, each Person of the Trinity cannot be determined in terms of a 
beginning.  Threeness in God is eternal.  In a unique and brilliant argument, 
Bulgakov counters 1500 years of church dogmatics which has defined the 
Persons of the Trinity in terms of origin.  He traces the history of trinitarian 
doctrine, from the early church to modern times, in an effort to understand 
the division between the eastern and western church. The filioque clause 
officially added to the Nicene Creed by the western church in the 11th 
century was an attempt to clarify the relationship between the three Persons 
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of the Trinity.  What it did was divide east and west. 12  The east emphasized, 
and continues to emphasize, the monarchy of the Father.  The Father is the 
cause of both the Son and the Spirit, who originate from the Father.  The 
west emphasized, and continues to emphasize, the relationship of the Father 
and Son, and sees the Spirit as proceeding from the Father and the Son.  For 
Bulgakov, however, both east and west have a problematic starting point.  
He believes the fundamental question of origin is misplaced.  Origin and 
cause are only appropriate categories in the empirical world.  In the Trinity’s 
immanent world, the three Persons exist eternally and must be understood 
not on their origin, which does not exist, but on the basis of their concrete 
self-definition, that is, through their difference in unity.   
According to Bulgakov, the difficulties of using origin as the starting point 
for establishing relationship within the trinitarian God have dogged 
Christianity since the fourth century.  When Christianity became the state 
church of the Roman Empire, the emperor Constantine sought to establish 
doctrinal certainty.  The councils of Nicaea in 325CE and of Constantinople 
in 381CE formulated the Nicene Creed, which became the “Symbol of Faith” 
for the Church.  At stake was the divinity of both the Son and the Holy Spirit 
against interpretations which appeared to show the Son and/or the Spirit in 
subordinate positions to the Father.  Subordinationism was seen to be a 
threat to the promise of salvation through the Son.  The Creed, therefore, 
asserted the oneness of God in essence and the threefold equi-divinity of 
Father, Son and Spirit.  The Creed states that the Son is begotten of the 
Father and the Spirit proceeds from the Father.13  Bulgakov claims that there 
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appeared to be little argument at the time about these statements of 
relationship.  The early church fathers obviously believed that these 
statements clarified the earlier Creed and were sufficient to show the equal 
divinity of the Son and the Spirit with the Father thus overcoming the 
various forms of subordinationism of the time.  However, disagreements 
over subsequent theologies of the credal statements eventually sundered 
Christianity into east and west.  
In Bulgakov’s thought, as we have noted, the problem has its roots in 
interpreting the credal statements as statements of origin and this was 
already evident in the theology of fourth century.  The idea of the Father as 
uncaused and the Son and Holy Spirit as caused from the Father has its 
beginnings in the thought of St Basil the Great.14  This idea was accepted 
uncritically by later theologians as self-evident whereas Bulgakov points out 
that ‘there is no concept more difficult to understand.’15   I t  i s  c a u s a l  
origination which becomes the centre of dispute in the east-west polemics of 
the ninth century.  The only question is whether the Spirit originates from 
the Father or the Son or both.  The end result is the addition of the filioque 
clause to the Creed by the west in the 11th century.  For the west, the Spirit 
proceeds from the Father through the Son.  For the east, the original creed 
suffices: the Spirit proceeds from the Father.  The polemics surrounding the 
filioque are, however, much more than doctrinal struggles.  With the fall of 
Byzantium and the rise of the papacy the filioque becomes representative of 
the power struggle between east and west.  Despite a lack of a uniform 
patristic doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit, western and eastern 
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interpretations become mutual grounds for heresy, which sees the final split 
within the church in the 12th century. 
While Bulgakov goes into great detail with the intricacies of the historical 
debate,16 the important point for him remains that the terms for the debate 
are themselves the problem.  The persons, or hypostases, of the Trinity do 
not originate but are eternal.  Their trinitarian relationship is eternal also.  
The second important point that Bulgakov is making is that the three 
persons are not defined by their nature alone, that is, by their relationships 
to one another.  The Father is not just the Father because of the Son’s 
generation and the Spirit should not be defined only in as a procession from 
the Father (or to the Son as well in Catholic theology).  Dyadic 
interrelationships are sundered by such monolithic definitions of Persons.  
Each Person has a relationship to the other two Persons as well as a 
trinitarian relationship. 17  Bulgakov’s point is that procession does not mean 
production.  He detects a christocentric bias in western theology which allows 
it to understand the sending of the Spirit as originating in the Son.  Instead, 
he posits an important binary relationship between the Son and the Spirit: 
‘the Church is the Body of Christ, living by the Holy Spirit.’18   Although 
there is, indeed, a biblical mandate for the sending of the Spirit, the actions 
of the second and third Persons still need to be held in dyadic equilibrium.   
Boris Bobrinskoy points out that Bulgakov represents one of three positions 
on the filioque controversy in Orthodoxy.19  For Bulgakov there is no 
dogmatic basis for the filioque—it is a theologoumenon, an opinion only.  He 
can see no grounds for the dispute, nor can he see any reason for the schism.  
A second Orthodox position maintains the absolute distinction between the 
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Orthodox and Catholic standpoints while a third position agrees that there is 
an important distinction yet seeks to elucidate a common aspect.   
Representing this third position, Bulgakov’s contemporary, Vladimir 
Lossky, turns to Gregory Palamas’ distinction between the essence and 
energies of God to clarify the problem.  In terms of the economic Trinity, as 
Bulgakov also affirms, there is, in fact, no disagreement between east and 
west about the sending of the Spirit through the Son.  For Lossky, this 
economic manifestation is made possible through God’s energies.  However, 
God’s essence remains unknowable and incommunicable to creation.20  If 
this distinction is maintained, then a creative opening into the filioque 
question is possible.  In one sense, Bulgakov is making a similar point: God 
is not to be defined by God’s economic manifestation.  More recently, a 
dialogue between Orthodox and Catholic theologians has also 
acknowledged that there is no real impediment to reconciliation of the 
churches on the question of the filioque.  One of the recommendations of the 
recent North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation is that 
‘Orthodox and Catholic theologians distinguish more clearly between the 
divinity and hypostatic identity of the Holy Spirit (which is a received 
dogma of our Churches) and the manner of the Spirit’s origin, which still 
awaits full and final ecumenical resolution.’21  This is precisely Bulgakov’s 
point some seventy years earlier!  Following V. Bolotov, Bulgakov asserts 
that the filioque ‘does not constitute an impedimentum dirimens (an obstacle 
that divides) for the reunification of the divided church.’22   
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Bulgakov’s own distinction between the hypostatic and sophianic 
manifestations of the Spirit (apparently not taken into account in the more 
recent dialogue above) is an attempt to clarify the Spirit’s identity both 
within the immanent God and within the economic Trinity.  The importance 
of this pneumatology, and the reason that the filioque  has remained a 
contentious issue, is that the Spirit is shown to have equi-divinity in the 
triune God, and therefore, an efficacious and salvific place in the economy of 
salvation.  The following section examines Bulgakov’s positive theology of 
the Spirit.  Because of the one-sided focus on the filioque Bulgakov believes 
that no positive theology of the Holy Spirit has arisen in the whole 1500 
years of pneumatology.  This has led to a ‘spiritual vacuum’23 in both east 
and west.  Nadia Delicata suggests that the result of this vacuum is a 
modern wave of Christianity ‘that seeks a naïve return to the primitive 
Church, to a Christianity before orthodoxy, before structure, even before 
liturgy—quite simply, a return to Pentecost.’24 Bulgakov’s response to this 
vacuum is also a return to Pentecost, yet one that is theologically both 
constructive and instructive.  He prefigures the renewed interest in 
pneumatology of recent years, and offers his own theologoumenon, based 
on the hypostatic identity of the Holy Spirit in her economic manifestation to 
the world.   
The Work of the Spirit 
The difficulties in understanding the hypostatic identity of the Holy Spirit 
begin with the fluidity of the word “spirit” in the Bible.  For Bulgakov there 
is a difference between spirit, the spirit of God and the Holy Spirit.  The first 
term, spirit, refers to the nature of the whole Trinity, of God and therefore 
refers to the spiritual nature of the whole Trinity: the Father is spirit, the Son 
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is spirit, the Spirit is spirit.  Indeed, this is another argument in favour of 
divine unity in nature as personal.  We have noted that in the created world, 
spirit needs a hypostasis for personal consciousness and a nature for self-
revelation.25  God’s nature is love so, by analogy, Delicata maintains that ‘we 
can confidently posit that God is not only Persons/Person who is/are self-
conscious, but that love is the being of God and God’s self-revelation.’26  God 
is love and love is relationship therefore God must always be constituted by 
‘community and not monism, even in God’s uniqueness as the divine 
absolute subject.’27   The difference in Trinity exists because ‘love requires 
mutuality and distinctiveness: hence each hypostasis loves differently, loves 
particularly, and the divine Persons are not interchangeable.’28  It is here that 
threeness is shown in both its perfection and its necessity.  For the Father 
and Son to have a relationship and still be hypostatic there must be 
something “other” than these two Persons.  This something is the Holy 
Spirit.  This is what Bulgakov means by the determination of the Trinity by 
definition and not by cause.  The Father is the Father because he is the 
‘image of Paternal sacrificial love.’29  The Son is the image of this sacrificial 
love, the kenotic love of the Father.  The Spirit is Love itself, revealing the 
very nature and content of the Father-Son relationship.  The primary role of 
the Holy Spirit within the triune God is as the hypostatic love of the Father 
and Son.  In this way, hypostasis and ousia, or nature, acquire a completely 
transparent and self-revelatory character.  They are not the same but in the 
Absolute God there is ‘no extrahypostatic nature and no extranatural 
hypostatizedness.’30  It is only in this economic relationship that ordinal 
                                                 
25 See also, Bulgakov, Comforter, 61. 
26 Delicata, "Comforter and Divine-Humanity," 9. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid.: 10. 
29 Bulgakov, Comforter, 138. 
30 Ibid., 65.   227  
numbers apply.  The Father is the first hypostasis because he is the source.  
The Son is the second hypostasis because he is the revelation of the Father.  
The Holy Spirit completes the self-revelation of God as the one who reveals.  
All three hypostases are absolutely necessary in this revelation and, 
although there is an order in process and completion, “third” does not mean 
lesser than “first” or “second.”  Each Person and each relationship is 
essential for the sharing of love, therefore threeness also is essential for love.  
Love and spirit, in turn, are the essence of the triune God. 
The other biblical terms mentioned, the spirit of God and the Holy Spirit, are, 
according to Bulgakov, both terms that refer to the third person of the 
Trinity.  The spirit of God is a term used in the Hebrew Bible and Bulgakov 
understands this to refer mainly to the sophianic work of the Holy Spirit.  In 
contrast, the hypostatic manifestation of the Holy Spirit indicates a new 
relationship to the world ushered in with Christ’s incarnation. Thus, 
Bulgakov divides the work of the Holy Spirit into a sophianic and a 
hypostatic manifestation, parallelled by how the Spirit is spoken about in the 
Hebrew Bible and the New Testament.  The sophianic aspect, previously 
summarized in Chapter 5, is the Spirit’s work in bringing reality, life and 
beauty to creation, and the Spirit here is referred to as the spirit of God.  This 
is the Spirit’s sophianic and non-hypostatic work in creation.  When the 
spirit of God sweeps “over the face of the waters” (Gen. 1: 2), this 
symbolically describes the initial action of the Holy Spirit in bringing form 
out of the nothing, out of Sophia.    The divine Sophia is the spiritual 
principle of God yet she has also been given a certain autonomy as the 
creaturely Sophia.  The connection of the Holy Spirit to creation is as the 
manifesting and revealing Spirit of creation.  The Holy Spirit does not 
incarnate, as it were, into creation, but works sophianically, to use 
Bulgakov’s terminology.  The Spirit works both within the triune God and 
“outside” God in creation.  Thus, ‘the direct revelation of the hypostatic God   228  
to creatures, of the divine Sophia to creation, is an action of the Holy Spirit 
(“grace”); and this revelation has as its content the Word, Who in Himself 
shows the Father.’31  This is Bulgakov’s trinitarian doctrine of creation.   
Bulgakov calls the Holy Spirit’s part in creation “natural grace.”  The natural 
grace of the Holy Spirit constitutes the foundation of the being of creation 
and ‘exists in the very flesh of the world, in the matter of the world.’32  The 
spiritual basis of creation is the precondition for its sanctification. 
The Spirit’s relationship with creation since the beginning is a kind of 
kenosis, signifying a certain “holding back” and marked by the relative 
incompleteness of a world in becoming.  The Spirit gives life and form to 
creation but allows for a creative process within creation that will move in 
time until the final transfiguration.  The Spirit also accompanies the path of 
humankind, and the Spirit’s presence is noted in some texts of the Hebrew 
Bible, usually in reference to the prophets and in relationship to God as the 
spirit of God (for example, Num. 24:2; Mic. 3:8; Ezek. 39:29).  For Bulgakov, 
the gifts of the Spirit accompany Israel as part of an economy of salvation for 
all humankind.  Israel is the source of Mary, the “mother of God”, but he 
notes that the universal nature of salvation is ‘perfectly clear from the 
historical and prophetic books of the Old Testament.’33   
For Bulgakov, the trinitarian nature of God is not obvious in the Hebrew 
Bible because the Son and the Spirit are working sophianically not 
hypostatically.  Bulgakov detects veiled allusions to the Trinity, and thus the 
identity of the Holy Spirit, in the Hebrew Bible, but it is only in the New 
Testament that ‘we have a clear revelation of the Holy Trinity and of Its 
three distinct hypostases: the incarnate Son revealed together with Himself 
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also the Father, as well as the Holy Spirit as the hypostatic Paternal love 
reposing upon Him.’34  The New Testament is testament to the new, 
hypostatic working of the Holy Spirit, signified in part by the new reference 
to the spirit of God as the Holy Spirit.  Bulgakov sees the best pneumatology 
within St John’s gospel.  The prologue is a witness to the triune God and to 
the Spirit’s work in creation and also to the Spirit’s connection to the Word.  
The “life” of the Word is a reference to the Spirit as is the glory beheld in the 
Word. “In him was life; and the life was the light of humanity.” (Jn. 1: 4)  The 
life and the light are the Spirit.  “And we beheld his glory.” (Jn. 1: 14)  The 
glory of the Word is no less than the Holy Spirit.  This is confirmed in the 
baptism when the Spirit descends from heaven (Jn. 1: 32) and gives the Word 
the power to baptize with the Holy Spirit (Jn. 1: 33).  For Bulgakov, then, the 
prologue is not just about the second hypostasis, the Word, but attests to the 
whole Trinity and includes its own pneumatology, although this ‘is 
expressed almost tacitly, in a mere breath, as it were.’35   
This condensed theology of the Prologue is a witness to the economic role of 
the Holy Spirit in both creation and in the incarnation of Jesus Christ.  With 
the incarnation, the Holy Spirit embarks upon a new hypostatic relationship 
with creation, and this can be seen in the more overtly trinitarian 
descriptions of God in the New Testament.   The Spirit accompanies the life 
of Jesus from the annunciation through to the baptism.  With the baptism the 
Spirit descends onto Jesus.  For Bulgakov, this Dyad of Word and Spirit has 
been inseparable in their work since creation but here it forms a new 
relationship.  It is only through the death, resurrection and ascension of 
Jesus that the dual relationship of the Word to the Spirit becomes a Pentecost 
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available to the whole of the creation.  Jesus Christ sends another Comforter 
to humankind and creation.  The Father, distanced from creation through the 
Fall, is now brought to a new relationship with creation by the Son and the 
Spirit working together.   The Spirit continues to work kenotically within 
creation but now also joins hypostatically with the evolution of the cosmos 
towards the end times.  The Spirit continues its kenosis post-resurrection, in 
its “holding back” from the final transfiguration but through the Ascension 
of Christ the Spirit has a new hypostatic relationship to the world.  Because 
Christ joins his own destiny with the evolution of humankind, in the 
redeeming of the old Adam, so, too, must the Spirit.  Christ “sends” the 
Spirit to humankind at the completion of the Ascension process, that is, at 
Pentecost.  The union of Christ and the Spirit with the divine Sophia is the 
restoration of the complete archetype for humanity, that is, Divine-
humanity’s archetype or prototype in the divine Sophia.  Jesus Christ is the 
“first fruits” of the new creation, the union of the divine and human natures, 
the union of the creaturely and divine Sophia. The first fruits requires the 
union of the Spirit with Christ in creation.  Thus, the Spirit is sent to work 
dyadically within the cosmos with Christ.  The union then gives humanity 
the power to work towards its true image in God.   
We have noted that the material world has a spiritual basis.  The fulfilment 
of matter’s receptivity to spirit is ‘the creaturely descent of the Spirit, Her 
kenosis in creation.’36   We have addressed the economic work of the Logos 
in the world in the previous chapter.  This picture remains incomplete 
without the complementary work of the Spirit.  The Logos and the Spirit 
work as an inseparable Dyad.   
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What is radical in Bulgakov’s pneumatology is the Spirit’s mutual descent 
with the Logos in the economic working of the Trinity.  Fullness is in the 
world but only ‘the measure  proper to unfullness, which is inevitable for 
creation with its “evolution” and growth.’37  This is the free work of 
humanity.  The opposition between spiritual and natural man (as expressed, 
for example, in Rom. 8: 1) is overcome by Christ: ‘In the Pentecost, Christ’s 
humanity becomes a reality by the Holy Spirit.’38  The Spirit’s descent ‘unites 
heaven with earth, erects a ladder between them.’39  The Spirit of creation is 
united with the hypostatic Holy Spirit in Christ.  This shift in the dyadic 
working of the Christ and the Spirit is revealed in the New Testament by the 
fact that sanctification is sometimes shown to be an action by the Spirit (for 
example, Rom. 15: 16; 1 Cor. 6: 11, 2 Thess. 2: 13) and sometimes by Christ 
(for example, 1 Cor. 1: 30; Eph. 5: 26; Heb. 2: 11).   For Bulgakov, this 
demonstrates their inseparable unity. 
The primary importance of this positive pneumatology is revealed when we 
return to Bulgakov’s proposal that the world is a mirror of the divine world.  
As we have noted, Bulgakov first champions the position of the Holy Spirit 
within the Trinity as equi-divine, dialoguing with, in his view, 1500 years of 
problematic pneumatology.  The divine world is seen to be perfect in its 
threeness.  This threefold relationship is then given as the supreme example 
for the creaturely world, where humanity is given the opportunity to come 
into right relationship with its own human world.  This is the divine 
relationship of love, a mirror of the relationship of love within the triune 
God.  Threeness is an important process which the world is only just 
beginning to understand and reflect.  Dualistic thinking deals in opposites: 
black/white, hot/cold, high/low, male/female, objective/subjective, and so 
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on.  Theological oppositions also arise from this thinking—body/spirit, 
heaven/earth, apophatic/kataphatic—made even more problematic by the 
privileging of one side of the opposition, heaven and spirit as superior to 
earth and body, for example.    Triadic thinking, on the other hand, adds an 
important place of transformation, a place of the in between.   The world is, 
indeed, made up of heaven and earth but heaven and earth are not 
opposites.  Heaven contains the ideal prototypes of earth.  The world is in a 
process of evolution or transformation.  Transformation understands the 
“lesser” to be part of the “greater.”  Earth is an aspect of heaven, and body is 
a part of spirit.  In a sense, there has been a sundering of heaven and earth 
and body and spirit but there is no possibility of a real sundering from God.  
Sophian theory embraces wholeness and the creaturely Sophia is the place of 
the in between, the place where apparent dualities meet. 
Bulgakov rejects what he sees as the neo-Kantian distinction of subject and 
object in western philosophy.  He turns to Friedrich Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie,  with its ‘identity of subject and object and the 
understanding of nature as a living, growing organism.’40   Bulgakov rejects 
the subjective idealism formulated by Kant and developed further by Johann 
Fichte because of their absolute subject/object distinction.41  According to 
Bulgakov, in Fichte’s system of the Ich-philosophie, ‘the world becomes 
merely the boundary of the I, is posited as non-I, and in this sense is the 
creation of the I.’42  In this self-assertion of the subject against the world, 
Bulgakov finds no mutual relations between subject and object.  He sees 
delusions of grandeur in such a human-centred epistemology and wants to 
broaden the determination of the subject ‘beyond the boundaries of 
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immanent consciousness.’43  He turns to Schelling’s philosophical theory of 
identity to explain how the subject/object distinction is a phase in an 
evolution of the world and human consciousness.   Schelling writes: ‘Nature 
must be the visible spirit, and the spirit must be invisible nature.  Thus the 
problem of how nature is possible outside ourselves is resolved here, in the 
absolute identity of the spirit within us and nature outside of us.’44  The two 
poles of subject/object or nature/spirit are in reality part of a primordial 
unity so that any distinction made is relative and ‘comes about in the process 
of nature’s self-development and self-definition.’45  This nature philosophy 
means that there is an intimate relationship between the human spirit and 
the world of nature.  In Bulgakov’s terminology they form the one Sophia 
and allow the possibility of the in between. 
The in between is a place of transformation but it can also be a place of 
balance between dichotomies.  What becomes important is recognizing the 
place of the in between and finding the balance.  The Buddhist practice of 
the middle path has this understanding of equanimity.  Hans-Werner 
Schroeder, a Christian Community priest, talks of “necessary evil,” and of 
the need to find the balance between the two extremes of evil.  Evil has two 
faces, not one.  One aspect of evil would like to pull us away from our work 
in and with the world.  This is the platonic concept of the earth as bad and 
all bodily parts and functions of the human person as inferior or evil.  This 
“luciferic” thinking has influenced Christianity in damning sexuality and 
any enjoyment in the world itself.  The other aspect of evil would like to 
draw us into the world too much.  This is materialistic, “satanic” thinking 
that tells us that the earth is all there is, with no place for spirit.  Schroeder 
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points out that good is the middle path between the two types of evil: ‘There 
are two characteristically different errors and temptations that threaten us, 
between which we must constantly find our way.’46  The middle path treads 
the way between the two extremes.   Already Aristotle in the Nichomachian 
Ethics (2.2) shows that virtue is the middle point between two aberrations.  A 
proper sense of self ‘holds the middle ground between arrogance and self-
disparagement; a healthy emotional state between effusive warmth and cold 
heartedness,’47 and so on.  For Schroeder, the two extremes are necessary 
because we come to selfhood through the oppositions and dichotomies of 
the world. 
Bulgakov, too, understands the “necessity” of evil.  The snake in the Garden 
of Eden ‘is a symbol of divine tolerance and patience toward evil, whose 
arena of action is God’s creation.’48  In creation, ‘each positive form of being 
is opposed by an anti-form.’49  The creative tension that arises is that same 
arena where the human being ‘realizes the possibilities of tasks proper to 
him, his latent and slumbering word.’50  The domain of creativity is within 
the sphere of possibilities within the divine Sophia.  It is not mere repetition.  
This, too, is made possible through inspiration from the world around us, 
the creaturely Sophia.  Through working in the world, the human being 
‘feels himself to be one with the world soul; in him is awakened the “cosmic 
sense” of world unity.’51  In this work resides the possibility of 
transformation where the oppositions of creation are transformed into a new 
creation.  Catherine Evtuhov describes this transformation as Bulgakov’s 
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“spirit of synthesis,” where the natural world is transformed into a new 
cultural world.52  The basis of this transformation (or re-creation) is based on 
the ideals present in Sophia, the Divine Wisdom.  Here Bulgakov challenges 
both Nietzsche and Kant.  As Evtuhov describes, ‘human creativity is not a 
result of chance, manipulated by a superman, nor is it the “nothing, creating 
from nothing” implicit in Kant’s fictive epistemological subject.’53  Human 
creativity works towards the proper or ideal forms in Sophia, each of which 
has a negative form.  The anti-form can thus be seen as a “necessary evil.”   
Another challenge to dualistic thinking is found in postmodernism, 
resulting, however, in an opposite yet equally problematic equation. Instead 
of either/or, there is neither/nor.  The subject/object dichotomy founders 
because the subject can never be fully removed from the environment.  In 
other words, our position can only be subjective because we are framed by 
our own point of reference.  In the thought of philosopher Michel Foucault, 
the postmodern subject is powerless to remove him or herself from his or her 
own discourse and is “constructed” from societal discourse.  Discourse is not 
‘the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking 
subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject 
and [his/her] discontinuity with [himself/herself] may be determined.’54  
The discourses created within each historical time and place are the only 
framework of existence and one cannot get beyond discourse—there is no 
transcendent subject, no God, not even a psychologically distinct subject.   
Applied to scientific experimentation the same thinking challenges the 
“objective” observer.  Thomas Kuhn demonstrates that science is not 
objective but has an historical context which depends on the acceptance or 
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rejection of the paradigms of the day.55  The “observer effect” also considers 
the possibility that the act of observing makes on the phenomenon being 
observed.  
The postmodern challenge is an extreme position on the power and 
authority of the individual yet perhaps it offers a healthy corrective to the 
modern (that is, Enlightenment) subject.  The modern subject was defined by 
its distinction from the environment and for its selfhood, Descartes’ “I think, 
therefore I am.” The postmodern idea that the subject is completely 
proscribed by its environment can be taken to an extreme position where the 
human subject is powerless to effect any change.  However, more recent 
applications of this thinking has a less negative connotation.  From a 
theological or ecological stance we may recognize that we are completely 
part of the world.  We are not separate from the world.  Martin Buber would 
agree.  His understanding of humanity’s task and destiny in the world has 
been summarized ‘as the realisation of [a person’s] true humanity in terms of 
genuine relation.’56  Treating the world as the other, the It, makes a life in the 
spirit impossible.  Spirit is ‘not in the I, but between I and Thou.’57  However, 
both Buber and Bulgakov recognize the process that is symbolized by “the 
knowledge of good and evil.”  Although the boundary between subject and 
object is fluid, there is still a distinction between persons or between person 
and world.  For Buber, the oppositions inherent in existence have the 
purpose of human soul transformation, by bringing humanity to self-
awareness and then to the greater awareness of the divine Thou.58  F o r  
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Bulgakov, as we have noted above, the subject/object distinction remains as 
a process of cultural transformation until there is, as Evtuhov describes it, a 
‘supreme synthesis of consciousness and being, the ideal and the real.’59 
In this synthesis of the real and unreal Bulgakov follows Soloviev in his 
understanding of the justification of the good through a threefold expression 
of love.  If the human being is the middle place of transformation there is an 
ascending love whose object is God, an equalising love between human 
beings, and a descending love that acts upon material nature, bringing all 
within the fullness of the absolute good.60 
Bulgakov’s natural theology supports some of the more recent scientific 
challenges to atomistic thinking.  The natural world, with its own patterns 
and cycles and events, has been understood as seemingly independently of 
the human world, and thus objectified.   There is, however, growing 
evidence that this is not the case.  Humanity affects the natural world with 
its collective actions, perhaps even in its unconsciousness. Humanity’s 
actions also appear to be affecting climate change. The problem may lie in 
this sense of isolation that humanity has from the natural world—the world 
has been understood as “other.”  Bulgakov’s sophiology challenges this 
thinking but in present times a growing shift of consciousness in diverse 
disciplines is also challenging this understanding.  David Bohm’s quantum 
theory of the implicate order, for example, suggests that reality is an 
undivided wholeness.61  From a philosophical reading of quantum physics, 
he proposes that humanity’s problematic and destructive sense of separation 
and otherness is a result of the failure to perceive this reality.   If the self is 
experienced as separate then it works to maintain its distinction in relation to 
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what is outside of it, be it another person, a group, nature, and so on.  Bohm 
considers that this mode of thinking leads to ‘the widespread and pervasive 
distinctions between people (race, nation, family, profession, etc., etc.) which 
are now preventing [hu]mankind from working together for the common 
good.’62 
It is more than likely that the problem, then, lies in our understanding, in 
our failure to perceive the place of humanity in the world, either in the 
modern and pre-modern understanding of dichotomies or in the 
postmodern loss of the subject.   The answer, once again, lies in the in 
between.  Humanity is the place of subjectivity in the world and it is a part of 
the natural world.  We have eaten of the tree of good and evil and we must 
walk the path within the dichotomies of existence.   We are formed in the 
image of God in our selfhood and we are part of the natural world.  The two 
sides belong together.  What is more, there is a merging of the two, 
‘unconfusedly, unalterably, undividedly, inseparably’63 until we become as 
our protoimage in Christ, with a nature completely transparent to the spirit.  
The world, according to Bulgakov, does have a certain objectivity, a natural 
existence, until humanity can fully hypostasize the world.  Humanity is on 
the evolutionary path of humanizing the cosmos.  It can only do this in 
relationship not in isolation, by recognizing togetherness rather than 
otherness. 
In Bulgakov’s theology the principle of threeness is an important component 
in the human evolution of the cosmos.  In any relationship there is a 
threefold quality, whereby the reality of the world (the Father principle) is 
revealed through a working of the Son and the Spirit.  The Father is the 
source, the Son is the content of the Father and the Spirit unites the two and 
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reveals them.  The Son has provided the structure and content of creation, 
the ‘seminal logoses,’ and this is revealed through the work of the Spirit.  For 
creation, the hypostatic principle is multiple.  Each person is part of the new 
Adam, yet each human person works towards his or her own self-fulfilment.  
This is achieved, in part, through sanctification and inspiration, both 
processes of revelation and consecration through the mutual work of the 
Spirit with humanity.  Humanity learns to reveal the reality of the cosmos in 
its true transparency of love through the process of the interpenetration of 
matter and spirit. 
Sanctification, according to Bulgakov, is the ability to ‘receive and retain the 
action of the Holy Spirit.’64  It is the communication of the grace of the Holy 
Spirit.  Sanctification of and in the world is only possible because of the 
general spiritual receptivity of the world.  For Bulgakov, sanctification of all 
elements in the created world is possible because of its basis in the divine 
Sophia.  Like receives like, and matter has a spiritual basis.  Matter is merely 
‘the condition of fallen substance.’65 However, the Holy Spirit has ‘poured 
forth into the world in the Pentecost and abides in the world, bestow[ing] 
upon the world the power to be transfigured and resurrected.’66   T h e  
creaturely Sophia receives sanctification, so that ‘the action of grace is 
equated here merely with the interaction between a higher plane and a 
lower one and the influence of the corresponding higher hierarchies.’67  
Sophia enables this interaction because she is ‘both divine (pleroma) and 
creaturely (becoming); both in God (divine nature) and in creation (created 
nature); both transparent (love perfectly and divinely revealed) and opaque 
(love imperfectly revealed because of creaturely limitation and human 
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sinfulness).’68  Sophia is the in between or, as Celia Deane-Drummond 
suggests, the boundary of order and chaos.69   
Bulgakov is clear that matter and spirit are not opposed.  Spirit is the power 
of matter.  In the initial creation, in which humanity is created after other 
material manifestations, humanity is separate from its nature but given the 
task to acquire “dominion” over nature.  This is making what is “not I” the 
hypostatic I-ness of humanity.  The not I is part of the creaturely proto-
matter of Sophia and so proto-matter is not alien to spirit.  Sophia, through 
the consciousness of humanity, can be made fully transparent.  The original 
“earth” is formed from the divine Sophia by the Holy Spirit, and thus is alive 
and forms a part of Adamic humanity.  The Spirit accompanies humanity in 
its process of the sanctification of the earth as a process of divine-human 
cooperation. There is no “dead” matter, only matter that can be enlivened.  
Matter loses ‘its inertia and impenetrability...It stops being unconscious and 
becomes conscious.’70  This explains why substances can be the conduits for 
spiritual gifts, as in the sacramental substances. 
The Holy Spirit works in creation in the process of sanctification but also 
works directly with the human spirit in inspiration.  Inspiration is part of 
humanity’s deification, a “communication of properties” or perichoresis 
between the Spirit and the human spirit.  It is part of the human capacity to 
be able to receive divine revelation.  The human spirit ‘is not closed off; it is 
permeable and transparent for different inspirations.’71  Inspiration is a 
divine-human act, but it is not the work of the Spirit to replace or overcome 
or overshadow the human spirit.  Divine-humanity is realized here in the 
world.   Inspiration is possible both from the natural world and through 
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grace.  Inspiration from the beauty and wonder of the natural world is 
possible because the world itself has been formed from the sophianic action 
of the Spirit.  With right feeling towards the world, with inspiration, the 
human person ‘feels himself to be one with the world soul; in him is 
awakened the “cosmic sense” of world unity...’72  Bulgakov considers 
inspiration through grace to be the action not of the sophianic action of the 
Spirit but the hypostatic Spirit.  Even so, the grace of the Spirit ‘does not 
coerce, but comes to man in response to his efforts, just as man cannot 
surpass his creaturely measure if he is not carried above it by a superhuman, 
supernatural force.’73  In humanity’s striving, human depths are revealed: 
the human being ‘tests and realizes the possibilities of tasks proper to him, 
his latent and slumbering word.’74  Humanity’s economic and creative works 
are only possible through this divine-human relationship.  The content of 
creation, the Logos, is revealed to humanity by the Spirit through human 
striving.    
Of course, even the most inspired thoughts are human and therefore fallible.  
Because this interaction with the Logos and the Spirit is not one-sided or 
mechanical, there can also be non-cooperation or resistance. There is also the 
danger that what is considered as inspiration does not come from the grace 
of the Holy Spirit.   Since the Fall the spiritual world is largely closed off 
from humanity, and discernment is difficult. The human spirit is also ‘open 
to the pre-human and nonhuman world.’75  This includes not only the 
animal world and the angelic world but the demonic world.  The fallen 
spirits have considerable power and we are warned against them (for 
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example, Eph. 6: 11-1276).   Discernment is often simulated by 
sanctimoniousness and ignorance, and Bulgakov warns against ‘false 
spiritual knowledge [which] covers hardness of heart, darkness of mind, and 
laziness of thought.’77  With such complex and mutually antagonistic 
influences of the spiritual world, of light and dark, discernment becomes a 
skill to be honed.  Even against such warnings, however, Bulgakov remains 
optimistic.  Fallen creation still ‘retains the capacity to receive [direct] divine 
influences.’78  Divine influences are manifold.  They are bestowed in the 
sacraments of the church, in the transformation of substances or the 
sanctification of matter.  We have the help of guardian angels and the 
angelic world.  Moreover, creation is maintained by the very being of the 
Holy Spirit in its life and being.  This divine life is the Spirit’s gift and 
integral to Divine-humanity and therefore humanity.   
There is an even greater compatibility to be seen between the life and being 
of the Holy Spirit and humanity.  Compatibility has already been 
foregrounded in the church’s Chalcedonian theology, in the dual nature of 
Christ, inseparable in two natures, both divine and human.  For Bulgakov 
this compatibility is in the ousia, the sophian nature.  Christ has two natures, 
but humanity has only one, its own human nature.  The human being 
remains human, but becomes transparent for the action of the divine nature.   
Each individuality contributes to the whole of humanity in a kind of 
complex “communism” of being. 79  Every human person is ‘a generic being 
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who is intended to be in spiritual contact with beings similar to him.’80  This 
is the movement of the ‘not “I”’ in the gracious death of the personal “I.”  A 
special form of Divine-humanity, the person of Christ, the higher “I,” is the 
goal in the evolution of humanity towards transforming its lower creaturely 
nature into its divine nature.   
This spiritual compatibility with the person of Christ is understood to be a 
working of the Holy Spirit.  Spiritual compatibility lies in humanity’s 
hypostatic determination. Humanity is created in the image of God, and this 
image is a dual reflection of God’s personhood and nature.   Humanity’s 
natural life is seen in ‘psycho-corporeal existence,’81 that is, body and soul, 
the creaturely Sophia.  Humanity’s personhood is determined by its spiritual 
life.  Humanity has received ‘a spark of Divinity [which is] the personal 
principle.’82  This divine life can become ‘a reality by the power and action of 
the grace of the Holy Spirit.’83  The divine life is achieved, as we have noted 
earlier, through the dual processes of sanctification and inspiration.  Just as 
Divine-humanity is adopted by God in the descent of the Spirit so, too, are 
we children of God: ‘The being clothed in Christ, which is accomplished by 
the Holy Spirit, is at the same time adoption by God.’84  We have received 
the kernel of Divine-humanity and we are in an evolutionary process 
moving towards the eschaton when all will be in all.  This adoption is 
possible because of humanity’s compatibility with these divine elements of 
the Spirit and Word present within it. 
Ever since the Fall, there has been sophianicity and anti-sophianicity in 
existence.  There is nothing outside of this, nothing extra- or non-sophianic. 
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Humanity’s mutual task is the overcoming of this division so that clear 
sophianicity becomes the nature of the cosmos.  The world ‘has become a 
mirror of the divine world; its images are not illusory, however, but really 
exist.’85  This is the task and goal of creation; we are “gods by grace” to 
mirror faithfully the divine world of the Trinity.  Humanity mirrors the 
Trinity’s multi-unity ‘that they may all be one.’86  We cannot fall out of this 
multi-unity.  We are all in Adam.  Adam has a duality of a sinless state and 
self-determination but the Old Adam has not been annulled.  ‘It is precisely 
this original hypostatic multi-unity of man, with one nature, that enables us 
to understand the fact that the Logos assumed the human nature (“flesh”) 
fully without diminishing it or doing violence to it.’87  The matter of the 
world experienced a fundamental change when it became the flesh of Christ.  
The Holy Spirit ‘spiritualized the matter of Christ’s flesh [corresponding] to 
the victory over death and to the state of the spiritual  body in its 
glorification.’88  This meant that ‘the entire human essence in its ontological 
kernel was assumed and saved by Christ.’89  From Pentecost onwards, 
humanity works in time with the power of Christ and the Spirit, nurturing 
the kernel into a fully spiritualized body, into the divine Sophia.  Thus, the 
complete sophianicity of the end times will mean the sanctification of all 
matter.  All will be “in Christ.”   
This section has examined the Holy Spirit’s role with Christ in the economy 
of salvation.  The Spirit is the Love of the Trinity, the essential third person 
who enables love to flow, who is indeed, hypostatic Love.  In creation, the 
Spirit is the principle of not only love but also of life, beauty and reality.  The 
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Spirit manifests and reveals, and is present as grace in the world.  Because 
the world has a spiritual basis, it is receptive to the Spirit.  The Spirit works 
hypostatically within creation since Pentecost as an inseparable dyad with 
Christ.  With the descent of the Spirit, a union is formed between heaven and 
earth, spirit and matter, allowing the continuing spiritualization of matter in 
the world.  The Spirit’s tools are inspiration and sanctification, allowing 
perichoresis with the human spirit.  Yet the Spirit does not coerce and so the 
human being must be open to the promptings of the Spirit while guarding 
against sanctimoniousness and ignorance.    
Eschatology  
Now I will examine Bulgakov’s eschatology with a view to linking this to 
present humanity and present day hope.  The Holy Spirit is the agency 
through which the transfiguration of the world in the end time is achieved.  
This transfiguration is not a physical but a metaphysical act: the substance of 
the world is brought into a new state by the Holy Spirit.90  We will examine 
this eschatology and then explore the connection between the present and 
the eschatological future.  In Chapter 1, Moltmann’s eschaton was seen to be 
an inevitable act of God seemingly unrelated to human endeavour.  For 
Bulgakov, there is a historical process of divine/human cooperation, moving 
towards the eschaton, including a time of judgment.   Yet the eschaton is also 
inevitable for Bulgakov and all will be saved.  I will examine what this 
means for the principle of free will and for my thesis of hope.  If the eschaton 
is inevitable, then hope could seem unnecessary.   Is there any purpose to 
human endeavour if God intervenes to save all in the end times?  Or, 
conversely, because we are “under sin,” is God’s intervention a reassuring 
hope that, despite our sinfulness, we will all be saved?  I suggest that both 
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these scenarios give little reason for human life itself.  I propose a third way 
forward, supported by Bulgakov’s theology: an historical process of divine-
human cooperation that meets the God of the future and gives real, 
ontological purpose to human life.  Hope then resides in purposeful 
existence. 
As with much of Bulgakov’s theology his eschatology is both unique and 
constructive.  In Paul Gavrilyuk’s view, ‘Bulgakov’s eschatological vision is 
unsurpassed in its breadth in Russian thought…’91  Bulgakov anticipates the 
later interest in eschatology begun by Moltmann in the 1960’s.  He believes 
that the church has ignored eschatology and ‘has not established a single 
universally obligatory dogmatic definition in the domain of eschatology,’92 except 
for the brief credal statement, “He will come again in glory to judge the 
living and the dead, and His kingdom will have no end.”  For Bulgakov, ‘the 
“last times” have already begun.’93  This process of divine-human 
cooperation began with the incarnation and will be fulfilled in the future 
times.  The Pentecost is the accomplishment of Divine-humanity, the 
establishing of the model for divine-human cooperation, the working of the 
Holy Spirit with humanity to prepare the world for its future glory.  As we 
have noted, the Pentecost itself is the beginning of this process, which 
continues until the whole cosmos is glorified.  The Pentecost remains 
unfinished until the parousia, yet, through the ascension, the work of Christ 
‘remains unfathomably and antinomically linked to the times and seasons of 
this world, whose duration is now fixed: It extends from the Ascension to 
the parousia.’94  Although one cannot know the exact duration of this 
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timeline, Bulgakov champions a co-working with Christ, an accompanying 
human, historical movement preparing the world for its transfiguration.   
The end of this process is biblically marked by judgment and separation 
before the descent of a new heaven and a new earth.  However, Bulgakov’s 
reading of Revelation, which understands judgment as an internal judgment, 
also allows for universal salvation and glorification. 
In Bulgakov’s thought, hope is enveloped in the complete trust and faith in 
the processes set in place by God.  Like Moltmann, Bulgakov is certain of 
God’s promise of the final glory.   
One can say that the fate of the world has already been decided - in 
the sense of its final salvation and transfiguration.  A supramundane 
force is already present in the world, sufficient to save and transfigure 
it . . . It is a true mystery, which is accomplished in the world and in 
history, but not without tragic opposition . . . the mystery of sin and 
of the flesh is being enacted there.95 
What is uncertain, then, is the movement towards that “fate.” The history of 
the world, including its suffering, is all part of the mystery of existence, but 
the mystery of the sin and flesh is a part of the self-determination of 
humanity.  God joins with humanity and this, too, is a part of the mystery.  
Bulgakov writes that the ‘sacrifice of this love consists in the fact that God 
must suffer the world with its imperfection, without destroying its proper 
self-determination.’96  The Holy Spirit ‘descended to make humanity 
Christ’s, to actualize the salvation of the world, brought by the Saviour.’97  It is 
the process of Divine-humanity.  Again: the world ‘must be brought to a 
state where it can receive the coming of the God-Man in glory and where 
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God will be all in all.’98  The question is not whether this will happen but how 
it will happen.   
For Bulgakov, the end times cannot be an external act of God.  God does not 
impose any action upon the world that is alien to it.  The end of this world 
and its transfiguration are depicted ‘both as God’s action upon the world and 
as the ripe fruit of the world’s life.’99  It is a twofold process.  The end times 
will happen only through divine-human cooperation, when humanity joins 
fully with its nature, with Sophia, and mirrors the Divine-humanity 
faithfully.  It is Bulgakov’s understanding of the second part of this process 
which sets his eschatology apart.  Humanity’s actions in the world are 
integral to the “ripening” of the world, of the preparation of the world for 
glorification. There is a strong sense of world history and of the right time 
for its fruition.  Human beings are the co-workers of the Spirit and of Christ 
in the work of bringing the world to a state where God will be all in all.  
According to Bulgakov all that has been accomplished in human history is 
an integral part of the new Jerusalem.  The new Jerusalem of Revelation is 
based on the measure of the human and angelic worlds and ‘contains the 
sum-total of universal history as well as the matter of the creaturely 
world.’100  It ‘contains the principles of the natural world and the synthesis 
of human creative activity in history.  It is already the meta-cosmos, which in 
meta-history raises the achievements of this age to the highest level.’101   
Gavrilyuk proposes that this principle of synergism was Bulgakov’s 
response to ‘a traditional concept of resurrection and judgment as acts of 
God brought upon largely passive creatures.’102  For Bulgakov, the end of the 
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world is also the completion of creation, and all that has been achieved by 
and transformed by humanity will be an integral part of that.   
The final act of the divine/human process towards the meta-cosmos is 
depicted in biblical literature as the parousia of Christ accompanied by a 
time of destruction and of judgment.  For Bulgakov, the parousia and 
judgment are simultaneous events, and occur within time, signified as the 
“end times.”  Once humanity has achieved its highest state of readiness there 
is a process of judgment.  Judgment is an inward encounter.  The human 
being’s self-determination is a sum total of all his or her experiences, and 
judgment concerns what that person has or has not done, as recorded in the 
“book of life.” There is no place for predetermination in Bulgakov’s 
eschatology because of the freedom of this self-determination, nor is there 
any escaping from the process of purification either.  The judgment and 
separation ‘consist in the fact that every human being will be placed before 
his own eternal image in Christ, that is, before Christ.  And in the light of 
this image, he will see his own reality, and this comparison will be the 
judgment.’103  This is the experience of “hell,” the consciousness of how one 
has not measured up to the image of Christ, ‘the consciousness of the sin of 
against love.’104  Everything that is not in conformity to this image ‘falls into 
the outer darkness, into nonbeing.’105  Judgment cannot be avoided, nor is 
simple forgiveness by God possible:  
God’s love, it must be said, is also His justice. God’s love consumes in 
fire and rejects what is unworthy, while being revealed in this 
rejection…One must reject every pusillanimous, sentimental hope 
that the evil committed by a human being and therefore present in 
him can simply be forgiven, as if ignored at the tribunal of justice.  
God does not tolerate sin, and its simple forgiveness is ontologically 
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impossible…Once committed, a sin must be lived through to the 
end…106 
The “chaff” may be burned away but each human being will be saved in 
Bulgakov’s belief in universal salvation and resurrection.  The purpose of 
judgment is one of purification in readiness for glorification.  No one is 
“lost” forever.  By interpreting judgment as an inner process, “judgment” 
texts can be understood as part of this universal preparation.  The separation 
of the sheep from the goats, for example, in the judgment text of Matthew 25: 
31-45, is seen as ‘a horizontal division, which passes through all humankind, 
not a vertical one, which would separate into two mutually impenetrable 
parts.’107   The idea of “eternal damnation,” as in the above judgment text, 
must be understood dynamically as a qualitative category and as part of the 
nature of being, or becoming.  The torments of hell, or the stage of self-
judgment, are a spiritual state, part of the ‘constant creative movement in 
which [the creaturely] spirit’s life is expressed.’108  Eternal life is a path, 
giving rise to the fundamental antimonic postulate of eschatology: ‘the 
eternal life of incorruptibility and glory can coexist with eternal death and 
perdition.  Both, to different degrees, are included in being.’109  T h e s e  
distinctions between heaven and hell exist only in our earthly condition, in 
our becoming.  Bulgakov adds a qualifying statement that beyond this the 
‘mystery of the life of the future age surpasses our understanding.’110 
Because there have been no dogmatic statements about eschatology 
Bulgakov argues for a universalism that had only been a minority position in 
the patristic period.  He uses the ideas of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, as 
well as his contemporary, Florensky, to support judgment as an ontological 
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category rather than a moral category.111  Moreover, humanity cannot 
commit ontological suicide.  It is not within humanity’s power to cease to 
exist or to destroy the basis of existence.  His argument is also tempered with 
faith in God’s love, which does not allow Bulgakov to countenance the 
eternal damnation of any being, not even Satan.112  Any interpretation of 
biblical or patristic texts ‘must be determined by placing it in the context of 
the entire Christian teaching.’113  Thus, Bulgakov counters any idea of the 
rejection of sinners with the biblical teachings of God’s love and forgiveness.  
The parable of the lost sheep declares that ‘it is not the will of your Father in 
heaven that one of these little ones should be lost’ (Mt. 18: 14).  The suffering 
of Christ for and in humanity before judgment will not stop with the 
parousia.  Christ does not deprive sinners of his love.  Indeed, we are all 
sinners in the final judgment (with the exception of Mary, mother of 
Jesus114).  All Christian and biblical teaching is to be viewed as words of 
God’s love, even the fire of judgment. 
The purpose of judgment is so that the image of God in each human being is 
made pure and therefore able to be glorified.  The Spirit accompanies this 
process since the first Pentecost but she will not fully descend until the 
process is complete.  For Bulgakov, the descent of the Spirit is ‘completely 
analogous to the descent from heaven of the Logos.’115  For now, the Spirit 
remains faceless to some extent, hidden under images of wind and fire (see, 
for example, Acts 2: 2-3).   In the fullness of time, humanity will have full, 
personal awareness of the Spirit.  The impersonal imagery and action of 
Spirit will be revealed as personal.  Bulgakov asks, will this mean that there 
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is ‘the manifestation of the Countenance of the Third hypostasis’?116  This 
cannot be answered.  It is a great mystery but, for Bulgakov, we already 
have some sense of the ‘Beauty-Holiness’117 within the cosmos.  We can feel 
this mystery within the world even if we cannot perceive it directly with our 
senses.  But there will come a time when we do see “face to face.”  In the 
fullness of time, when love has truly enveloped the world, the world will 
fully experience the gifts of the Spirit.   
The general classification of sin for all humanity is a problem of theodicy.  
Surely a baby who dies at birth, for example, has not committed any sin.  In 
answer to this problem, Bulgakov returns to the picture of humanity in its 
entirety.  We are all “under sin” in terms of our material bodies yet each life 
is unique and also contributes to the meta-Adam.  There is a qualitative and 
quantitative difference in the experience of each soul.  Heaven and earth is ‘a 
summation of life not only in its fullness and complexity but also in its 
diversity of forms.’118  For Bulgakov it is no coincidence that Christ speaks of 
many  mansions in his Father’s house.  The relation between image and 
likeness may thus be ‘in mutual harmony’119 suggesting that judgment in the 
sense of the burning away of the chaff does not apply to the souls who have 
not committed any personal sin.    
After the purification of the parousia and judgment, in the fullness of time, 
the world becomes the new Jerusalem.  The new Jerusalem is not a new 
creation.  The imagery of Revelation makes it clear that the new Jerusalem is 
based on the materials of the earthly world (see the description in Rev. 21. 
18-21).   The whole world now becomes God’s temple as the kingdom of 
love.  Humanity enters a new phase in its existence but this is not a static 
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existence in some kind of timeless eternity.  Bulgakov suggests that even in 
the future age ‘the life of creation continues in time, remains a becoming, 
and is accompanied by growth, by ascent from glory to glory “in infinite 
life.”’120  Divine eternity is proper only to God signifying that God cannot be 
wholly encompassed by creation.  The creaturely eternity of the new 
Jerusalem is the beginning of a new relationship with time.  Eternity in the 
future signifies knowing God in the world, eternity in time.  This was the 
foundation upon which God created the world, so that the world would 
know God as its divine foundation.  This was the task given to humanity.  
The fall, however, ‘caused an essential change: it broke man’s direct 
connection with eternity and cast his life wholly into temporality.’121  The 
knowledge of God, the experience of heaven, was cut off for humanity.   
Humanity became an inhabitant of the earthly world alone, measuring itself 
by the elements of the world.  The experience of heaven, or eternity, ‘became 
the achievements of just a few chosen ones, in brief moments of their 
lives.’122  The distance between heaven and earth was overcome by Christ in 
the Pentecost with the union of the two natures, divine and human.  The 
parousia is the culmination of Pentecost with all of humanity now 
experiencing the bridge between heaven and earth.   
The parousia, the coming in glory, is God’s definitive action directed 
toward the sophianization of the world.  In Sophia, God becomes the 
immediate and dominant reality for the world and humanity.  All 
human beings who are resurrected in incorruptibility and glory 
recognize themselves in Christ and, by the Holy Spirit, come to know 
themselves in their sophianicity, in the glory prepared for them in 
Christ before the foundation of the world.123 
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The experience of incorruptibility and deathlessness and direct experience of 
God is the creaturely eternity of the future, when God will be all in all. 
Of course, Bulgakov’s theology is a Christian one.  The new Jerusalem is the 
Church, the Bride of the Lamb.  The Church is a spiritual organism yet also 
one with a historical form.124  As a spiritual body it is unified by the Spirit.  
Bulgakov’s contemporary, Nicholas Afanasiev, retrieves Tertullian’s 
expression: Ecclesia Spiritus Sancti, the Church of the Holy Spirit, to express 
the primary place of the Spirit’s activity.125  In its earthly form it varies in 
form according to its historical time and cannot have a quantitative universal 
form.  In any particular time, the Church is guided by dogma and tradition, 
which can arise in the local church as much as in an ecumenical council.  
Indeed, the tradition of a local church can become universal in time.126  This 
is possible because of the divine nature and activity of the Church brought 
about by the constant presence and work of the Holy Spirit.127  Afanasiev 
proposes that because the Church is one in the Spirit, the Church has an 
internal, catholic universality.  What is done in one church is done in all and 
no church can separate itself from any other.  The character of the local 
church should be ‘absolutely devoid of any isolation and provincialism.’128   
Although part of this emphasis on the local may be attributed to ambivalent 
attitudes towards the Moscow Patriarchate at this time,129 the ontological 
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place which Bulgakov gives to the Church is in keeping with his theological 
outlook.  As John Chryssavgis comments, for an Orthodox person ‘the entire 
world is the Church.’130  Thus, for Bulgakov, the Church is a synonym for 
Sophia.  The divine Sophia is the invisible archetype of the historical form of 
the church as the creaturely Sophia, the body of the world.  As Anthony 
Baker writes, ‘the unity of divinity and humanity will be fully revealed when 
the form of the earthly becomes indistinguishable from the heavenly, when 
the New Jerusalem descends.’131   The new Jerusalem is essentially connected 
to the historical church: ‘[t]he historical concreteness that belongs to 
phenomenal being is not a deficiency but a necessary mode of being, without 
which it would disappear into nothingness.’132  The historical, empirical 
world is necessary for the eschatological world.  The Church is ‘a synergism 
uniting heaven with earth,’133 the vehicle for transformation, whether one 
encounters the Church in one’s historical life or only in the end times.   
A theology of hope? 
We come now to the end of the exposition of Bulgakov’s theology.  His 
sophiology is complex and difficult to summarize.  The uniqueness of his 
sophiology may be better served by comparing and contrasting it with an 
alternative theology, which is the endeavour of the following chapter.   In 
this chapter, we have completed a survey of Bulgakov’s trinitarian theology 
by particularly noting the role of the Holy Spirit.  His defense of the equi-
divinity of the Spirit rests in the essential hypostatic place of the Spirit as one 
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of the three persons in the immanent Trinity, all without origin or cause.  
God in itself cannot be defined by its economic manifestation.  However, 
because of the Spirit’s equi-divinity, she plays an equally important role 
with the Son in the economy of salvation.  Bulgakov then distinguishes the 
economic manifestation of God: the relationship of the Persons to creation.  
The incarnation of the second Person into earthly existence creates a new 
relationship between God and the world.  The early biblical writings are 
about this new relationship.  In the economic Trinity, Bulgakov honours his 
eastern roots by assigning monarchy to the Father, who sends the Son and 
the Spirit (through the Son) to redeem and renew creation.  In John 15:26, 
Jesus speaks of sending the Spirit from the Father: ‘When the Advocate 
comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who 
comes from the Father, he will testify on my behalf.’  Bulgakov emphasizes 
the dyadic work of the Son and Spirit together since Pentecost.  The Spirit 
descends into creation, making Christ’s humanity a reality.  The healing of 
this Divine-humanity is the union between the heavenly and earthly 
prototype of humanity, between the divine and creaturely Sophia.  The 
Spirit forms the bridge between heaven and earth.  The Spirit continues to 
work kenotically, holding back the fullness of the final transfiguration of the 
world, but remains in the world as a sanctifying, inspiring and healing 
presence, helping humanity attain to its highest state. 
Bulgakov not only has a high Christology he has a high anthropology.  The 
end times will result in the complete humanization of the cosmos because 
humanity is ‘the essence, or nature, of the world.’134  There is a strong feeling 
for the goodness of the world and the goodness of God.  The world is 
created good and good will always prevails over evil: ‘sin and sickness 
cannot abolish in man the image of God, which constitutes the foundation of 
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his being. But neither can they abolish beauty in nature.’135  B e a u t y  c a n  
b e c o m e  g o o d  o r  e v i l  i n  h u m a n  f r e e d om.  The life of nature has a dual 
character of light and darkness, an abyss, because of the falling away of 
humanity.  In the inertia of nature, humanity is subject to the elements.   
Christ has overcome the ‘Pan’ of nature but nature, the creaturely Sophia, 
remains unfinished. This transfiguration comes from the Spirit.  Thus, the 
‘power of being and life, which is also the power of beauty, will not cease in 
the world, despite passive and active resistance, inertia, and outright evil.’136   
Despite the evil, Bulgakov maintains that the Spirit cannot be defeated.  The 
Spirit works with the human spirit to reveal the beauty in nature, which is 
the human world.   
God’s love for the world is the cornerstone of our faith and hope in the 
future.  Bulgakov’s theology highlights the unity of the world and this unity 
is expressed in God’s love.  When one suffers, all suffer.  The universality of 
Christ’s sacrifice extends to all people and all things.  Bulgakov, in one of his 
few usages of the word “hope,” speaks of the Christian hope which is 
inalienable from our faith because of its basis in the power of the Holy Spirit 
to gather and resurrect the angelic-human world.137  The Holy Spirit will 
continue her work ‘of healing and restoration as long as that which is 
unhealed and unrestored remains.’138  We trust in the power and the glory 
and the love of the triune God to work with humanity into the future. 
Humanity, created in God’s image, is integral to the world.  Since the 
resurrection and the joining of the divine and human natures, divine-human 
cooperation ensures that the history of the world and humankind is an 
integral part of this process.  One may find little evidence for love in the 
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world but the new commandment of love, love for others beyond one’s self, 
has obstacles set before it in the state of sin that humanity is within.  “Soul 
work,” using the human faculties of sympathy and antipathy, is needed to 
work through the dichotomies of material existence.    In understanding the 
difficulties of others, we hope that empathy may arise.  Love and trust in 
humanity must join with love and faith in God.  For Bulgakov,  
One cannot love God without loving man—first of all, in the God-
man Himself, in His holy humanity, as well as in His personal 
humanity, that is, in the Mother of God; and then in the saints, in His 
Church, the body of Christ and the temple of the Holy Spirit.  Further, 
one cannot love humanity while separating it from the world; one 
cannot love it apart from the world.  To love the saved world is 
therefore to contemplate God’s works, to see the revelation of God in 
the world.139  
It is for this reason that I see Bulgakov’s sophiology as a theology of hope.  
His sophiology gives humanity a part in God and also an essential part in 
the world’s very fabric.  He restores faith in Christian humanism, that 
humanity with the whole of creation is destined for glory.  He gives a reason 
for loving both humanity and the world.  Both are a revelation of God’s 
loving work.  Not only is the commandment to love one another central to 
this theology, but also a love of the world.  The world reveals God.  The 
world is Sophia, part of God’s very being, but also a part of humanity.  It is 
our world and we are responsible for it.  But it is a divine/human world, 
based in goodness.  Humanity cannot commit ontological suicide.  Its very 
substance is divine, and Christ and the Spirit are present as the Comforters 
of worldly existence.  Their transformative power of healing is working in 
the world, helping humanity to fulfil its destiny of revealing the sophianicity 
of the world. 
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Chapter 7   Moltmann and Bulgakov:  
   convergence and divergence 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the theologies of 
Jürgen Moltmann and Sergei Bulgakov.  This will be followed by the 
concluding chapter which places these theologies within my own thesis of 
hope.  My own thesis of hope examines the idea that a belief in meaningful, 
purposeful human existence is necessary for the kind of hope that motivates 
humanity to work creatively and positively on the earth in the present time.  
Meaningful existence for humanity is underscored by meaningful existence 
for the whole cosmos.   This chapter will summarize the theologies of 
Moltmann and Bulgakov in terms of their own particular constructions of 
meaningful existence within a framework of hope.   The three sections 
examine the theologies of Father, Son and Spirit to elicit the similarities and 
differences in Moltmann’s and Bulgakov’s worldviews.  The first section, 
God in creation, compares the theologies of creation examined in Chapter 3 
(on Moltmann) and Chapter 4 (on Bulgakov), and looks particularly at the 
interplay between the divine and human worlds.  The second section on 
christology compares Chapters 2 and 5 and explores Christ’s mission as well 
as theodicy in the face of evil.  The third section compares the respective 
pneumatologies discussed in Chapters 3 and 6 and also examines the 
eschatologies of Chapters 1 and 6, reflecting on hope both now and in the 
future.  The three areas of comparison will be summarized in the conclusion 
of the chapter, entitled convergence and divergence.  This section will also 
interpret the basis of hope for both theologians.  Although Bulgakov does 
not have an explicit theology of hope I will take the elements of his theology   260  
that have been discussed and place them within the framework of hope 
defined above.  This implicit theology of hope will then be compared with 
Moltmann’s explicit theology of hope.  Both theologies of hope have 
important contributions to make towards understanding hope in the world.  
However, my overall conclusion is that the meaning and purpose of 
humanity in Bulgakov’s sophianic system contributes to a worldview that is 
a more effective basis for hope than Moltmann’s theology of hope. 
God in Creation 
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I examined Moltmann’s and Bulgakov’s 
respective theologies of the trinitarian God’s relationship to creation.  One of 
the fundamental theological question concerns the divinity of the created 
world or, in other words, how God is related to creation.   This is of critical 
importance if we are seeking meaning and purpose to humanity’s existence.  
I will now compare the two responses to this question which were examined 
in the chapters above.  There are more similarities than differences in their 
theologies of the immanent God although the differences are significant for 
my thesis of hope.  Moltmann merges the principles of transcendence and 
immanence in understanding love, freedom and necessity as synonymous in 
God.  Bulgakov agrees.  Both theologians examine creation from a trinitarian 
perspective as a united work from the three persons of the Trinity.  Both 
Moltmann and Bulgakov support a cosmic model of heaven and earth.  In 
Moltmann’s theology heaven is God’s dwelling place.  Heaven contains all 
the creative possibilities for the world and earth becomes the created 
potentialities.  In Bulgakov’s model the divine Sophia is heaven, the 
potential of the earth, which is the creaturely Sophia.  Both share an 
understanding of humanity formed in both the image of God and the image 
of the world but there are significant differences in what this means for each 
theologian.  Ultimately, it is the difference in the meaning and purpose of   261  
humanity that divides the theologies of Moltmann and Bulgakov.   
Bulgakov’s humanity is the reason for the world while Moltmann’s humanity 
is just one life form of many, although the most destructive one. 
We begin with the similarities between Moltmann and Bulgakov, which are 
to be found in God’s connection to the godself’s creation.  Both Moltmann 
and Bulgakov see creation as intimately connected to God. Because the 
triune God is understood to be the highest model for human relationships 
they both speculate on the inner structure of God.  In God’s relationship to 
humanity, that is, God’s economic manifestation, God is three persons, 
Father, Son and Spirit.  In Moltmann’s trinitarian creation, the Father is the 
creating origin, the Son is the shaping origin and the Spirit is the life-giving 
origin.1   This is similar to Bulgakov’s theology where the Father is the 
transcendental principle and primal will, the source of being and love.  The 
Son fully reveals the content of the Father, the image of the Father’s glory.  
The Holy Spirit actualizes this content with the Father’s love and is the life of 
the world.2   
Moltmann and Bulgakov are in agreement that creation is an act of God’s 
will from out of God’s nature of love.  Both agree that freedom, love and 
necessity are synonymous in God.  God chooses to share the triune love with 
a creation of God’s making because that is the nature of love.  In a sense God 
cannot help but make creation.  For Moltmann, God ‘cannot but love the 
world eternally.’3 Bulgakov develops this theme extensively: freedom and 
necessity are not oppositions in God.4  God creates from the overflowing 
abundance of love that flows between the three persons of the Trinity.  God’s 
desire to share this love is born from a kind of necessity of the nature of love: 
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love must create more love. Love forms the basis of creation, which 
Bulgakov names Sophia.  
In their efforts to demonstrate God’s connectedness to creation both 
Moltmann and Bulgakov struggle to maintain any sense of separation.   
Moltmann even supposes that the transcendent God is also the in-dwelling 
immanent God.5  The eternal God’s connection to temporal creation is 
explored by both Moltmann and Bulgakov.  Moltmann distinguishes 
between the temporality of creation and its eternal future in terms of God’s 
indwelling.  The difference between the beginning and the end is the 
difference in the presence of God within creation.  In the beginning, God sets 
an independent creation in motion.  Through the resurrection God joins with 
the heaven of creation until the eschaton when God joins fully with creation.  
This “final” eternity is ‘the fullness of time, not timelessness. If the beginning 
of creation is also the beginning of time, then time begins with the future out 
of which the present comes into being.’6  Moltmann does not specify the 
dynamics of the transition from temporal to eternal creation beyond his 
assertion that the eternal God can and will fully unite with God’s creation.  
Creation, both temporal and eternal, is an act of God’s will in two parts. 
Bulgakov is more explicit in his exploration of the relation of time and 
eternity in God and creation.7 Bulgakov rejects the idea of the origin of the 
world in time before which nothing existed.  The temporal, creaturely 
Sophia is formed from the divine Sophia who exists eternally as God’s 
nature.  From Bulgakov’s viewpoint, God eternally creates the earth but this 
creaturely eternity is not the same as God’s eternity:  ‘In God and for God, all 
is eternal, all belongs to eternity.  But, in the life of creation, all is necessarily 
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united with the temporality of creation.’8   Bulgakov refutes the Thomistic 
notion of creation as causality, as a series of causes and effects from a 
beginning point in time.  Rather, time does not have a beginning.  Time 
flows.  Time is a measure of temporality located within eternity.  “In the 
beginning” does not refer to time but to the institution of temporality within 
Sophia.  “The beginning” is an ontological category, not a temporal one.   
Creation is defined thematically, ‘according to the themes of their creative 
realization.’9  Everything in creation has an eternal form in the divine Sophia 
awaiting its fulfilment in the course of time.   The importance of this is that 
the eternal, immutable, omnipotent God is still connected to the eternal in 
creation. Creaturely eternity embraces a temporal mode of becoming and is a 
part of, but also different from, God’s eternity. 
Through the understanding that creation is an act of God’s will both 
theologians attempt to avoid doctrines of emanation.  Moltmann and 
Bulgakov both examine the history of creation theology and particularly 
address the doctrine of non de Deo, sed ex nihilo (not from God, but out of 
nothing).  Moltmann proposes that, since Augustine, Christian theology has 
separated God’s inner life, the divine relationships within the Trinity, from 
God’s outer life, creation.  This has resulted in the understanding that God is 
separate from creation and that creation is therefore everything that God is 
not.  Both Moltmann and Bulgakov see the “nothing” as inside God.  The first 
act of creation is this setting aside of the nothing.  For Moltmann, God makes 
room for creation by ‘withdrawing his presence and his power.’10  This is an 
act of self-limitation and it is a space of non-God, non-being.  From out of 
this self-limitation within God, God wills creation. This space of nothing 
allows for the possibility of becoming yet also contains the possibility of the 
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hell of annihilation through the creature’s own self-limitations or self-
isolations. This separation protects God from a pantheistic connection to 
creation—creation is both “inside” and “outside” of God.  Because 
Moltmann attempts to combine traditional doctrines of decree with 
doctrines of emanation his creation theology is not consistent.  While 
Moltmann sometimes sees creation as the space of non-God he also speaks of 
creation as made from God’s supreme substance.11 
Bulgakov’s theory of the nothing is similar in that the setting aside of a place 
for creation is a limitation on God’s part but the nothing is an essential part 
of God, the divine Sophia.12  God forms creation out of the divine Sophia 
and this is an act of limitation on God’s nature, on Sophia.  Both Moltmann 
and Bulgakov agree that there is no absolute negation of being (nothing 
outside of God) but only a relative negation of being inside  God.  This 
negative space (Bulgakov’s chaos) allows for a process of becoming in time 
and space, a space in which God may be experienced  as absent or non-
existent.  This is a necessary postulate for human freedom.  Bulgakov’s 
sophiology allows a more nuanced separation of the transcendent God from 
creation.  Creation is Sophia, but Sophia is formed from God’s nature.  The 
immanence of God within creation is both natural (sophian) and personal 
(humanity formed in the image of God).  The mission of Christ to heal the 
damaged nature of the world in time also takes God’s immanence to a new 
level.13   
The result of these theologies of creation is that everything is in God while, 
at the same time, God is greater than the totality of creation.  As Aidan 
Nichols suggests, this is the meaning of the Absolute God: ‘the Absolute, of 
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its very nature, must constitute the reality of everything else that is.’14  This 
is a panentheistic stance: the world is in God, God is God of this world, and 
God is with us and for us.  The question may be asked, does there need to be 
a separation between God and the world?  One argument against pantheism, 
where God is the totality of being, is that there can be no overriding, 
omnipotent being in control.  This results in a Gaia-like pantheism where the 
mechanisms for world maintenance and evolution are part of the fabric of 
the cosmos.  God is effectively changed by whatever is happening in the 
cosmos.  Panentheism, the belief that God’s being penetrates the world, has a 
similar understanding while giving a transcendent, immutable God the 
power to influence world events.   Moltmann and Bulgakov do not challenge 
the Christian theology of the past two thousand years which maintains 
God’s separation at some level from creation and both theologians support a 
notion of panentheism.  The definition of Absolute perhaps reaches the 
limits of human language, however, do we really need to protect God from 
the world?  Perhaps the Absolute not only constitutes the reality of all that 
is, this experience of God may be all that is.  Moltmann seems to tread this 
path when he says that the God who is transcendent in relation to the world 
and the God who is immanent in the world ‘are one and the same God.’15   
Transcendence is a relative term:  ‘our understanding of transcendence is 
always dependent on our experience of some reality as immanence…There 
is no dichotomy between immanence and transcendence.  There is only a 
distinction and a relationship in the experience of “the boundary.”’16  In any 
case it is in the realms of theory.  From a human point of view, as Moltmann 
points out, the economic manifestation of God is all that really need concern 
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us and in this regard God is with us and manifests a particular relationship 
with the cosmos.   
Moltmann’s and Bulgakov’s theologies of creation have much in common. 
They both present a vista of creation as an act of the triune God’s love with 
God immanent in the world, either dwelling in heaven (Moltmann) or 
connected through a shared sophian nature (Bulgakov).  The second section 
in both chapters on God in creation examined God’s relationship to the 
godself’s human creation.  Both understand humanity as made in the image 
of God and the image of nature yet what this means differs for each 
theologian.  Moltmann uses the idea of social analogy while Bulgakov uses 
the concept of microcosm. 
Moltmann offers several suggestions of what it means for humanity to be 
made in the image of God.17  As God’s image, humanity corresponds to God 
in God’s essence, which is love.  This element in creation is created to 
recognize God as Creator and creation as God’s creation.  Humanity is 
created to love God.  Humanity learns to love God by recognizing God’s 
deeds in the world, that is, through Christ’s sacrifice and the Spirit’s 
pervasive presence in creation.  Humanity represents God on earth.   
Humanity learns to love by mirroring the perfect relationality of the triune 
God.  Likeness to God can only be lived in community, and humanity aims 
to mirror the perfect trinitarian model of perichoresis.  More specifically, we 
aim to follow the Spirit’s trinitarian role.  The Spirit at once unifies yet points 
away from herself towards the Son and the Father.18  The Spirit is the 
principle of both immanence and self-differentiation.  The Spirit’s work in 
creation is in an evolution towards complexity.  The greatest complexity 
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resides within humanity in its own evolution through both self-
transcendence (immanence) and self-preservation (self-differentiation).   The 
goal is a new spiritual revelation of creation.  Spirit is not divided from the 
world, it unifies the world.  Spirit corresponds with the whole unified 
structure of body and soul.  According to Moltmann, the ecological crisis in 
the world today is due to alienation of the human being from the physical 
world, beginning with the human being’s own body.  Humanity has lost 
sight of the divine in creation, of the Spirit in nature and, therefore, body.   
Moltmann continues proposing that conscious knowledge of God is the 
mandate for humanity.  This is possible because human beings are both 
created in the image of God (imago Dei) and in the image of the world (imago 
mundi).  The natural knowledge of God is experienced directly through the 
testimony of the human conscience and indirectly by observing the outer 
world.  Because the Spirit is in everything, everything has meaning and 
purpose.  A reflection of the paradisal knowledge of God exists in the world, 
which also reflects the glory t h a t  i s  t o  c o m e .   I t  i s  this  world which ‘is 
destined to be revealed in its eternal transfiguration.’19  For Moltmann, 
however,  theological naturalis ‘confers wisdom, but it does not confer 
salvation or blessedness.’20  This comes solely from the revelation of God in 
Jesus Christ through scripture.  The knowledge of God in the world is a 
correlation between an understanding of the outer and the inner, between 
understanding the world and self-understanding, including revelation.   
Using the principles of the Gestalt Moltmann proposes that humanity in the 
image of God is composed of the total pattern of the whole lived life, 
including the interaction of body and soul, and inner and outer experiences.   
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Bulgakov’s anthropology is similar to Moltmann’s yet more detailed with 
regard to imago Dei and imago mundi in humankind.  Humanity is formed in 
the image of God in its hypostatic “I” and in its sophianic nature.  Humanity 
is unique within creation because it is a special, hypostatic or personal 
principle within creation.  The human person is spirit, body and soul.  The 
spirit is the divine spark from God, the personal aspect of each person.  Body 
and soul together form the nature of each person, collectively called the 
creaturely Sophia.   Just as God is a being of hypostatic persons with a 
nature (the divine Sophia), so, too, the human being is a hypostatic being 
with its own nature, the creaturely Sophia.  Humanity moves towards a 
perfect, transparent relationship between hypostasis and nature, thus 
mirroring the divine relationship of love, also exemplified by the 
relationship of God to Sophia.  For this purpose the whole of creation, the 
creaturely Sophia, is given to humanity as nature.  Bulgakov sees humanity 
as the pinnacle of creation created to “keep” the earth, that is, to join fully 
and consciously with nature.   Collectively humanity is Adam and the entire 
sum of each person’s experiences contributes to the whole Adam.   
Furthermore, humanity is given freedom to know God as the basis of all 
existence by learning to recognize the divine in all of creation through its 
conscious spirit (I or ego).  This is Bulgakov’s picture of ideal creation prior 
to the Fall.  The break between spirit and nature began with the Fall and it is 
here that human history in its current material manifestation has its 
beginnings.  Humanity is helped in its task by the hypostatic work of Christ 
and the Holy Spirit since the Pentecost, as we will review in the following 
sections. 
Humanity is made in the image of both God and the world in the theologies 
of Moltmann and Bulgakov.  Humanity formed in the image of God is a 
social analogy for Moltmann: humanity learns to love by mirroring the 
trinitarian relationship of love.  Humanity formed in the image of God is a   269  
principle of personhood for Bulgakov.  Humanity receives its ego from God.  
Moltmann’s human spirit as the principle of self-differentiation may be a 
similar principle.  However, humanity formed in the image of the world has 
a very different meaning for both.  Both propose that a natural knowledge of 
God can be found in the world.  This is a reflection of the Spirit in creation 
for Moltmann.   In Bulgakov’s thought the outer world is not separate from 
the inner world of the human spirit.21  They are two parts of a whole. 
Moltmann certainly enjoins humanity to act responsibly towards the earth 
but he also sees humanity as one more life form and he can even envisage a 
time when humanity has disappeared from the planet altogether.22  
Moltmann experienced a radical transformation when he began his theology 
of creation in the 1980’s.  As we observed in Chapter 3, the radical 
distinction in Moltmann’s theology between God and humanity, or God and 
the world, began to blur.  The world was no longer condemned to pass away 
as the very antithesis of divinity.  The world now needed saving.   
Humanity’s alienation from the world was now seen in a negative light.   
Indeed, the way towards understanding was from a contextual viewpoint.  
Better understanding was to be found in assessing relationships, humanity 
within its environment.  The divine model given to us for this purpose was 
the trinitarian model of perichoresis.  Threeness in mutual relationship 
moves beyond the egotism of the individual or the couple.   Bulgakov shares 
a similar understanding of the trinitarian model of perichoretic love and the 
importance of threeness in God.  However, humanity made in the image of  
God and the image of the world is a reflection of the relationship structure of 
the world.  Humanity mirrors God’s relationship to Sophia.  Humanity is the 
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meaning of the world and its task is to form perfect relationship with its own 
sophian nature. 
Christology: Theodicy in the Face of Evil  
The theologies of creation discussed above share a sense of the world’s 
importance for God.  They also share a trinitarian perspective of God’s 
importance for humanity as a divine model of perichoretic love.  In chapters 
2 and 5 of the thesis I examined the respective christologies of Moltmann 
and Bulgakov.  Humanity is formed in the image of God and the world but 
both theologians also explore what it means for humanity to be formed in 
the image of Christ, with very different outcomes.  Moltmann holds to his 
social analogy and considers the particularity of the life of Jesus with human 
persons enjoined to follow Jesus’ example of a life challenging injustice.     
Moltmann’s focus on the crucifixion addresses the issue of theodicy and the 
presence of evil and suffering in the world.  The Father and the Spirit suffer 
with Christ.  The resurrection is an eschatological victory over suffering and 
death and a sign of God’s promise for the future and final victory.  God 
identifies with the godforsaken by raising Jesus and the model of Christian 
praxis is also to identify with the godless and forsaken.  The church must be 
a political model of resistance to the alienation and oppression in the world.  
In Bulgakov’s model Christ is the divine prototype of the human being.  A 
human misunderstanding of freedom creates the Fall resulting in a great 
imbalance between humanity and its nature.  The chaos of creation becomes 
the shadow of evil and death enters the world.  Humanity becomes alienated 
from its nature and weighed down by matter.  However, the original 
aptitude between the divine nature and human nature makes it possible for 
the Son of God to incarnate and become the Son of Man.  The incarnation is 
necessary to redeem humanity’s prototype so that humanity continues its 
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Moltmann is unique in combining theologies of eschatology and the cross.  
In Moltmann’s thought the cross is the centre of all Christian theology.  It is a 
defining point in God’s trinitarian history and it is an act of God.  Moltmann 
suggests that if God is love then God must also be able to suffer.  The 
suffering of Christ is matched by the suffering of the Father.  In a very 
personal trinitarian picture, God the grieving Father abandons his Son to a 
death on the cross.  Christ identified with the godless and was abandoned on 
the cross.  However, God is also shown to champion the godless because he 
resurrected Jesus.  From out of the Father’s grief and his love for his Son 
arises a new future and life in the Spirit.  Thus, the crucifixion is a trinitarian 
event.  Moltmann offers a challenge to the credal doctrine of two separate 
natures in Christ.  He proposes we must give up the distinction between 
God in godself and God for us so that ‘the nature of God would have to be 
the human history of Christ and not a divine ‘nature’ separate from 
[humanity].’23  Through Christ, God takes all the evil and suffering in the 
world and transforms it into God’s self.  John Jaeger, in his analysis of 
Moltmann’s theology, states that ‘by bringing nothingness into [God’s] own 
being and history, God began a process of eliminating all transitoriness and 
nothingness.’24  Through God’s redemptive love all of creation is integrated 
into the very being of God and will be completely redeemed in the end 
times.   
Bulgakov maintains that the crucifixion is a trinitarian event and an event of 
co-humanity.  He speaks of the co-crucifixion of the Father, Son and Spirit 
and the mutual suffering of love.25  Christ is also Divine-humanity, the 
prototype of humanity.  It is this prototype that Christ acts to redeem in the 
economy of salvation through the crucifixion and resurrection, culminating 
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in Pentecost.  Bulgakov’s emphasis is on a cosmic perspective of divine-
humanity.  Sin is a hereditary illness which can only be healed through 
Christ’s deed on earth.  Bulgakov also wrestles with the credal affirmation of 
Christ in two natures.  In his comprehensive review of patristic theology26  
Bulgakov suggests that although the parameters for debate on the 
relationship between the divine and human worlds were set in the 
Chalcedonian Creed, the need for further theological debate was (and 
continues to be) indispensable.  Bulgakov’s christology offers his own 
theologoumenon on what it means for Christ to be both divine and human.  
What is wholly human is also wholly divine in that divine-humanity is an 
essential part of God.   The divine-humanity within God is the Logos, the 
eternally begotten Son, who is the prototype of all humanity, of the meta-
empirical Adam.  The difference between the divine nature and the human 
nature lies in the difference between the divine and the creaturely Sophia.  
As we have noted above, the properties of time and space within the 
creaturely eternity are different from God’s eternity.  The divine Sophia is 
the eternal, unchanging nature of God whereas the creaturely Sophia is 
immersed in becoming.   
The different interpretations of Christ’s work affect its meaning for human 
salvation.  In Moltmann’s theology the crucifixion is not salvific.  It is 
understood as representative suffering based on grace rather than a 
sacrificial expiation of sins.  Moltmann proposes that God’s abandonment of 
Christ, resulting in the forsakenness of Jesus, arouses a love which cannot be 
indifferent.  We follow Christ in both his kenosis and his suffering.  The love 
that comes from the identification with Christ’s suffering leads humanity 
beyond ideas of personal salvation towards active participation in concrete 
political and social conflicts.  When a person follows Christ’s example of 
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kenosis it leads to encounters with resistance, opposition and contradiction.  
Christ’s deed then does not have a salvific purpose.  Salvation is a function 
of the eschaton. 
Bulgakov conforms to a more traditional interpretation of Christ’s deed as a 
sacrificial expiation of sin.  Humanity’s mythic choice of the path of good 
and  evil resulted in a tremendous imbalance between humanity and its 
sophian nature.  Instead of humanity working with its nature it was 
overpowered by the chaotic element within nature.  Sin became a hereditary 
illness in the whole of creation.  The substance of the world became 
impenetrable to spirit.  The divinity of the world was hidden from 
humanity.  Consequently, Christ’s ministry on earth was necessary to restore 
the damaged nature of the creaturely Sophia and it restored the possibility of 
humanity also being in right relationship with its nature.  This was not an act 
of God’s imposition.  Christ’s ability to assume “flesh” has, as we have noted 
above, its ontological prerequisite in the original conformity of the divine 
and human natures.  In his assumption of the flesh Christ qualitatively takes 
on the full weight of the sins of the world.27  Its purpose is not to remove 
human freedom but to restore the possibility of humanity coming into right 
relationship with its nature.  This is the salvific purpose of the events of 
Golgotha: humanity can now continue with its original goal—to reveal the 
world’s sophianicity, its source in God’s love, in freedom.  For this reason, 
the Christ event is a turning point in time.   
Moltmann and Bulgakov approach the issue of theodicy and the presence of 
evil in the world from different standpoints.  Moltmann views the cross, like 
the anomaly of evil in the world, as a contradiction: he who is righteous 
suffers an unrighteous death.  This dialectic principle of knowledge is the 
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only way to answer theodicy and evil in the world—that there is, in fact, no 
answer.  Evil has come into the world through humanity but Moltmann does 
not excuse it nor explain why there is so much pain and evil needing 
transformation.  Moltmann avoids any defence of evil: ‘we cannot go beyond 
the fact of evil, for which no reason can be given.’28  He rejects any 
philosophy that proposes evil as necessary for the sake of good.  Yet 
Moltmann certainly takes the effects of evil seriously.  Indeed, the scales are 
weighted in favour of evil.  Moltmann is against the ‘tendency for the 
resurrection to take supremacy over the cross, for the exaltation to acquire 
ascendency over the humiliation, and for the joy of God to have more weight 
than his pain.’29  Despite his eschatological certainty, Moltmann proposes 
‘steadfast resistance against evil in its various forms.’30  This may have no 
transformative effect but it is part of the Christian path of following Christ. 
Because human history with its evil excesses is incomprehensible Moltmann 
centres his theology from a God perspective.  In a new, trinitarian act God 
joins with creation because of the evil in the world.  The cross is the centre of 
all theology because God joins with creation and takes upon godself all the 
evil and suffering in the world, transforming it into God’s own history. The 
parousia is God’s answer to the history of the world: God will transform the 
world.  There will be an eschatological victory over all forms of evil.   
Bulgakov’s answer to theodicy and the evil in the world resides with both 
his theology of creation and the Fall and his understanding of human free 
will.31  In Bulgakov’s theology of creation the world was created “good.”  
The nothing from which creation is formed is originally a state of neutral 
chaos.  This is the “not-yet” as humanity is given temporal existence to move 
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forward in time and bring the chaos of nature into conformity with spirit.  
The force of nonbeing becomes dominant in the world and becomes a sheer 
force of materiality, impenetrable to the spirit.  Evil itself is a ‘phantom of 
nonbeing.’32  Through the incarnation Christ overcomes the power of the 
original Adamic sin.  This returns to humanity the possibility of conformity, 
of transparency in spirit and nature, of right relationship.  Human beings 
remain temporal beings of free will and continue a process in time towards 
right relationship.  This freedom means that human beings must make their 
own choices and suffer the consequences of those decisions.   A historical 
process is still taking place within which humanity works towards its goal.  
Individual sin continues to have a quantitative effect on the world.  The goal 
for humanity is to learn that true freedom is divine-human cooperation.   
Human beings are not greater than God.  The world is divinely ordered and 
humanity learns to creatively work in the world out of love for the world.  
Humanity is the agency of transformation working with Christ and the 
Spirit to reflect all the modes of God’s love in creation.  Because of the 
world’s foundation of goodness the good will prevail over evil.   
Michael Meerson suggests that for both Moltmann and Bulgakov, ‘the image 
of God dying on the cross for humanity’s sake is the response of the God of 
love to the suffering in the world…’33  The fundamental difference between 
the theologies of Bulgakov and Moltmann lies in the salvific role of the 
crucifixion.  The crucifixion is not salvific in Moltmann’s theology because 
he does not have a theology of the theosis of human nature in time.  In 
Bulgakov’s model, while not a strict process theology, humanity is a part of a 
gradual theosis in time.  God and humanity are co-workers in this 
transformative process.  Moltmann, on the other hand, gives God full power 
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to overcome evil in the parousia.  History is God’s history.  It begins with the 
resurrection of Christ which creates the possibility for the eschatological 
kingdom of God.  Christ is a hidden presence in the world until God’s 
transformation of all of creation in the end times from its lower state to a 
future form of glory.  Human history is transitory and we must hope in a 
God who ‘snatches all that is transitory and fragmentary into his loving 
fullness in order to put right what has never achieved its rights.’34  
Meanwhile, human history is given the task of active resistance to evil until 
that time.  There is the necessity to struggle for freedom but human actions 
do not have any transformative effect in the world.  Human history does not 
contribute to the transformation of the world in the eschaton.   
The Holy Spirit and Eschatology  
In this final section a review of the trinitarian worldviews of Moltmann and 
Bulgakov is completed by a comparison of their pneumatologies together 
with eschatological hope.  Both pneumatologies are important for the 
emphasis given to the work of the Spirit both now and in the future.   
Awareness of the Spirit’s action will be seen to be an important adjunct to 
hope both now and in the future.  In the trinitarian God, however, 
understanding the working of the Spirit has always been difficult and 
pneumatology has not been given the theological weight it deserves.  Both 
Moltmann and Bulgakov participate in a revived interest in the Spirit.  We 
have addressed how the Spirit works as the conduit of love in the Trinity.  
Now we examine how these two theologians understand the Spirit’s 
connection with creation in time.  This will include the “face” of the Spirit, 
how the Spirit works with Christ in creation, and how the Spirit informs the 
human spirit.  The following comparison is taken from the pneumatologies 
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outlined in Chapters 3 and 6 of the thesis with some crossover from Chapter 
4 on Bulgakov’s theology of creation. 
The concept of the Spirit as a person of the Trinity is a difficult one to 
visualize because the Spirit is “faceless.”  The biblical images associated with 
the Spirit are non-human: fire, breath, the dove.  And yet according to both 
Moltmann and Bulgakov, relationality is the basis of existence.  In 
Bulgakov’s model the Spirit is the basis of existence and for Moltmann the 
Spirit is in all things.  It is therefore important to have some feel for the Spirit, 
some sense of our human connection to the Spirit, and relationality is easier 
if one has a picture of what one is relating to.  Bulgakov postulates that the 
face of the Spirit may be revealed to us in the end times.  In addition, both 
theologians develop a theology of the Spirit as mother.  For Bulgakov, the 
Father calls creation into being and the Spirit answers the call by giving 
reality to the world, by giving the world a form and being.  The Spirit is 
Mother.35  The Spirit ‘manifests its maternal character in the revelation of 
Sophia during the creation of the world: it manifests itself as the maternal 
womb in which the forms of this world are conceived.’36  The Spirit as 
Mother joins the Father of creation to birth the world.   Moltmann’s use of 
the feminine Shekinah from the Hebrew Bible as Holy Spirit supports the 
understanding of early Christian communities which spoke of the Spirit of 
God as mother. 
Creation itself is pictured in images of a mother giving birth.  Moltmann sees 
creation as a creative letting-be, to be seen more in motherly than fatherly 
categories.  For Bulgakov, the Spirit as “womb” points to an aspect that is 
closely connected to spirit’s relationship to matter.  The antithesis between 
body and spirit is discarded by both theologians.  In Bulgakov’s thought, 
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spirituality forms a body for itself and, in turn, spirit is given form by 
corporeality.  We also noted that spirit ‘is the union of an act of self-
awareness, conscious independent existence, with the “nature” of which it is 
conscious.’37  It is the Spirit who forms the body of the world, the creaturely 
Sophia, out of the divine Sophia, God’s nature.  This is Spirit-Sophia: the 
union of spirit and body.  This body is not to be thought of as ‘flesh that 
suppresses and shuts off the life of the spirit.’38  Rather, the perfect body 
consists of a substance that is ‘the image and self-revelation of the spirit,’39 a 
spiritual/substantial body.  This same body is the foundation of the world. 
Both theologians identify the human spirit with the Holy Spirit.  In 
Bulgakov’s model of divine-human cooperation the Holy Spirit also works 
with humanity to prepare the world for its future glory through both 
inspiration and sanctification.  The Spirit joins fully with the world at 
Pentecost but, in a different form of kenosis to Christ, “holds back” the full 
power of glorification until the end times.   In Bulgakov’s theology, the dyad 
of Christ and Spirit working inseparably in creation since the Pentecost is 
unique.  The Spirit’s equal importance with Christ is a fundamental basis of 
Bulgakov’s hope both now and for the future.  The Spirit is linked 
fundamentally to the world in its creation as the power of reality. The Holy 
Spirit actualizes the content of the world, the divine prototypes, with and 
through the Father’s love.  The whole of creation has this spiritual, sophianic 
basis.  This is the sanctified cosmos, set in the process of becoming fully 
sanctified through the actions of both God and humanity in divine-human 
cooperation.  The human spirit is a special instance of creation, the “divine 
spark” of God.  Inspiration from the Holy Spirit is possible because of 
perichoresis between the divine Spirit and the human spirit.   
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Moltmann often uses Spirit and spirit interchangeably.40  He describes the 
possibility of theosis in the eschaton is because of the identification between 
Spirit and the human spirit.  In addition, Moltmann understands the Spirit 
as the life-giving origin of the world.  Because the Spirit is in everything, 
everything has meaning and a purpose.  Here, Moltmann reclaims the body 
that he denied in his early theology. He speaks of a progressive revelation of 
the Spirit.  As we noted above, humanity is made in the image of God and in 
the image of world.  There is a natural knowledge of God available through 
conscience and through observing the outer world, a reflection of the 
paradisal world to come.  Spiritual growth for humanity is possible through 
the trials of existence.  With faith and hope, we offer active resistance and 
opposition to the evils of the world.  The movement of the human spirit is 
‘onwards—not upwards.’41  We cannot transform present reality but we 
keep moving forward towards the new reality promised to us.  There is no 
principle of gradual theosis, of transformation of substance, in Moltmann’s 
theology.  For humanity there is only the possibility of spiritual growth.   
Indeed, God ‘stands opposed to (entgegen-steht) the human spirit’42 so that 
we may have the freedom to choose obedience.  Just as Jesus obeyed his 
Father, so we choose to obey God.  This obedience opens the possibility for 
transformation at a spiritual level.  We learn that all of life’s experiences 
contribute to the Gestalt, the total pattern of the whole lived life, the 
interaction of body and soul, inner and outer experiences.  Acceptance of the 
whole life, with all of its suffering and joy, is one of the mainstays for 
Moltmann’s hope.  Suffering makes us stronger so that the human spirit can 
move forward. 
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In his later theology Moltmann appears to move closer to a theology of 
wholeness.  Transformation is observable in the physical environment.  The 
idea that suffering makes us stronger comes directly from nature, the idea of 
the “survival of the fittest.” Systems become stronger through struggle and 
natural selection.  Following these principles simpler systems become more 
complex. Moltmann suggests there is an evolution towards complexity with 
the greatest complexity found in humanity.  Yet Moltmann, like Bulgakov, 
proposes that we must start from the whole.  The holistic and perichoretic 
principles in creation are because of the Spirit.  Beyond humanity the Spirit 
is the highest model of complexity and is therefore the model for humanity 
and the world.  The goal for creation is a new revelation.  The Spirit unifies 
but also points away from herself towards the Son and the Father.   
Humanity works through the principles of self-transcendence and self-
preservation towards this new revelation.   
Despite the possibility of spiritual growth, Moltmann sees any human 
transformation in the physical outer environment as a negative intervention.  
Humanity’s personal growth should not be at the expense of the 
environment.  Non-intervention in nature is preferable, learning to be “at 
rest” instead of busy “doing.”  The theological basis for this in Moltmann’s 
theology is the principle of the sabbath.  The sabbath is the pinnacle of 
creation because it is the day of God’s rest.  Humanity’s destructive 
relationship to the environment is due to the alienation of the body.  We 
have lost sight of the Spirit in nature and body, and so our actions in the 
world can only be detrimental.  Moltmann has no equivalent notion to 
Bulgakov’s economy of labour where humanity works positively and 
creatively to transform the physical world.  In Moltmann’s thought the self-
transformation of the natural environment is “natural” and therefore good.  
Within this context, humanity can only help the environment by refraining 
from any interference with nature’s own processes of natural selection.   281  
The advantage of Bulgakov’s theological enterprise is that it is a 
comprehensive, integrated system.  This means that humanity has a 
structural place in creation.  Humanity’s deeds and actions, both positive 
and negative, affect the whole of creation.  The world is the creaturely 
Sophia, the creaturely nature of the human being.  Humanity has been 
created, in Bulgakov’s system, to work with its creaturely nature towards the 
ideal of relationship—God’s relationship to Sophia.  The human being is a 
microcosm of God’s macrocosm.  Humanity has been gifted with creativity 
(limited only by its creaturely nature) and is given the ability to self-posit.  
The human “I” can find itself through its nature, through its creaturely 
world.  This world is a self-contained system, composed of an ever-changing 
balance of chaos and order.  Humanity in its own self-determination tipped 
the scales in favour of chaos with the Fall.  An intervention by God through 
Christ’s incarnation, death and resurrection was necessary to overcome the 
resultant powers of death within the human prototype.  Yet Bulgakov even 
hesitates to name this action as “intervention.”  Rather, Christ’s incarnation 
was pre-ordained or at the very least part of a plan for a possible eventuality.   
Bulgakov’s humanity is instrumental in creating order out of chaos, in 
bringing clarity to the unconsciousness of the creaturely Sophia. The 
creaturely Sophia is soul and flesh, the materiality of existence.  Humanity 
brings the consciousness of its “I,” its spirit, to Sophia.  This is the human 
task: a ‘stable equilibrium between spirit and flesh can only be found by man 
himself, by his actuality.’43  Within the cosmos, humanity is part of a great 
historical and cosmological timeline.   Yet the cosmos also lies within a 
greater system yet—that of the triune God.  God in both person and nature 
joins with creation.  Since the Pentecost, Christ and the Spirit work with the 
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human spirit towards a “fullness in time” when all will be in Christ in full 
transparency of spirit.  All of Bulgakov’s work is filled with this principle of 
divine-human cooperation.  Humanity may be self-determining but it is also 
given the perfect world with which to achieve proper self-determination.  
God may suffer with the world, but God also shares the love and joy of 
existence with the world also.  The end times are a part of this twofold 
cooperation, a combination of God’s action and a culmination of the ripe 
fruits of human creative effort.  The church as the “bride of the lamb” is part 
of this cosmic picture, working with both physical and spiritual modes of 
transformation in the eucharist and prayer.  Because God is with us and for 
us Bulgakov maintains a positive vision of both the present and the future.  
Hope is formed by faith in God’s biblical word to us and by the experiences 
of material existence.  We have the joys and sorrows of existence yet we have 
existence itself, the creaturely Sophia who is a veil of the Divine Sophia.  
Behind the veil of material existence we may experience the beauty and 
reality of divinity.  The world is a God-given source of our joys and of our 
sorrows.  Our faith is at the same time our hope. 
Both Moltmann and Bulgakov have worked extensively on the Trinity.  Both 
theologians have turned to the Spirit after completing books on christology.  
The Spirit is understood to complement the work of Christ in salvation 
history.  On the one hand, Moltmann’s turn to the Spirit participates in the 
general renewal of theological interest in pneumatology.  He challenges the 
body/spirit dichotomy with a concept of an inspirited cosmos, grounded in 
an ecological concept of the cosmos.   The Spirit works with the human spirit 
at the frontier of existence, helping humanity shoulder the cross of Christ 
and engage with the injustices of the present time.  But ultimately, our hope 
remains with God.  On the other hand, Bulgakov posits a dyad of Christ and 
the Spirit working conjointly with humanity to achieve humanity’s self-
determination, that is, to find its proper relationship to Sophia.  There is a   283  
progressive revelation and spiritualization of the cosmos until the end times 
in Bulgakov’s theology.  Consequently, hope is based in God’s promise to 
us, but also in the positive basis of creation.  Humanity was part of God’s 
good creation and we may hope that humanity is worthy to be a part of 
God’s progressive revelation.  Our hope is with God and humanity. 
Convergence and Divergence 
Many similarities and some differences between the theologies of Moltmann 
and Bulgakov have already been noted in the above three sections.  This 
concluding section will draw together some of these points and give a 
summary of convergence and divergence between these two worldviews.  
More particularly this summary will be situated within the definition of 
hope of this thesis.  By using the framework of meaningful and purposeful 
human existence I will determine that an implicit theology of hope can be 
found in Bulgakov’s work.  Moreover, this implicit theology of hope has a 
different basis of meaning than Moltmann’s explicit theology of hope.  In the 
conclusion of the final chapter the implications of this difference for a 
theology of hope relevant for the 21st century will be discussed. 
The many convergences between these two theologians from east and west 
are perhaps surprising but several reasons may be suggested for the 
concurrences. Bulgakov appears to me to be a man ahead of his times and, 
indeed, his work is now receiving a burgeoning of interest.  It testifies to a 
kind of Christian universality in his work that it has sparked interest among 
people from east and west alike.  Bulgakov also promoted ecumenism and 
was influenced by western philosophical ideas.44  Moltmann, on the other 
hand, is a man of his times, writing about hope in the 60’s, the politics of 
suffering in the 70’s and ecology in the 80’s.  Indeed, it is Moltmann’s 
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intention to be recognized as a committed man of his day and to dialogue 
with the issues of the times.45  Because Bulgakov appears to anticipate these 
times, points of intersection are not difficult to find, particularly in both 
ecological theologies of creation.  Added to this, Moltmann’s tendency to 
offer several theologies on any one theme means that some of his ideas are 
bound to find points of intersection with disparate theological views. 
Both Moltmann and Bulgakov describe God by perichoresis as the mutual, 
non-hierarchical community of the three persons.  God’s relationship of love 
is the highest model for humanity.  Indeed, love is the basis of creation.   
Because of love, God’s freedom and necessity are the same.  God’s 
immanence in creation is central to both theologians.  Bulgakov discusses 
this in more detail, describing this immanence in both hypostatic and 
sophianic formula.  Christ and the Holy Spirit work hypostatically within 
the created world since the Pentecost to aid human self-determination.   
God’s own nature, the divine Sophia forms the basis of creation, and so the 
creaturely Sophia (and therefore humanity) is also an aspect of divine 
immanence.  In contrast, Moltmann seems to discard any sense of separation 
between God and creation at all: ‘God has made (godself) in need of 
redemption through human beings,’46 meaning that God has joined fully 
with creation.  The Spirit is the medium for the rebirth of the cosmos in the 
end times.   
Both Moltmann and Bulgakov have been accused of saying too much about 
God.  Bulgakov’s kataphatic theology goes against the more apophatic 
tendencies of Orthodox theology.  Bulgakov defends his position: theology 
can talk about God because God is a transcendent and an immanent being.  
In the revelation of this immanence we know that the divine and human 
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natures can coexist in Jesus Christ, therefore the divine nature is not foreign 
to us.  Moltmann also defends his positive stance against his critics but says 
his theology should always be understood as a quest rather than dogmatic 
utterance.  Moltmann prefers the idea of dialogue and “suggestion.”47   
Nevertheless for both theologians we can speak about God because there is a 
natural knowledge of God to be perceived in the natural world. ‘The frame of 
reference for the perceivable world is its fundamental knowability. To put it in 
biblical terms: there is a divine wisdom in all things.’48  This wisdom is the 
structure of the world determined by the Logos.  Thus, ‘every scientific 
discovery discovers something of this wise rationality.’49 But it is through 
the fear and love of God that we respect all living things, and learn the 
difference between knowledge and wisdom.  Knowledge has the power of 
destructiveness whereas wisdom always has reverence for life. 
Despite Moltmann’s circumscriptions the problem of the unequal emphasis 
on God’s view remains in his theology.  In The Coming of God, in the section 
entitled “Interactions between divine and human activity,” he examines 
three aspects of this activity all from God’s point of view.50  God allows the 
world to affect God’s self through self-restriction and a process of trinitarian 
glorification.  Moltmann does not discuss the nature of divine-human 
collaboration.  In fact we cannot depend on the acts of human beings in the 
process of sanctification and glorification at all.  Only ‘trust in the indwelling 
Shekinah of the holy God himself, and its wanderings with us, offers a well-
founded hope for the final redemption of God and of human beings by 
God.’51  W h i l e  i t  i s  l e g i t i m a t e  t o  h a v e  little faith or hope in humanity 
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Moltmann’s theocentric proclamations can easily sound didactic and 
assured.  Turn to almost any page in any of Moltmann’s extensive works 
and God, or a person of the Trinity, will figure as the subject of a sentence. 
“God has revealed…” “God’s glory is the goal…” “The Spirit fills 
creation…” “God suffers…” and so on.  To make such statements is the 
nature of systematic theology; nevertheless, a balance is needed between 
such positive assertions and qualifying ones. 
A similar criticism has been made about Bulgakov with his kataphatic 
theology.  Vladimir Lossky, for example, is appalled by the ‘holy audacity'52 
of Bulgakov's treatment of the divine Mystery.  Although both theologians 
have much to say about God Bulgakov balances this tendency with his 
extensive writing on humanity and the world.  The main divergence 
between Bulgakov and Moltmann is in their understanding of humanity’s 
place in creation and of what humanity means for God.  The basis for this 
begins with their interpretations of imago Christi.  As we have noted, 
Bulgakov sees Christ as the prototype of humanity.  This cosmic perspective 
of divine-humanity means that humanity is a very part of God.  God creates 
humanity out of God’s own nature, Sophia, giving humanity hypostatic 
being following the prototype of Christ.  Creation is a twofold structure of 
humanity with its nature, the creaturely Sophia.  Over the aeons of history 
humanity works to illuminate and reveal nature so that, “as it is in heaven 
(the ideal prototypes) so also on the earth.”  Bulgakov’s anthropocentric 
picture places humanity at the forefront of change, co-workers with Christ 
and the Spirit.  This is Bulgakov’s interpretation of theosis, the deification of 
the cosmos as a process of divine-human cooperation. 
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In Moltmann’s own examination of Eastern Orthodox theology he finds a 
docetic element in this process of the deification of the cosmos.  He writes, 
‘Orthodox theology has never made as rigorous a distinction between 
person and nature as has modern Western theology.’53  H e  q u o t e s  D .  
Staniloae (Orthodoxe Dogmatik I, 294):  “According to our belief, every human 
person is in a certain sense a hypostasis of the whole of cosmic nature, 
though of course always in close association with other created beings.”54   
The positive aspect of this for Moltmann is that because of the hypostatic 
bond between person and nature then ‘if the person is redeemed, 
transfigured and deified, nature is redeemed, transfigured and deified too.’55  
However Moltmann believes that Orthodox theology needed to take the 
further step and define the whole cosmos as imago Dei, God’s image.  Then 
to be in the image of God is ‘not something that divides human beings from 
non-human nature. It is the very thing that binds them hypostatically to all 
the living and the whole cosmos.’ 56  Moltmann’s criticism is that ‘the 
deification of cosmos is not thought of as being a new creation of heaven and 
earth.  It is seen as a spiritualization of the cosmos and its interpenetration 
by the radiance of the Spirit.  That lends an element of docetism to the 
doctrine of cosmic deification held by the Orthodox churches, and to their 
spirituality.’57 
Bulgakov is not always representative of Orthodox thought; however, he 
confirms Staniloae’s understanding of the union of hypostasis and nature.  
Nature and hypostasis are  equally necessary components of body.  And 
nature is a very part of God.  Thus, Bulgakov does take the step of confirming 
                                                 
53 Moltmann, Coming of God, 273. 
54 In Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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the cosmos as God’s image.   However, progressive spiritualization does not 
have to be docetic.  Indeed, it is an important way of making sense of human 
embodiment and cosmic history.  The principle of becoming requires time 
and process.  While Moltmann acknowledges that the new heaven and earth 
have some relationship to this earth he does not elaborate what this may be.  
Bulgakov’s theology can be seen as an attempt to explain this relationship as 
progressive spiritualization completed at some future time when the human 
fruit’s of labour have ripened sufficiently.  There is no imposition of God’s 
will in this process.  Creation was created in its entirety with everything 
needed for this eventuality in place.  Humanity’s free will was the 
indeterminate part of the equation resulting in the great imbalance between 
humanity and nature of the Fall.  Part of salvation history therefore included 
Christ’s incarnation.  Bulgakov’s Christ does suffer and die on the cross to 
overcome the effects of sin on earth.  But through this deed Christ, 
humanity’s prototype, becomes absolutely immanent to humanity and 
through humanity, to the world.  This is not docetism. 
For Bulgakov, the ontological principle dominates over the moral principle.  
Moltmann, too, in his later work also examines a kind of eschatological 
ecology and understands Christ to be ‘a hidden presence in the earth.’58  
Using the theology of Johann Beck, Moltmann’s predecessor at Tübingen, he 
proposes that it is this earth which ‘is the real and sensorily experienceable 
promise of the new earth.’59 He suggests a concept of mutual interpenetration 
that ‘makes it possible to preserve both the unity and the difference of what 
is diverse in kind: God and human being, heaven and earth, person and 
nature, the spiritual and the sensuous.’60  Although this may sound like a 
process of theosis it is not.  The key word is “promise.”  What we experience 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 279. 
59 Ibid. Original emphasis. 
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now is promise for the future, and this is the basis of hope.  It is God who 
will transform the world in the future, not humanity.  For Moltmann, 
humanity in Christ’s image remains a predominately social (or moral) 
principle.  Humanity conforms to Christ’s image in following his human 
deeds and in remembering his suffering.  Our hope lies in God’s resurrection 
of his Son, image of the godlessness of the world.  If God resurrects the one 
who was godforsaken and humiliated so God will make good the promise of 
the resurrection of the dead in the end times. 
In terms of my thesis on hope, this anthropological difference between 
Bulgakov and Moltmann is of critical importance.  On the one hand, 
Bulgakov believes that humanity contributes to and has a great 
responsibility for the transformation of the earth.  Humanity is a co-worker 
with God.  On the other hand, Moltmann proposes that humanity should 
take greater responsibility for the earth but his hope lies in God’s 
eschatological promise of transformation in the future.  There is no doubt 
humanity should take responsibility for the earth but I suggest that there is 
no real motivation to do so in a theology of hope that gives God the only 
power of transformation in the world.  A new understanding of human 
purpose may be necessary to inspire a hope that will motivate humanity to 
move out of its lethargy and depression and act with greater consciousness.  
I believe that a sense of individual purpose will help motivate each person 
towards change.  A theory of wholeness that incorporates change is the first 
s t e p .   I f  h o p e  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  b e l i e f that there is some correspondence 
between the human will to live and the world which supports and sustains 
life then Bulgakov’s theology is, indeed, a theology of hope.  In the aspects of 
his worldview that we have examined here, there is an intimate 
correspondence between human life and the world.  Indeed, human life has 
significance for the sanctification of the cosmos.   290  
The following conclusion will discuss the implications that such a theology 
of hope may have.  I will give an outline of my own theology of hope, 
presenting what I understand to be the necessary factors for engendering 
hope in life now, in the 21st century.  My hope is that from theory, praxis 
arises that brings what is in the head and the heart into the hands and the 
feet.    291  
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this dissertation I suggested that hope is based on the 
wager that there is some correspondence between the human will to live and 
the world which supports and sustains life, sometimes against all evidence 
to the contrary. I suggested that it is necessary to cultivate hope so that one 
has the courage and the will to live and work positively in the world.  Hope 
is needed as an antidote to despair and a sense of meaninglessness in life.  I 
proposed that each person can be an architect of hope, taking what is needed 
to construct a sense of meaning and purpose in one’s life.  If the definition of 
hope given above is correct then the most important structural element in 
one’s worldview of hope is that there is some connection between the 
human person and the world.  Since I am seeking a Christian worldview a 
theology of hope would also need to encompass a connection between God, 
humanity and the world. 
I have examined the worldviews of Jürgen Moltmann and Sergei Bulgakov 
from this perspective of hope.  I particularly examined their theologies for 
the connections between God, the world and humanity.  In the previous 
chapter I noted similarities in perspective as well as differences.  I proposed 
that Bulgakov has an implicit theology of hope.  I would now like to outline 
my own theology of hope using the building blocks of Moltmann’s and 
Bulgakov’s theologies.  I offer these insights as a work in progress towards 
challenging the notions of chance in existence and the insignificance of 
human life present in some scientific and postmodern worldviews.  I suggest 
that the theology of hope that I present here may be a more useful 
springboard of hope for life in the 21st century than some of the worldviews 
that we have inherited from the 20th century.   292  
The foundation for my theology of hope is Bulgakov’s sophiology because it 
is a complete system of connectedness between God, humanity and the 
world.  More than this, humanity has a meaning and a purpose in the world.  
Bulgakov, finding wisdom in a great diversity of sources, constructs a 
cosmic timeline for the world.  Human history has a beginning and a long 
process in time and what has happened in the past also has significance for 
the future.  Hope is not just to be found in the future (as in Moltmann’s 
theology of hope) hope may be found in the foundation of creation.  The 
path is also important on this timeline, as people are understood to be agents 
of creativity, change and transformation.   Bulgakov’s sophiology is a 
theology of hope because it reclaims human significance and agency in the 
world as a positive part of the world.  On this basis, I will now summarize 
the broad outlines of this system with reference to the areas previously 
discussed in this thesis.   
Bulgakov begins with the source of our existence, the triune God.  God is 
love in three persons, united in a perichoretic relationship of love.  The 
world is a result of God’s love and a mirror of God’s love.  The world is 
good.  The very structure of the world is also a mirror of the divine world.  It 
is created from God’s substance of love, from Sophia, and given reality by 
the Spirit and structure by the Son.  The world is created to realise all the 
abundant possibilities of God’s love.  For this purpose God creates a 
hypostatic principle within creation.  Humanity receives its spirit or ego 
from the personhood of the Trinity and its nature from God’s nature, the 
divine Sophia.  Humanity is a microcosm of God’s relationship to the 
godself’s nature, Sophia.  Thus the world of creation is a human world, 
consisting of hypostatic humanity and its sophian nature.  This means that 
there is an identity between the spirit perceived inside a human being and 
nature outside so that both are part of a unity that is Sophia.     293  
The original sophian creation is a state of neutral chaos.  This is the “not-
yet.”  Humanity is set next to its nature to come to full actualization in time 
and in freedom.  In the original creation, nature is transparent to the human 
spirit.  Humanity is given temporal existence to move forward in time and 
bring the chaos of nature into conformity with spirit.  However, humanity 
misunderstands the principle of freedom and this has disastrous 
consequences.  With the Fall the force of nonbeing becomes dominant in the 
world and becomes a sheer force of materiality, impenetrable to the spirit.   
The chaos of creation becomes the shadow of evil and death enters the 
world.  Humanity becomes alienated from its nature and weighed down by 
matter.  However, the original affinity between the divine nature and human 
nature makes it possible for the Son of God to incarnate and become the Son 
of Man.  Humanness exists in God prior to creation.  This is a key insight in 
Bulgakov’s theology.  Christ is the divine prototype of the human being and 
the incarnation is necessary to redeem humanity’s prototype so that 
humanity continues its path towards actualization. 
Consequently, through the incarnation Christ overcomes the power of the 
original Adamic sin.  This returns to humanity the possibility of conformity, 
of transparency in spirit and nature, of right relationship.  Human beings 
remain temporal beings of free will and continue a process in time towards 
right relationship.  This means for Bulgakov that humanity must learn that 
true freedom is divine-human cooperation.  Human beings are not greater 
than God.  The world is divinely ordered and humanity learns to creatively 
work in the world out of love for the world.  Humanity is the agency of 
transformation, working with Christ and the Spirit to reflect all the modes of 
God’s love in creation.  The Spirit and Christ work as an inseparable dyad in 
the world since Pentecost.  The final transfiguration of the eschaton is a work 
of the Spirit but the human spirit can also receive the Spirit’s gifts of 
sanctification and inspiration in its own journey in the world.  Here   294  
humanity participates in the process of sanctification—theosis—until the 
future time when the world is ready to receive the full glory of Christ, 
Divine-humanity.  Salvation is assured but there is a time of judgment when 
any sin committed will be experienced in Christ’s presence and measured 
against the image of Christ.  The purpose of this time of judgment is for 
purification in readiness for the final glorification so that God will be all in 
all.  The existence of this time of judgment in Bulgakov’s theology is an 
important aspect of theodicy. 
These are the broad brushstrokes of Bulgakov’s worldview, giving the 
structure for a theology of hope.  It is a theology of hope because it gives an 
intimate connection between God, the world and humanity.  It gives 
purpose and meaning to human existence.  Bulgakov’s sophian model is one 
of unity and interconnection.  Every atom is connected with the entire 
cosmos.  Every action affects the world.  Human beings are central to the 
world and are the all-important agents of change in the world.  Change does 
not refer to a process of making something out of what it is not.  Rather, it 
refers to a process of revelation, of revealing the true nature of the world.  
Bulgakov speaks of re-creation or even remembering, a process of revealing 
the spiritual nature of the physical world.  The human life is about forming 
right relationship with Sophia. 
A theology of hope needs to give hope in one’s life now.  Therefore, in 
outlining my own theology of hope I must be able to identify the practical 
implications of this sophian framework.  What does forming right 
relationship with Sophia mean for Christian praxis today?  The key word 
here is relationship.  Instead of the self-contained individual of the 
Enlightenment I propose that a concept of persons within a personal world 
is a more constructive basis for understanding right relationship. The 
perception that the outer world is separate and “other” is an illusion of   295  
materialistic thinking.  This has not always been so.  Moltmann gives a 
précis of the many cultures and religion throughout history that have 
experienced the earth as Mother.1  We can also understand Sophia as 
another name for the feminine presence in the world.  What may be helpful 
for a Christian perspective is that Bulgakov brings the concept of world 
mother into Christian theology.  The outer feminine nature of the world is a 
part of our inner nature.  Our world is a personal world.  This 
understanding may help one to dissolve the apparent boundaries between 
inner and outer in all the perceived oppositions in the world. 
What this means for Christian praxis is that the basis for relationships is 
commonality rather than otherness.  This includes the solidarity of 
Moltmann’s praxis, empathizing with the suffering of another.  This 
common ground of life should affect the way we think and the way we act in 
the world.  The need for a sustainable way of life is becoming more 
apparent.  To redress the imbalance of materialism I believe a worldview 
could even embrace more than sustainability—it could move beyond the 
principle of maintenance to the principle of giving more than one takes.  This 
could be the aspiration in all relationships, both in the “natural” world of the 
environment and in the personal world of human relationships.   
Both Bulgakov and Moltmann recognize that the world is not as it should be.  
As we have seen Moltmann’s response is to see the natural world of the 
environment as good and human intervention in the environment as 
damaging.  He suggests learning to be “at rest” with nature.  Bulgakov also 
recognizes the effects of sin on the world and that the balance between 
humanity and the creaturely Sophia is seriously disturbed.  Bulgakov 
nonetheless proposes an economy of human labour working with  nature.  
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The metaphysical ideal of the divine Sophia guides humanity in this labour 
of raising the world from chaos to cosmos.2  The concept of human 
interaction with the environment, however, is sensitive within social and 
environmental ethics and ecotheology.  The problem with Christian concepts 
of human labour is that nature is “other” and open for human 
manipulation.3  Bulgakov’s understanding of the relationship between 
humanity and nature is not based in manipulation or even human 
superiority over nature.  Humanity and nature are two parts of a whole.  
Nature is not “other” and the redemption of nature can only occur with the 
redemption of humanity.  These aspects of Bulgakov’s theology would be a 
worthy subject for future research.  They reclaim a useful humanistic (or 
personal) dimension which I suggest need to be heard in the current 
ecotheological debates. 
Human praxis in the natural world can also inform human relationships.  
Relationships are not about persons as “other” and therefore seen as objects 
of manipulation or usefulness.  Moltmann and Bulgakov point to the 
relationality and mutuality between the three persons of the Trinity as the 
highest model of love for humanity.  For Bulgakov, this relationship also 
manifests itself in God’s love overflowing to create another centre of love, 
Sophia.  The love of God for Sophia and of Sophia for God is also a model 
for human love and this is realized in its highest earthly form in human 
relationships.  A beautiful expression of this may be heard in Paul’s hymn to 
love in the marriage service: ‘And now faith, hope, and love abide, these 
three; and the greatest of all is love’ (1 Cor. 13: 13).  These words express the 
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mutuality of faith, hope and love, meaning that these attributes can only be 
expressed in relationship, whether human or divine.   
Such a path of faith, hope and love may seem misguided or unrealistic in the 
scenarios with which I began this dissertation.  How does one sustain hope 
in the face of worldwide media coverage that presents a daily dose of war, 
famine, environmental disaster and every evil imaginable?  Humanity’s 
ability to be destructive is well-documented.  Less publicised is humanity’s 
ability to be constructive.  In the face of the negative images in the media it is 
important to bring balance by seeking more positive pictures.  Some of the 
most encouraging findings of my research into hope came from the field of 
behavioural psychology.  A large-scale study of well-being discovered that, 
on the whole, most people’s outlook in life was positive.4  Yet far from being 
delusional, most self-reports of happiness are thought to be ‘reasonably 
reliable over time, despite changing life circumstances.’5  Other studies show 
that happiness is not essentially linked to materialism.  The growing 
affluence of the last four decades in North America, Europe and Japan has 
not been accompanied by increased happiness.6  After a certain level of 
economic comfort has been met, the greatest factor in well-being concerns 
personal relationships: ‘a mountain of data reveal that most people are 
happier when attached than when unattached.’7  Despite popular myth this 
is as much the case for women as for men.  Other major contributors to 
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happiness include good social support, close friendships, a sense of 
belonging and faith.8  These studies indicate that life on a small scale rather 
than a “newsworthy” scale is often more positive than negative.  Perhaps the 
world is a happier and more constructive place than we are led to believe.  If 
one cannot sustain a sense of hope for the greater world returning to a 
personal perspective may be a positive move.  The importance of 
relationships and of faith signposted in the above studies also supports my 
own thesis of hope. 
The main element of Bulgakov’s sophiology that I have described in my own 
theology of hope is that of the personal world as the basis of all 
relationships.  In a personal world there is no “other”: there are only 
possibilities for relationship.  I have suggested that giving more than one 
takes is a healthy basis for any relationship both environmental and 
personal.  I have also promoted involvement and interaction within the 
world as a positive human trait.  Indeed, this is the purpose of humanity in 
Bulgakov’s sophiology.  
I define a theology of hope as one which makes sense of the present as a path 
towards a meaningful and enlightened future.  Therefore, the major focus in 
this dissertation has sought to understand humanity’s place in the cosmos. 
Bulgakov’s theology returns humanity to its place as the agency of change 
and transformation in the cosmos, revealing the inherent wisdom, or 
sophianicity of creation.  On the one hand, there is a positive transformation 
of substance, of the physical, seen in the eucharist and in artistic and creative 
endeavours of humanity.  On the other hand, Bulgakov alludes to the 
positive and transformative power of prayer.  Theology about God is also a 
speaking to God.  Although the importance of prayer and worship to both 
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Moltmann and Bulgakov has not been described in any detail in this thesis, 
it is of fundamental importance to both.  Human knowing has its limits.  
Müller-Fahrenholz comments that when Moltmann faces the 
“ungraspability” of God he ‘moves from wanting to understand to 
worship.’9  The great mystery of God leads to wonder, praise and prayer.  
Above all, God is the source of our hope.  This thesis has emphasized human 
endeavour but that is only because a positive theology of human endeavour 
has been missing from discussions of Christian anthropology.  I suggest 
research into the concept of a personal world would help dissolve the 
currently perceived boundary between environmental ethics and Christian 
humanism.10 
The principle of human transformation as divine-human cooperation in its 
many forms is the tenet of my thesis.  What is outside us is a reflection of 
what is inside, it is a very part of us.  For this reason we can begin to change 
the way in which we interact with our own world.  Each microcosm is an 
important part of the macrocosm.  We cannot change the whole world but 
we can change our personal world.  Each overcoming of the chaos is 
important.  The challenge for each person in the 21st century is to build a 
sustainable worldview, or even a framework that gives more than it takes.  I 
suggest that recognizing Sophia who is a part of our very self can be an 
important step to treading more lightly on the earth.  The homo viator is on a 
journey to God and the journey can teach us to recognize the divine in the 
world so that we may also be ready when we meet God “face to face.”  On 
this journey I do not believe that faith in the God of the future is enough to 
sustain us.  I believe that it is time to renew our hope in humanity, knowing 
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the faith God has in us and knowing that humanity is created for the highest 
possible spiritual destiny.  It is in our lives with others that we learn how to 
love God.  Faith, hope and love for and in God is the basis of our faith, hope 
and love for and in humanity.  If God has faith in us, so we can have faith in 
humanity.  If God loves us, so we, too, can have love for humanity.  And if 
God has the highest hopes for the beings created in God’s image then we 
must trust God and hope for humanity also.  In this picture of the world 
each person is important.  So we can be architects of hope, for ourselves, for 
our neighbour and for the world.  We begin with hope in our own lives, 
knowing that it is through our own strivings that we contribute to our own 
good and the greater good. And this is a reason to hope.   301  
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